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Preface
The thesis contains three chapters, each of which studies a separate dimension of
inequality in modern labour markets. Each chapter analyses the individual-level
behaviours of workers or firms that underpin regional and aggregate distributional
features of labour markets. Together, they address cross-sectional wage inequality
policy at the national level, the propagation of labour market inequalities between
regions, and the impacts on employment inequalities of long term structural
changes in the labour market.
The first chapter considers the labour market propagation mechanisms of
minimum wages, a policy commonly used to support low-wage workers. Extensive
evaluations of minimum wages around the world typically find that higher minimum
wages do not generate increased unemployment but are associated with substantial
decreases in lower-tail wage inequality. The chapter provides the first empirical
test of one explanation; a substantial search and labour supply response is behind
the observed patterns.
The chapter identifies the impact of minimum wages on search, distinguishing
the decision of whether to search (extensive margin) from the decision of how hard
to search (intensive margin) for both non-working and working individuals. The
analysis combines data on UK workers’ search behaviour with quasi-experimental
analysis of the UK minimum wage policy structure. Results find an increase
in the number of individuals searching, but a decline in search intensity, and a
corresponding increase in the duration of unemployed search. There is no evidence
that workers already employed in low-wage jobs are discouraged from searching
for higher paying jobs. The chapter shows that these results are consistent with
search explanations of minimum wage labour market consequences.
The second chapter switches to addressing the spatial dimension of inequality,
particularly the mechanisms that generate diverging outcomes between regions.
The chapter models the individual firm employment responses to local shocks and
the contributions these make to driving unequal employment rates between local
regions.
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The chapter builds a spatial network of the universe of UK firms with near
pinpoint location accuracy and estimates the response of the local network to
adverse employment events. Results show that firms in close proximity to a large
mass layoff in turn reduce their own employment and that these negative spillovers
are highly localised. The strength of the negative spillovers approximately halves
for every kilometre further away from the event. The spillovers are also very
persistent, with further localised employment losses continuing for at least five
years after the event. In effect, a negative spiral is triggered at the local firm
level, through a combination of sluggish individual firm adjustment and local
agglomeration forces, and this can be used to explain the persistence in local
labour market outcomes. The chapter also develops a new method for analysing
spatial variation, and outlines the large costs associate with using more traditional
techniques.
The third chapter, which is co-authored with Antonio Dias Da Silva and
Filippos Petroulakis of the European Central Bank, is themed around the im-
pact of long term, structural changes on employment inequality. Technological
progress and deepening global integration have contributed to reduced middle-
skill employment in a process commonly referred to as employment polarisation.
Simultaneously, there has been a large decline in the number of hours worked per
worker in European economies.
The chapter investigates the relationship between hours per worker and em-
ployment polarisation, asking whether hours per worker follow similar polarisation
patterns. The analysis categorises occupations based on their task content, in
particular the type and degree of routinisation involved. Results find large relative
declines in hours per worker in routine manual jobs – precisely the occupations
most negatively affected by employment polarisation from routine-biased tech-
nical change. A lower relative decline in hours per worker is observed in higher
skilled jobs growing through polarisation. The patterns affect all age, gender and
education groups approximately equally. The chapter concludes by evaluating the
contribution of the hours per worker margin to overall employment polarisation.
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Chapter 1
Do minimum wages increase search
effort?
Abstract
This paper identifies the impact of minimum wages on search, distinguishing the
decision of whether to search (extensive margin) from the decision of how hard
to search (intensive margin) for both non-working and working individuals. The
analysis combines data on UK workers’ search behaviour with quasi-experimental
analysis of the UK minimum wage policy structure, including the 2016 introduction
of the National Living Wage. I find an increase in the number of individuals
searching, but a decline in search intensity, and a corresponding increase in the
duration of unemployed search. Overall, there is no change in employment rates.
The results are consistent with search explanations of minimum wage consequences.
In contrast, no significant estimates are found for any on-the-job search moments,
i.e. higher minimum wages do not provide a disincentive for workers to progress
up job ladders.
Keywords: search, minimum wages, labour supply response
JEL codes: E24, J21, J64
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2 CHAPTER 1. DO MINIMUM WAGES INCREASE SEARCH EFFORT?
1.1 Introduction
Large wage consequences concurrent with small employment consequences feature
regularly in the minimum wage empirical literature. The pattern of impacts is
often explained using search and matching theory yet direct evidence on search
adjustment has been difficult to date. This paper is, I believe, the first to
combine explicit evidence on search mechanisms and natural policy experiments
to directly estimate the impact of minimum wages on multiple search margins.
Using detailed data on search behaviour and minimum wage natural policy
experiments, I separately identify the impact of minimum wages on extensive
margin (participation) and intensive margin (effort) search for both employed
and non-employed individuals. The analysis uncovers new stylised facts on the
responsiveness of key labour market frictions to wage floor policies which are
consistent with search theoretic explanations of minimum wage impacts.
Since the seminal work of Card and Krueger (1994) the majority of empirical
findings on minimum wages have been inconsistent with the predictions of Wal-
rasian labour market models. Minimal or zero adverse employment consequences
are common microeconometric study results across diverse settings.1 Despite
the absence of employment consequences, significant wage increases in the lower
half of the distribution including spillovers to individuals not directly affected,
are attributed to minimum wages (see for example DiNardo et al. (1996); Lee
(1999); Teulings (2003); Autor et al. (2016); Engbom and Moser (2017)). The
most promising candidate explanations of the combined wage and employment
consequences stem from the search and matching literature. As argued, minimum
wages have potential to impact on the returns to extensive and intensive mar-
gin search decisions for both unemployed and employed job seekers, impacting
equilibrium unemployment and wage distributions.2
Given data constraints, much of the existing literature on minimum wages
and search has been required to treat search frictions as an unobservable black
box. Estimation has relied upon imposing structure on outcomes such as wages
1See for example Card and Krueger (2000, 2015), Dube et al. (2010), Kuehn (2016)) for the
USA, Stewart (2002, 2004b,a) Dolton et al. (2015) and Dickens et al. (2015), Manning (2016) for
the UK, Engbom and Moser (2017) for Brazil, Hyslop and Stillman (2007) for New Zealand and
others. It should be noted that some authors have measured negative employment consequences
of minimum wages in the USA, for example Neumark and Wascher (2000); Neumark et al.
(2007). Such results are normally generated through state-panel methodologies over many years.
Other authors, such as Dube et al. (2010), argue that the negative results are a consequence of
divergent residual state-level employment trends. UK research almost uniformly finds no large,
significant employment consequences.
2Seminal work on the topic is Pissarides (1990, 2000).
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and employment status to generate hypothesised search responses indirectly, for
example Bontemps et al. (1999) and Flinn (2006). Others, such as Dube et al.
(2016), prefer less structural methods and instead take stocks and flows between
labour market states as indirectly indicative of search behaviours. Outcome
data restricts how easily one can separately identify different search mechanism
responses. Potential search margin responses could include effort and participation
responses of both non-employed individuals versus those wishing to transition
between jobs.
This paper provides what appears to be the first direct evidence of minimum
wage impacts on multiple search adjustment mechanisms of individuals.3 I use
large survey data on both the extensive margin (searching or not searching) and
intensive margin (search effort exerted) for unemployed and on-the-job job seekers.
These data are combined with the unique and time-varying age tier structure of
United Kingdom minimum wage policy.
The bulk of this paper’s analysis focuses on a 2010 change in the age of
eligibility for the adult minimum wage from 22 years to 21 years: overnight, the
minimum wage for 21 year olds received a boost of nearly 23%. Minimum wages
for other age groups changed only in line with inflation, providing a well-identified
setting for quasi-experimental analysis. A difference-in-differences identification
strategy is used to estimate the treatment effect of the 23% increase in minimum
wages for 21 year olds, using non-targeted age groups as controls. I also investigate
the introduction of a fourth age category for those aged 25 years and over in
early 2016, and the full set of age-specific minimum wage changes since their
introduction in 1999.
Headline results find a large increase in minimum wages has no significant
impact on employment probabilities but significantly increases the incidence of
extensive margin unemployed search. Put differently, a larger proportion of
non-working individuals partake in unemployed job search relative to inactivity,
boosting labour force participation. Applied to a search framework, an increase in
the stock of job seekers reduces firm hiring costs. The zero aggregate employment
impacts suggests this is sufficient to outweigh any direct effect of higher minimum
wages on firm labour demand. The search-employment results also provide indirect
evidence that worker bargaining power and market clearing wages are set too
low relative to the levels suggested by the Hosios condition in search theory.4
3A contemporaneous working paper Adams et al. (2018) investigates search responses to US
minimum wages, but is restricted to unemployed search given data constraints.
4The Hosios condition states that for market clearing to provide optimal allocations, the
relative contribution of worker search and firm vacancy posting to the matching function should
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Higher minimum wages might therefore be a second-best approach to address the
allocation distortion.
I also find some evidence that average search intensity declines for unemployed
job seekers following the minimum wage rise and unemployment durations rise.
No statistically significant impacts are found for any search measure associated
with on-the-job searching. Potential claims that minimum wages disincentivise
progression up a job ladder are not supported by these results.
The contributions of the paper are threefold. Firstly, and most significantly, I
provide a direct test of search theory’s application to minimum wages and the
hypothesised adjustment mechanisms. Secondly, the analysis uncovers stylised
facts on search and labour force participation decisions that can be used to guide
future search modelling of minimum wage impacts. Finally, the results allow
an assessment of the consequences of the highly publicised, recent and planned,
increases minimum wages in the UK, from both an unemployment and job ladder
perspective.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the search
framework and testable implications for the empirical analysis. Section 1.3 outlines
the empirical context including the UK policy environment, the data and the
identification strategies used. Section 1.4 presents the estimated impacts of higher
minimum wages on unemployed search, including the extensive and intensive
margins of adjustment. Section 1.5 presents the analogous estimates for on-the-
job search. Section 1.6 outlines robustness checks undertaken and section 1.7
concludes.
1.2 Framework
1.2.1 Extensive margin search decision - participation
In a baseline search model, such as the one outlined in Appendix A.1, workers
are in one of two possible states: employed or unemployed but searching for a
job. In reality, many individuals are removed from the labour market (defined as
not employed plus not seeking employment and/or not able to work) for a variety
of reasons, including caring for family members, studying, and pursuing other
non-market activities. Binding minimum wages can only generate zero or positive
employment consequences if the baseline search model is augmented to include an
extensive margin search decision, elsewhere referred to as a labour supply decision.
equal their relative shares in the matching surplus. If workers’ bargaining shares are below this
level, equilibrium wages will be lower than socially optimal.
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To model the phenomenon, each individual has a flow value of remaining
outside the labour market and not searching, ρVO, where ρ is the discount rate,
and VO the stock value of the outside option.5 The ρVO are heterogeneous and
follow some distribution Q. An individual decides to enter the labour market if
the corresponding value of unemployed search, ρVU , is higher than their outside
option i.e. ρVU ≥ ρVO. The proportion of the population engaged in the labour
force - the participation rate - is therefore Q(ρVU).
Minimum wages enforce a lower bound of m on the feasible wage distribution,
and job matches with values less than m do not result in employment. Workers’
participation value of search is influenced by the distribution of possible jobs, hence
presence of the minimum wage, and workers will now search only if ρVU (m) ≥ ρVO.6
The search participation rate under minimum wages becomes Q(ρVU(m)) and
increases only if the value of unemployed search is increasing in the minimum
wage.
The search participation rate directly increases the number of vacancy-worker
matches,M(U, V ), asM is a positive function of the stock of unemployed searchers
U and vacancies V . The rate that a worker is matched with a job is the number of
matches over the stock of unemployed, λU = M(U, V )/U . This rate is decreasing
in the number of searchers - i.e. ∂λU
∂U
< 0 - which is a congestion externality imposed
by job search competitors. The expected duration of job search is the inverse
of the job finding rate, which is therefore increasing in the stock of unemployed
workers.
From a firm’s point of view, the probability that a vacancy will be filled is the
number of matches over the vacancy stock, λV = M(U, V )/V , and the expected
duration of a vacancy is 1/λV . λV is increasing in the search participation rate,
i.e. ∂λV
∂U
> 0, in effect decreasing the costly probability that a vacancy remains
unfilled. It is entirely possible for the value of reduced hiring frictions to outweigh
the direct impact of costlier wages on vacancy creation, generating zero or positive
employment consequences. Such an employment result is, however, only possible
if search participation is increasing in minimum wages.
Implication: Higher minimum wages can have a non-negative impact on
employment only if there is a corresponding increase in unemployed search.
5The form follows Pissarides (2000) and Flinn (2006). The outside option can be conceptu-
alised as a value of leisure, pursuing education, caring for family members and so on.
6Minimum wages have several possible effects on the value of unemployed search. Directly,
minimum wages lead to the destruction of the lowest productivity jobs (productivity θ < m)
and increase wages for those still profitable at m but previously paying less than m. Indirect
effects include adjustments to the number of vacancies created and the number of unemployed
individuals searching.
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1.2.2 Intensive margin search decision - effort
Vacancy-worker matches are also a positive function of the intensity with which
workers chooses to search. For an individual worker, their probability of a match,
λi, is increasing in their own search effort but, through congestion, decreasing in
the aggregate search effort, i.e. ∂λi
∂si
> 0 and ∂λi
∂s
< 0. Additional search effort is
costly for individuals, thus they will only exert effort up until the point where the
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of additional search.
There are two possible effects of minimum wages on search effort, as shown
more formally in Appendix A.1. Firstly, search effort is increasing in the offered
wage. Minimum wages that increase the wage offer distribution provide a stronger
incentive to find employment, increasing the return to search effort. Secondly, how-
ever, search effort is decreasing in the ratio of vacancies to unemployed searchers.
If minimum wages increase the number of searching individuals competing for jobs,
the congestion externality strengthens and the search effort of existing searchers
will decrease.
The combined effect influences the overall employment consequences of higher
minimum wages. A positive equilibrium effect of minimum wages on aggregate
search effort can augment extensive margin search impacts. Contrastingly, a
negative effect is likely to be a mitigating force.
Implication: Higher minimum wages have an ex ante ambiguous impact
on search intensity. The direction of change indicates whether the (positive)
wage consequences of minimum wages or the (negative) congestion externality
dominates.
1.2.3 On-the-job search
Minimum wages can theoretically impact on on-the-job search and therefore job-to-
job transitions up a job ladder. A primary question is whether individuals in low
productivity matches invest in searching for a higher productivity match. Workers
will choose to search on-the-job if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. The
benefit is the expected gain from a new job multiplied by the probability it occurs,
taking into account that only higher productivity jobs are accepted. The cost is
primarily the direct search cost, denoted σ.7
The first order implication of binding minimum wages is the reduction in the
7In Pissarides (2000), there is also a wage cost from searching. Wages are higher for non-
searchers than searchers because searching imposes the cost of a potential quit on the firm.
Firms observe whether their workers are searching so can adjust the wage to recoup some of
this cost.
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value of switching jobs arising from compression in the wage distribution. For jobs
with low values of productivity θ, where the minimum wage binds, the current
employment value is increasing in the minimum wage and the expected gain from
a new job is decreasing. As a consequence we are likely to see fewer job-to-job
transitions in particular from low-productivity jobs. Phrased differently, there is
concern that minimum wages disrupt the start of the job-ladder model.
Implication: Higher minimum wages can reduce the incentive to progress up
the job ladder, thereby reducing on-the-job search and job-to-job transitions.
1.3 Empirical setting
Following the abolition of the Wage Councils in 1993, no minimum wage legislation
existed in the United Kingdom until the introduction of the National Minimum
Wage (NMW) in April 1999. A youth rate, applicable to those aged 18-21 was set
at 83% of the adult rate and a lower rate for 16-17 year olds was introduced in
October 2003. The stratified levels of minimum wages have been updated annually
by a small amount, slightly altering the gap between the adult and youth rate
overtime as shown in Figure 1.1.8 The age categories themselves are adjusted
occasionally: on the 1st October 2010 the age of eligibility for the adult minimum
wage switched from 22 to 21 years old and on 1st April 2016 a fourth age category
was added with those aged 25 and over.
The primary data source used is the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS).
The QLFS is a large survey of households in the UK with detailed demographic,
geographic and labour force information on approximately 100,000 individuals
each quarter. The labour force data contain information on workers’ labour market
situation e.g. employment status and history, wages, occupation. Crucially, the
QLFS also includes comprehensive and highly detailed data on search behaviour
including search methods, intensity and durations. The data are provided for
both unemployed and employed job seekers, allowing analysis of unemployed
labour supply responses and desired job-to-job transitions. For comparison, the
equivalent data for the US data - the Current Population Survey (CPS) - only
records search information for unemployed individuals.
A limitation with the QLFS is the accuracy of the wage data arising from
individual self-reporting. Wage analysis is therefore carried out using the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). The ASHE is a 1% sample of employees
8A separate minimum wage applies to individuals on apprenticeship schemes however this is
not shown in the figure.
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Figure 1.1: United Kingdom minimum wage policy structure
Source: Low Pay Commission
totaling around 150-200,000 individuals per year. The data on hours and earnings
are employer reported from payroll records and response is compulsory. As a
consequence it is deemed to have less measurement error than the QLFS.
1.3.1 Regression framework
The key empirical question is the impact of minimum wage levels and subsequent
adjustment of the wage offer distribution on the three search mechanisms discussed
in section 3. To identify the ‘treatment effect’ of minimum wages, I use quasi-
experimental methodology around age-tier policy changes.
The bulk of the analysis focuses on the change in the eligibility age for the
adult minimum wage from 22 years to 21 years on the 1st October 2010. The
minimum wage applicable to 21 year olds jumped nearly 23% from the reduced
youth minimum wage rate of £4.83 to the adult rate of £5.93 overnight. A
difference-in-differences approach is applied, where the ‘treatment’ group is 21
year olds and the primary ‘control’ group is 22-23 year olds.9
9Some attention is paid to the recent introduction of a fourth age tier to those aged 25 and
over on 1 April 2016. The minimum wage increased from £6.70 to £7.20 (an increase of around
7.5%) - smaller in financial terms but applicable to a much larger group. Here, those aged 25
and over are the ‘treatment’ group and those aged 21-24 the most obvious ‘control’ group.
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The baseline regression framework follows the familiar difference-in-differences
functional form:
Yigt = α0 + α1Gg + α2dt + δ(Gg ∗ dt) +X ′igtβ + igt (1.1)
Yigt is the search outcome of individual i in age-group g at time t. There
are two age groups for each policy change: g ∈ {treatment, control}. Gg equals
one if individual i is in the treatment group (g = treatment) and zero otherwise,
dt equals one if time t is after the policy change and zero if before, and Gg ∗ dt
is an interaction between the two. The difference-in-differences estimate of the
treatment effect is the coefficient on the interaction term, δ. Other covariates,
Xigt can be added in as controls to improve the precision of estimation. If the
difference-in-differences strategy is correctly specified controls should not alter the
point estimates significantly.
Section 1.6 addresses in detail potential identification concerns surrounding
the framework. In short, the approach passes the general tests (parallel trends,
no contemporaneous policies etc) and several setting specific concerns.
At times, the analysis is extended to include all minimum wage variation since
the introduction. The following functional form captures age threshold changes
and the variation in the ratio of adult-to-youth minimum wages:
Yigt = α + λGg + γdt + δlog(minwageigt) +X
′
igtβ + igt (1.2)
The only difference to previous regressions is the replacement of the difference-
in-differences interaction dummy with the log of individual i ’s legal minimum
wage.
1.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 present descriptive statistics to give context to the core
analysis. Table 1.1 shows fractions of the sample engaged in various labour market
activities. The sample of individuals are those within 24 months of the policy
change in October 2010, calculated for both the regression sample (21-23 year
olds) and for the general working age population.
The labour market activities are generated from the QLFS. Two alternative
pairs of ‘searching’/‘not searching’ categories are defined as follows. ‘Unemployed’
refers to the International Labour Organisation definition of unemployment -
individuals actively seeking work and available to begin work. ‘Inactive’ is the
complement - individuals who are not actively seeking work and/or unavailable to
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
21-23 year olds 16-64 year olds
% N % N
Working 62.68 33,459 69.96 753,728
Unemployed 11.91 6,358 5.73 61,732
Student 14.32 7,645 5.47 58,918
Inactive 11.09 5,919 18.84 203,030
Total 100 53381 100 1,077,408
Not working: Searching 13.29 7,094 6.40 68,961
Not working: Not searching 10.44 5,574 18.45 198,829
Of those working:
No on-the-job search 86.39 28,953 93.52 705,340
On-the-job search 13.61 4,561 6.48 48,848
Of those searching on the job:
Want a replacement job 87.69 3,966 83.74 40,468
Want an additional job 12.31 557 16.26 7,855
Table presents sample percentages and counts of individuals within 24months
of Oct 2010. Working, unemployed, student and inactive are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive categories. Searching and Not Searching have slight definitional
changes from Unemployed and Inactive. Source: Quarterly labour force survey:
Secure Access.
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Figure 1.2: Log(wage) distribution for 18-25 year olds
Kernel density plot of log hourly wage, excluding overtime. The blue and red vertical bars
represent youth and adult minimum wage rates respectively. Source: ASHE 2010
begin work. As a consequence, individuals searching for work but unavailable to
work are classified as ‘inactive’. This subset of non-employed searching individuals
is still of interest, so the second ‘Searching’ category adds these individuals to the
ILO ‘unemployed’ workers to create a full set of non-employed searchers. ‘Not
searching’ is its complement - the remainder of inactive individuals. ‘Student’
refers to individuals who are inactive as a consequence pursuing educational
activities.
Figure 1.2 presents a kernel density graph of the log hourly wage distribution
with vertical lines for 2010 youth and adult minimum wages superimposed, cal-
culated prior to the October adult rate change of that year.10 The two density
peaks around the minimum wage rates clearly show the impact of multiple age
tiers on the distribution.
Appendix A.3 includes additional descriptives for interested readers. Table
A.1 discretises the wage distribution into minimum wage categories, which demon-
strates that over 10% - i.e. a sizeable fraction - of 21 year olds earn below the adult
minimum wage immediately prior to the policy change (when they, by law, must
be paid the higher rate). The directly treated group of 21 year olds is therefore
sizeable. Table A.2 presents descriptives on search intensity variables.
10These are employer reported weekly wages divided by employer reported paid hours, exclud-
ing overtime for both hours and pay, all sourced from the (unweighted) Annual Survey of Hours
and Earnings, 2010.
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1.4 Unemployed search results
As discussed in the framework section, for minimum wages to have no employment
consequences there must be an increase in unemployed search. Therefore, the core
analysis begins with estimating the impact of the increased minimum wages on
the probability of employment and unemployed search behaviour.
The baseline extensive margin search results asks whether non-working 21
year olds switch from not-searching (inactivity) to searching (unemployment) in
response to a 23% increase in the minimum wage in 2010, and whether employment
rates are affected. A system of linear probability models, using the difference-in-
differences identification, is estimated on the mutually exclusive and exhaustive
set of labour market outcomes - working, unemployed (i.e. searching) and inactive
(i.e. not searching).11 Errors are clustered at the age-region level to account
for non-spherical errors associated with difference-in-differences.12 I include all
individual observations 24 months either side of the policy change (1st October
2010) who are aged between 21 and 23 years of age.13
Table 1.2 presents the baseline unemployed search results for the linear prob-
ability system. I control for individuals’ sex, region of residence (defined at the
NUTS2 level), the quarter of the observation, various measures of educational
attainment, marital status, ethnicity and occupation.14 I also include a variable
referred to as ‘proxy’ which controls for whether the survey was a proxy response
by a family member rather than the individual themselves, known to introduce
more measurement error.
The estimated treatment effect for the probability of employment is insignificant
and small, implying the higher minimum wage has no measurable impact on the
propensity for 21 year olds to be in work. A zero employment consequence result
is in line with most of the previous UK minimum wage literature.
Consistent with search theoretic explanations of a zero employment conse-
quence, we see a corresponding significant increase in unemployed search and a
decrease in search inactivity. The result should be interpreted as higher mini-
11Probit and multivariate logit models are also estimated and produce similar estimates.
Given the ease of interpretation, and weaker identification requirements, the paper presents
the linear probability versions. Athey and Imbens (2006) discuss the additional error structure
assumptions for identification in non-linear difference-in-differences models.
12Bertrand et al. (2004). Age is defined in years, region is defined by the NUTS2 level
geographic region of residence. This gives 117 clusters.
13For most of the analysis, individuals removed from the labour market due to full time
education are omitted. Robustness checks verify that this is not driving the results.
14Table A.3 in Appendix A.4 presents the results without any controls - reassuringly the
inclusion of controls does not change the treatment estimates.
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Table 1.2: Baseline unemployed search estimates - extensive
margin
(1) (2) (3)
Working Unemployed Inactive
Post -0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗ 0.0112∗∗
(0.00588) (0.00429) (0.00438)
Age 21 -0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.00588
(0.00788) (0.00602) (0.00527)
Post*Age 21 -0.00403 0.0205∗∗ -0.0164∗∗
(0.0110) (0.00835) (0.00744)
Constant 0.607∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0151) (0.0216)
Observations 45736 45736 45736
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is
21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital
status, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
mum wages increasing the share of extensive margin search among non-working
individuals. The increase is in the order of two percentage points from a base of
around twelve percentage points (from the descriptive statistics), so is therefore
economically significant too.
The analysis is also repeated with the alternative pairing of ‘searching’/‘not
searching’ variables - including searching but unavailable workers into the ‘search-
ing’ category. The results are unchanged. Secondly, I use an entirely separate
variable from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey that asks individuals, under a
different question, whether they have been searching for work at any point in the
last four weeks. Again, the results find an increase in extensive margin search
in response to the minimum wage increase. Taken together, the results do not
appear to be driven by data definition quirks.
An amount of analysis was undertaken to test if the treatment estimates varied
by educational attainment, region of residence and gender. One would expect
minimum wage policy to impact less educated groups more strongly than highly
educated groups. One might also expect estimated impacts of minimum wages to
be higher in low wage areas, where the minimum wage is more locally binding. By
stratifying the sample on education and regional income levels, it was found that
low education individuals are driving the baseline results for unemployed search.
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Put differently low educated workers appear far more impacted by the minimum
wage than their highly educated counterparts. The results however did not vary
significantly across regions by local median wages. There was some evidence that
the extensive margin search response of men was slightly stronger than that of
women, but overall both genders exhibit similar patterns.
Concern may be raised about the external validity of focussing on a single,
albeit clean, minimum wage wage change. To address the issue, I also re-ran
the difference-and-differences analysis on the high profile 2016 introduction of
the National Living Wage - effectively a higher minimum wage for those aged
25 and over. I then extended the analysis to include all minimum wage variety
since the introduction in 1999 - effectively all the age-tier changes and upgrading -
confirming the findings.
1.4.1 Unemployed search intensity
The above results suggest a robust increase in the number of unemployed searchers
in response to the higher minimum wage for 21 year olds in 2010. The next
question is to ask how this impacted on the search effort exerted by unemployed
searchers.
‘Effort’ by its very nature is a rather intangible concept. Using the Quarterly
Labour Force Survey search data, I have constructed what can be thought of
as noisy measures of an individual’s search effort. These are available for both
unemployed job seekers and employed job seekers, searching on-the-job.
In the QLFS, individuals who have already acknowledged that they are seeking
a job then list off the primary and secondary methods by which they seek a job.
Fourteen different search methods are included in the tabulated results, including
‘Visit a Jobcentre’, ‘Study situations vacant’, ‘Ask friends, relatives, colleagues’
and ‘On books at a private employment agency.’ Individuals indicate their main
search method followed, in decreasing order, by any other search methods they
use.
The first summary measure of ‘search effort’ is a simple count of the number of
methods an individual uses to search. The logic is that if an individual indicates
that they are searching using multiple methods, they are likely to be investing
more effort than if only searching with a single measure.
The majority of respondents (90%) only acknowledge one search method
and there is a long tail of respondents acknowledging many search methods. In
response, the second summary measure is simply a binary variable equal to one if
the individual acknowledges more than one method.
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The third measure categories the level of effort based on the main method
acknowledged. Many of the options can be deemed ‘low commitment’, or passive,
search methods such as ‘On books of private employment agency,’ ‘Wait for results
of application.’ Others are more likely to require considerable effort exertion
and can therefore be considered active search methods. For example ‘Answer
job advertisements,’ ‘Apply directly to employers.’ All fourteen answers were
categorised as either passive or active, with the full list in Appendix A.2. A binary
variable, ‘Active’, was created that equals one if the main search method used is
active, and zero if passive.
I begin by investigating the response of unemployed search intensity to the
2010 minimum wage change. Again, the baseline difference-in-differences method
is used and those aged 21-23 years old and surveyed 24 months either side of the
policy comprise the core sample.
Table 1.3: Unemployed search intensity estimates - intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: Active >1 methods # methods # methods
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Post -0.0451∗∗∗ 0.0101 0.0292 0.0192
(0.0153) (0.00907) (0.0476) (0.0261)
Age 21 0.0298∗ 0.00911 0.0394 0.0267
(0.0175) (0.0104) (0.0546) (0.0299)
Post*Age 21 -0.0168 -0.0262∗ -0.112 -0.0789∗
(0.0242) (0.0144) (0.0754) (0.0416)
Constant 0.643∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 2.120∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.0352) (0.185) (0.100)
Observations 6990 6990 6990 6990
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side
of 2010 policy change who are not in work and are searching for a job. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status,
ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.3 presents the initial results by estimating whether unemployed job-
seekers search more intensely in response to the minimum wage change. Columns
one and two are the classic linear probability model using the binary variables
‘Active’ and ‘Multiple search methods’ respectively. Negative treatment point
estimates are estimated, but only the second is weakly significant. Columns three
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Table 1.4: Unemployed search intensity estimates - correcting
for selection
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome: Active >1 methods # methods
Post -0.0441∗∗∗ 0.00983 0.0237
(0.0151) (0.00896) (0.0474)
Age 21 0.0299∗ 0.00750 0.0368
(0.0173) (0.0103) (0.0545)
Post*Age 21 -0.0202 -0.0272∗ -0.125∗
(0.0240) (0.0142) (0.0753)
Constant 0.668∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗
(0.0597) (0.0353) (0.188)
Select eq.
Post 0.0324 0.0324 0.0344
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0278)
Age 21 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0318)
Post*Age 21 0.0755∗ 0.0755∗ 0.0946∗∗
(0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0444)
Constant 0.115 0.115 0.0737
(0.102) (0.102) (0.103)
Lambda -0.0575∗∗∗ -0.0371∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗
(0.0169) (0.0100) (0.0527)
Observations 19922 19922 19922
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months
either side of 2010 policy change who are not in work. The selection equa-
tion includes all controls and treatment variables alongside a variable for
studying - the exclusion restriction. Heckman selection model estimated
by two-step maximum likelihood. Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2
level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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and four use the actual number of search methods reported, estimating the model
with standard OLS and maximum likelihood Poisson respectively. Given the low
count data nature of the variable, column four is likely a better specification.
Column four again finds negative and weakly significant treatment estimates.
Table 1.3 only includes those already searching for a job and thus is potentially
susceptible to selection bias. In response, Table 1.4 present Heckman selection
corrected regressions.15 Consistent with the extensive margin search results, a
significant positive treatment effect is estimated in the probit selection equation.
Intensive margin results are similar to those with no selection correction: negative
point estimates are found all around, but these are only weakly significant for the
second and third columns: the variables for using multiple search methods. The
significance of the mills lambda estimates suggests that selection is an important
part of the regression fit, however excluding it does not appear to cause bias for
any outcome variable investigated.
Tables A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A.4 repeat the above regressions on strati-
fications of the sample by education and regional income. As for the extensive
margin results, it appears that the negative treatment estimates are driven by low
education individuals. Highly educated individuals do not have any significant
treatment estimates. Again, no major differences between higher and lower median
wage regions are uncovered.
1.4.2 Unemployed search duration
Job seeking duration is an additional search moment for which to test the theory.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 present the standard difference-in-differences regressions for self-
reported unemployed job seeking durations. Durations are provided at the point
of the QLFS interview not at the point of finding a job therefore the job seeking is
ongoing. Respondents are grouped into discrete time categories such as “less than
one month" and “between one and three months" rather than reporting precise
durations, thus the mid-point of each time category is taken as the approximated
time spent searching for each individual respondent. Two outcome variables are
used in separate instances: one is the self-reported unemployment duration (as, by
definition, unemployment must involve job-seeking) which is referred to as TimeA.
Respondents are separately asked how long they have been searching for a job,
and this outcome variable is referred to as TimeB. TimeB is generally shorter
15As is common place with Heckman selection models, an exclusion restriction is used: the
variable ‘Student’ is included in the selection equation but not the intensive margin equation. It
seems realistic that full time studying should impact on an individual’s decision to search or
not, but perhaps less so on how hard they search once deciding to search.
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than TimeA. Reassuringly, both responses give qualitatively identical results.
Table 1.5 presents pure linear regressions of the expected time spent job-seeking
while Table 1.6 formally corrects for those selecting into searching. Significant,
positive treatment estimates are found for both the selection equation (implying
more individuals search in response to the higher minimum wage, consistent with
previous findings) and the intensive margin duration equation. More individuals
may be searching, but on average they are searching for longer. When stratified on
education level (in Appendix A.4), again the duration results appear to be mostly
driven by low education individuals. As for the search intensity results, none
of the intensive margin treatment estimates appear biased by the exclusion of a
selection correction - all regressions were run with and without selection correction
and no significant differences were uncovered for the estimated treatment effect.
Table 1.5: Unemployed search duration estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TimeA TimeA TimeB TimeB
Post 0.895 1.418∗∗ 1.265∗ 1.841∗∗
(0.703) (0.704) (0.714) (0.724)
Age 21 -1.329∗ -1.518∗∗ -1.384∗ -1.609∗∗
(0.727) (0.616) (0.738) (0.632)
Post*Age 21 2.985∗∗∗ 2.529∗∗ 2.861∗∗∗ 2.394∗∗
(1.031) (0.977) (1.058) (1.007)
Constant [Witheld] 19.14∗∗∗ [Witheld] 20.86∗∗∗
(1.875) (2.229)
Observations 5096 5096 5087 5087
Controls No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. TimeA is unemployment
searching duration, TimeB is job-seeking duration, both self-reported. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status,
ethnicity, occupation. The constants in columns 1 and 3 are witheld according to
the UK Data Service statistical disclosure controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Unemployed search duration estimates - selection correction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: TimeA TimeA TimeB TimeB
Post 3.064∗∗∗ 1.362∗ 1.275∗∗ 1.587∗∗∗
(0.547) (0.699) (0.565) (0.562)
Age 21 -0.188 -1.539∗∗ -1.340∗∗ -1.261∗∗
(0.728) (0.611) (0.666) (0.516)
Post*Age 21 2.905∗∗∗ 2.504∗∗ 2.335∗∗∗ 1.848∗∗
(0.921) (0.974) (0.867) (0.839)
Constant [Witheld] 19.43∗∗∗ [Witheld] 21.85∗∗∗
(1.919) (1.775)
Selection eq.
Post 0.169∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.0330 0.0199
(0.0277) (0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0322)
Age 21 0.00249 0.0664∗ 0.0667 0.0660∗
(0.0378) (0.0387) (0.0439) (0.0379)
Post*Age 21 0.188∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0559) (0.0476) (0.0497)
Constant [Witheld] 0.355∗∗∗ [Witheld] 0.168∗
(0.0985) (0.0918)
athrho
Constant 2.951∗∗∗ -0.0368 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.0293) (0.0203) (0.0207)
lnsigma
Constant 2.923∗∗∗ 2.588∗∗∗ 2.641∗∗∗ 2.564∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0250)
Observations 19922 19922 19922 19922
Controls No Yes No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included: sex,
region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity and occupation.
TimeA refers to self-reported unemployment searching duration. TimeB is a
separate self-reported measure of time spent job-seeking. The two are similar, but
generally TimeB is shorter than TimeA. The constants in columns 1 and 3 are
witheld according to the UK Data Service statistical disclosure controls.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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1.4.3 Relating the unemployed search results to theory
To summarise and relate back to the search theory implications: the results have
found no change in the probability of employment and the required corresponding
increases in unemployed searchers. In this situation, it appears that minimum
wages increase the value of unemployed searching and the corresponding increase
in unemployed searchers prevents employment destruction. Put differently, the
positive labour supply response, and the subsequent reduction in firm hiring costs,
is sufficient to outweigh any direct negative effect on firms’ labour demand. The
increased search concurrent with zero employment impacts is also indirect evidence
that the Hosios condition is not satisfied.16 In particular, the results suggest that
worker bargaining power (in the low wage portion of the labour market) is set
too low relative to workers’ search contribution to the matching function. Market
clearing wages and employment levels are below the socially optimal allocated.
Higher minimum wages can provide a second-best redress in such a situation.17
There is some evidence of decreased average intensity, which if robust, suggests
that the congestion externality of more searchers dominates the direct effect of
higher wages. Overall, the returns to search effort appear to have decreased.
Consistent with more searchers (congestion) and potentially lower search effort,
the duration of unemployed search increases.
1.5 On-the-job search
As discussed in the framework section, search and matching models of job ladders
would suggest that minimum wages may disrupt on-the-job search, and hence the
job ladder, by weakening incentives to progress to higher productivity matches.
To test this hypothesis, as before, I use a combination of difference-in-differences
identification strategy around policy changes and pooled regressions of the entire
set of minimum wage variations. An individual is categorised as searching on
the job if they answer affirmatively to whether or not they are looking for an
additional paid job or business. If they are, they then clarify whether it is to
be an additional job or a replacement job for their current position. The vast
majority of respondents are looking for a replacement job - consistent with a job
ladder model.
16The Hosios condition states that for market clearing to provide optimal allocations, the
relative contribution of worker search and firm vacancy posting to the matching function should
equal their relative shares in the matching surplus.
17The theoretical framework and relevance of the Hosios condition to minimum wages is
discussed in more detail in Flinn (2006).
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Table 1.7: Baseline on-the-job search estimates - extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OJS (all) OJS (all) OJS (new) OJS (new) Replace
Post 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0196
(0.00593) (0.00582) (0.00473) (0.00465) (0.0139)
Age 21 -0.00615 -0.00456 -0.00963 -0.00765 -0.0239
(0.00835) (0.00783) (0.00720) (0.00669) (0.0191)
Post*Age 21 0.00488 0.00576 0.00387 0.00426 -0.00864
(0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0240)
Constant [Witheld] 0.187∗∗ [Witheld] 0.201∗∗ 0.993∗∗∗
(0.0933) (0.0927) (0.0582)
Observations 33392 33392 33354 33354 4488
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23 year olds,
24 months either side of 2010 policy change who are in work. Controls included: sex,
region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity and occupation.
Columns 1-2 are LPM with the dependent variable equal to one if an individual is searching
for any job. Columns 3-4 are LPMs for an individual searching for a replacement job.
Column 5 is, of those searching for a job, the likelihood of searching for a replacement job
not an additional job.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: On-the-job search intensity estimates - intensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Active >1 methods # methods # methods
OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Post -0.0392∗∗ -0.00326 -0.0647∗ -0.0534
(0.0161) (0.00898) (0.0372) (0.0335)
Age 21 0.0317 0.00675 -0.00420 -0.00388
(0.0210) (0.0118) (0.0487) (0.0434)
Post*Age 21 -0.0161 0.00138 0.0903 0.0736
(0.0287) (0.0160) (0.0664) (0.0592)
Constant 0.333∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 1.643∗∗∗ 0.519∗
(0.132) (0.0736) (0.305) (0.272)
Observations 4529 4529 4529 4529
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side
of 2010 policy change who are in work and are searching for a new job. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status,
ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.7 presents baseline results linear probability models for the estimated
treatment effect of the 2010 policy change on the propensity to search on the job.
Columns 1 and 2 use a dependent variable Yigt that refers to the default measure
of on-the-job search, labelled OJS. This equals one if the individual is undertaking
any form of on-the-job search. Column 3 and 4 redefines on-the-job search as only
occurring if the individual is looking for a replacement job and zero if the are either
not searching, or searching for an additional job. This brings the definition more
in line with the notion of a job-ladder. Finally, column 5 investigates whether
those individuals already searching are more likely to search for a replacement
job versus an additional job following the policy change. There, the dependent
variable ‘Replace’ equals one if the job they are searching for is intended to replace
their existing one and zero if it is in addition to their existing job. As can be
observed, all estimated treatment effects are not statistically distinguishable from
zero.
Similar to the unemployed search analysis, I further investigate whether the
estimated treatment effects vary by sub-populations. I interact the treatment term
with educational attainment, and split the sample into high and low educated
individuals as shown in Table A.11 in Appendix A.5. There is no statistical
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Table 1.9: On-the-job search intensity estimates - correcting for
selection
(1) (2) (3)
Active >1 methods # methods
Post -0.0256 -0.0186 0.143
(0.0720) (0.0405) (0.202)
Age 21 0.0287 0.0101 -0.0501
(0.0262) (0.0151) (0.0891)
Post*Age 21 -0.0123 -0.00283 0.147
(0.0347) (0.0201) (0.121)
Constant 0.0655 0.531 -2.432
(1.382) (0.775) (3.782)
Selection eq.
Post 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0220)
Age 21 -0.0231 -0.0231 -0.0231
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277)
Post*Age 21 0.0274 0.0274 0.0274
(0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0387)
Constant -1.088∗∗∗ -1.088∗∗∗ -1.088∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.196) (0.196)
Lambda 0.167 -0.188 2.540
(0.857) (0.480) (2.332)
Observations 33459 33459 33459
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months
either side of 2010 policy change who are in work. The selection equa-
tion includes all controls and treatment variables. Heckman selection
model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status,
ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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difference in the estimated treatment effects, either in the split sample or the
interaction term regressions. I also test to see whether the estimated treatment
effect varies by regional wages. These results are presented in Tables A.12 and
A.13 in Appendix A.5. Again, the answer appears to be that all regions have
statistical zero estimated treatment effects.
In short, no evidence of causal impact of minimum wages on on-the-job search
is uncovered, either overall or in any sub-population. It appears that, at least in
this setting, no significant impact on the intent to change jobs can be uncovered.
Table 1.10: On-the-job search duration estimates
Baseline By education By regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Low High Poor Rich
Post 1.745∗∗∗ 1.806∗∗∗ 1.892∗∗∗ 1.457∗∗∗ 1.987∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗
(0.399) (0.395) (0.601) (0.475) (0.624) (0.574)
Age 21 -0.764∗ -1.292∗∗∗ -1.044∗ -1.942∗∗∗ -1.540∗∗∗ -1.112∗
(0.441) (0.381) (0.539) (0.590) (0.532) (0.578)
Post*Age 21 -0.721 -0.455 -0.383 -0.444 -0.329 -0.727
(0.599) (0.573) (0.779) (0.965) (0.839) (0.870)
Constant [Witheld] 18.82∗∗∗ 26.47∗∗∗ 6.267∗∗∗ 28.73∗∗∗ 8.915∗∗∗
(5.078) (7.101) (1.916) (8.367) (2.447)
Observations 4503 4503 2584 1891 2206 2090
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23 year olds,
24 months either side of 2010 policy change. TimeA is unemployment searching duration,
TimeB is job-seeking duration, both self-reported. Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2
level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity, occupation. Columns include
1-2 all individuals, 3-4 split the sample by educational attainment, 5-6 by regional income.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Despite not finding evidence that minimum wage changes impact on employed
individuals’ propensity to search on the job, there remains a possibility that
search effort changes for those already searching. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 repeat the
search intensity analysis for those individuals employed and potentially searching
on-the-job. The same search measures are used and, again, a mixture of regressions
that include only those already searching (ignoring selection) and those that deal
with selection are presented. The sample is stratified along education and regional
income lines. Nowhere do I find a significant treatment estimate of minimum
wages for on-the-job search intensity. It appears that any adjustment is again
restricted to unemployed job seekers.
1.5. ON-THE-JOB SEARCH 25
Table 1.11: On-the-job search duration estimates - selection correction
Baseline By education By regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All Low High Poor Rich
Post 2.111∗∗∗ -1.613 -9.262 2.681 -1.827 -1.223
(0.332) (3.375) (37.17) (2.060) (5.016) (4.331)
Age 21 -0.866∗ -0.522 -3.555 -3.502 -2.431 3.047
(0.457) (1.577) (9.820) (2.676) (2.103) (6.717)
Post*Age 21 -0.641 -1.378 -2.366 -0.371 -0.527 -4.403
(0.631) (2.128) (9.868) (1.283) (2.435) (6.501)
Constant [Witheld] 89.66 212.8 -12.80 88.65 78.54
(66.39) (616.1) (31.10) (76.17) (105.2)
Selection eq.
Post 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.0600∗
(0.0206) (0.0216) (0.0281) (0.0346) (0.0312) (0.0313)
Age 21 -0.0308 -0.0216 0.0212 -0.133∗∗ 0.0277 -0.0968∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0278) (0.0327) (0.0554) (0.0402) (0.0406)
Post*Age 21 0.0238 0.0249 0.0181 0.00181 0.00492 0.0859
(0.0377) (0.0388) (0.0461) (0.0782) (0.0556) (0.0571)
Constant [Witheld] -1.030∗∗∗ -0.718∗∗∗ -0.618∗ -0.981∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.262) (0.357) (0.285) (0.256)
Lambda 4.067∗∗∗ -45.41 -142.1 15.13 -39.59 -53.72
(0.150) (42.11) (469.0) (24.26) (49.66) (80.42)
Observations 33459 33459 23593 9482 15814 15677
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010
policy change who are in work. Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy,
marital status, ethnicity and occupation. TimeA refers to self-reported unemployment searching
duration. Model is a Heckman selection model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Finally, Tables 1.10 and 1.11 repeat the durations analysis for on-the-job search
durations. Only one outcome variable is available; the self-reported duration
of search, equivalent to TimeB in the unemployed job-seeking analysis. No
statistically significant effects are found either on the intensive or extensive
margin. Again this is fully consistent with earlier on-the-job search results.
1.5.1 Relating the on-the-job search results to theory
Interestingly, there is no on-the-job search measure - probability of searching,
search effort or duration of searching - that produces significant treatment estimates
from minimum wages. A statistically zero result such as this is important in
its own right. It should be interpreted as there being no measurable impact of
minimum wages on a worker’s desire to transition jobs. Here, at least, it appears
that concerns over higher minimum wages incentivising individuals to remain in
low productivity jobs are not substantiated.
1.6 Robustness checks
As for any difference-in-differences identification strategy, the underlying assump-
tions are tested where possible. I test the common trends identification requirement
by looking for statistically significant differences in time trends between treatment
and control groups prior to the policy change. I do this in a number of ways.
Firstly, outcomes of interest are regressed on an intercept, the treatment dummy,
a collection of time dummies dt and those time dummies interacted with the
treatment group, dt ∗Gg. Significant coefficients on the interaction terms, α2,τ ,
leading up to the policy change would indicate that the treatment and control
groups were diverging prior, a likely violation of the common trends assumption.
To formalise, for each outcome variable of interest, the following regression
was run for 21-23 year olds, our sample of interest:
Yigt = α0 + α1Age21 +
T∑
τ=−T
βτdτ +
T∑
τ=−T
γτ (Age21 ∗ dτ ) + igt (1.3)
These were undertaken for both annual time dummies and quarterly time
dummies. When it came to quarterly regressions, seasonal fixed effects had to be
taken into account. 18 Once quarterly fixed effects were included, no significant
interaction terms were uncovered in the four years leading up to the policy change
18More 21 year olds are in full time education than 22-23 year olds and thus significant
differences in time dummies for each summer quarter (during summer break) were uncovered.
1.6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 27
when all the primary outcome variables (detailed below) were tested. From five
years prior, there was some measured minimal divergence which is not overly
surprising given the time lag.
Analysis also checked for diverging parametric time trends by fitting separate
linear and quadratic time trends for the treatment and control group. Once
controlling for group fixed effects, again no statistically significant differences were
uncovered in the four years leading up to the policy change.
As a further robustness check, placebo difference-in-differences regressions
were run on data at alternative time periods. False interventions were generated
for various time periods within a four year range either side of the true policy
intervention (ensuring that the true policy intervention was not captured). None
of the false interventions generated significant treatment estimates.
I was also able to test for observable composition changes in the treatment
and control groups that might conflate demographic change with the policy
intervention. Difference-in-differences regressions were run were with the outcome
being various observable group characteristics e.g. ethnicity, gender, geographic
location, educational attainment. None were found to have significant, diverging
results between the treatment and control groups, which is an encouraging result.
By definition, there is no way of testing changes in unobservable characteristics
that may influence labour force outcomes. As I am comparing 21-23 year olds - a
very narrow demographic band in the population - it seems reasonable to assume
that a major unobservable change differentially affecting one group is unlikely.
There are a couple of other considerations for identification. One must be sure
that the control group of 22-23 year olds is indeed a control group - they cannot
be impacted by the treatment. I considered this in detail by using difference-in-
differences methodology with 22-23 year olds as the treatment group, and various
sets of other age groups as the relative controls. Under no specifications were
significant treatment estimates on 22-23 year olds measured.
Nonetheless I also varied the age of the control group used, out of concern
that 22-23 year olds might still be impacted. The results were robust to using any
control group of twenty-something year olds.
In this particular setting, the treatment and impact on the results of students
may be of concern. Many 21 year olds are still in formal education and the
baseline results exclude labour force inactive students from the sample. To
assuage concerns that this decision impacts on the results, all regressions were
run including students into the analysis. For no outcome did the results change
quantitatively meaningfully. Combined with the earlier findings that the results
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are driven by less educated individuals - i.e. those with no post-school education -
this should reassure those with concerns.
Finally, there is always concern that the estimated results should instead be
attributed to a concurrent policy change. I was unable to find any relevant policy
change around the 2010 mark that affected 21 year olds differentially to 22-23 year
olds. The majority of other age discontinuities in labour market policies kick in
at 18 or 25 years old. No other policy impacts were found differentially affecting
21 year olds compared to 22-23 year olds.
As a matter of functional form robustness, all linear probability models were
also run as non-linear probit and/or multivariate logit models. This did not
qualitatively change the results but, naturally, decreased the ease of estimate
interpretation.
1.7 Conclusion
Taken together, the analysis finds robust responses to minimum wages for unem-
ployed searchers. There is a shift from inactivity (no search) towards labour force
participation, specifically unemployed searching, in response to the 23% boost in
minimum wages of 21 year olds in 2010. The increase in search, a form of labour
supply response, appears sufficient to outweigh any direct effect of higher minimum
wages on firm labour demand. The net effect of the two generates no significant
impact on employment rates. However, due to increased search congestion, the
increased extensive margin search is accompanied by a corresponding increase in
the average duration of unemployed search.
Surprisingly, I also find weak evidence of a decrease in average search effort for
unemployed searchers. This has three potential explanations. Firstly, decreased
average search effort could be due to a composition effect: marginal searchers
switching into searching at a low intensity drag the average down. Alternatively,
the increase in extensive search generates a congestion externality on existing
searchers which in turn may decrease in their search effort. Thirdly, search
intensity may play a valuable role in assisting workers to find their optimal
job match. Minimum wages that increase wages for the lowest paying jobs
may decrease the returns to an optimal match from the worker’s point of view,
discouraging costly search effort. In short, minimum wages may create an ‘any
job will do’ mentality, reducing match qualities. Each of these three explanations
has significant ramifications for labour markets, and merit further consideration.
In contrast to the unemployed search margins, no significant impacts on any
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measures of on-the-job search are found. No change in the propensity to search,
effort of searching or duration of searching is estimated. It appears that, at least
in this setting, minimum wage increases do not impact on worker’s intentions
to progress up the job ladder, assuaging a possible concern that minimum wage
policies incentivise individuals to remain in low productivity jobs.
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Chapter 2
Localised employment spillovers
Abstract
This paper is the first to provide firm level estimates of the propagation rates of
localised employment shocks through space and time. A spatial network of the
universe of UK firms with near pinpoint location accuracy is used to estimate
the firm-level employment adjustment to mass layoffs. Results show that firm
level employment adjustment is highly localised and decays rapidly through space
- the negative spillover effects halve approximately every kilometre further away
from the event. Firm level adjustment is also highly persistent, with further
localised employment losses continuing for at least five years after the event. The
spillover effects are experienced by a wide range of local firms, but are strongest in
non-tradeable sector firms, consistent with the presence of local product demand
transmission mechanisms. The paper provides new supporting evidence to theories
that sluggish firm level adjustment interacting with local agglomeration forces
generate persistence in local labour market outcomes. Furthermore, the micro-
level effects uncovered are extremely localised, and thus more standard analysis
methods discretising space into regions will incur significant measurement costs.
Keywords: local employment dynamics, spillover decay rates, agglomeration
JEL codes: J23, J63, R12
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2.1 Introduction
There is substantial path dependence in local economic fortunes: economic in-
equalities between regions are highly persistent and, in some places, diverging over
time.1 These dynamics provide somewhat of a puzzle, as the traditional spatial
equilibrium framework would suggest that localised shocks dissipate through factor
adjustment and regions converge overtime. Focussing on the labour market, recent
explanations have suggested that an initial labour demand shock is strengthened
into a larger, more permanent shock (Amior and Manning, 2018). The conversion
to a permanent shock may occur at the local firm level as sluggish firm adjustment
interacts with local agglomeration forces (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017). To
date, little is known about the strength through time and space of employment
shock propagation at the firm level because the existing literature has approached
the question of local employment dynamics by aggregating across firms, geography
or both.
This paper provides the first firm level estimates of the propagation rates
through space and time of localised employment shocks. Doing so demonstrates
that an initial shock is indeed converted into a persistent shock as individual firms
located in close proximity to an initial adverse employment shock continually
reduce employment for many years after the event. The paper addresses 1) how
localised are employment spillovers and how rapidly do these decay through space,
as well as 2) what are the dynamics at the firm level of the shock propagation
– do they exhibit continual employment adjustment or does the firm level shock
dissipate overtime? The relevance and spatial scale of potential channels, including
input-output links, local product demand, labour market spillovers, and within-
industry knowledge spillovers are also considered.
The paper is able to answer such questions by approaching the problem in
a way novel to the established literature. The predominant approach when
analysing spatial variation in any economic outcome is to discretise space into
mutually exclusive and exhaustive units.2 This may be due to data restrictions –
observations are generally allocated an administrative unit rather than a precise
location – or because spatial aggregation simplifies analysis. However, when
the object of interest is spatial spillovers, any form of discretisation will not be
innocuous. There is an inherent tradeoff in the scale of discretisation. If the unit
1Moretti (2011) provides a summary of the literature.
2See for example Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017); Amior and Manning (2018); Dube et al.
(2010); Autor et al. (2013); Acemoglu et al. (2016), and many others, for a selection of applica-
tions.
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size is too small, spillovers will extend into neighbouring units, contaminating
control units. If set too large, the spillovers operate only in a small fraction of the
unit and the estimates will likely average to near zero. The estimated result is
therefore fundamentally dependent on the discretisation. Unfortunately, without
knowledge of the underlying scale of the effects it is impossible to know where on
the continuum one’s analysis lies.
In contrast, this paper bypasses the inherent cost presented in standard
methods by treating space as continuous. A spatial network of all firms in the UK
is constructed using near pinpoint location accuracy from the Business Structure
Database (BSD). The response of the firm level network to localised adverse
employment shocks is then assessed. Mass layoffs, defined as more than 1,000
workers lost in a given year (with some caveats), are used as a localised employment
shock event. Each non-masslayoff firm is linked to their closest masslayoff events in
each year. The primary feature of interest is the relationship between geographic
proximity to a masslayoff, measured in Euclidean distance, and subsequent firm
level employment behaviour.
Employment spillovers from masslayoff events are strong and very highly
localised. A firm located very close to a masslayoff loses, on average, approximately
7% of their employment. This employment loss exhibits strong spatial decay by
abating rapidly with distance. The effect approximately halves for every kilometer
further away from the events, becoming very small for firms located further than
about 5 kilometers from a masslayoff.
The dynamic analysis finds that further firm level employment losses continue
for at least five years after the masslayoff event. These subsequent effects also
exhibit the strong spatial decay pattern. The annual effects compound over
time such that the longer term firm level impact is much larger than the initial
response to the shock. This provides firm-level microfounding evidence to support
observations that the longer term effects exceed immediate effects at the regional
level (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2017).
A number of possible spillover channels to explain these effects are considered.
In particular, I address several potential sources of agglomeration spillovers put
forward by the literature. Firstly, I consider whether firms in similar industry,
or similar labour markets, to nearby mass layoffs are more strongly affected by
spillovers.3 These two features are often through to indicate knowledge sharing,
which in turn can generate productivity (and employment) spillovers following
3These features can also be referred to as ‘industrial closeness’ and ‘labour market closeness’
respectively.
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shocks. I also consider whether industries with input-output linkages to mass
layoff firms might experience stronger spillovers. Lastly, I investigate the relevance
of local product demand spillovers by testing for differences in responses between
tradeable and non-tradeable firms.
Neither the spillovers nor their strong degree of localisation appear confined
to a particular subset of firms or firm-masslayoff pairs. A wide range of firm
types experience strong, localised enploymnent spillovers. However, firms in non-
tradeable sectors experience stronger spillovers than the tradeable counterparts.
The stronger non-tradeable response points to the relevance of local product
demand spillovers following initial employment shocks.
The contributions of the paper are fourfold. Firstly, I provide the first direct
estimates on the degree of localisation of negative employment spillovers - employ-
ment spillovers from adverse employment events, here taken to be masslayoffs,
are highly localised. This pattern has not been directly uncovered to date as it
requires the use of precise location data. The degree of localisation is stronger than
had been anticipated, either explicitly or implicitly in the employment spillovers
literature. The results show that firm level employment spillovers are much like
many other economic activities considered by other literatures; the micro effects
are highly localised.4
Secondly, the paper sheds additional light on the dynamics behind localised
employment adjustment. The firm level dynamic results provide the first empirical
support to the theory that labour shocks are transmitted at the firm level, possibly
through delayed firm adjustment interacting with agglomeration forces (as per
Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017)).
Thirdly, the paper demonstrates the inherent costs of discretising space when
attempting to measure effects that are continuous in nature. The use of discrete
geographic units is near ubiquitous in spatial variation analysis, and yet is not
an innocuous decision. Estimated results of zero may simply be because the
spatial discretisation is at the wrong scale – in either direction – rather than
due to genuinely absent effects. In short, the treatment of space is not a mere
technicality but fundamental to the outcomes of interest. This lesson applies to a
broader range of applications than just employment or agglomeration spillovers.
Any research question using spatial variation must consider the issue carefully.
Lastly, the paper also provides an initial look into the spatial scale and strength
of possible spillover mechanisms. I find evidence that supports the relevance of
4For example, consumer and producer amenities in cities (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015), job search
and commuting behaviour (Manning and Petrongolo, 2018; Hassink and Meekes, 2018), and
export learning behaviour (Kamal and Sundaram, 2016; Bisztray et al., 2018) among others.
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local product demand spillovers as a possible transmission mechanism.
The paper connects three strands of literature. Firstly, there is a large body of
literature on regional dynamics following localised shocks. This paper extends the
literature by looking at the micro level, in particular at the behaviour of individual
firms and highly detailed spatial scales. Traditionally, the broader regional
dynamics literature has followed the spatial equilibrium adjustment framework
whereby regional outcomes converge overtime following shocks (surveyed in Moretti
(2011)). A recent subset of the literature calls the validity of regional convergence
into question. Papers have focussed on the strong persistence of shocks and, in
particular, how the effects of shocks appear to exacerbate rather than mitigate
overtime.5 Amior and Manning (2018) argue that the deviation from spatial
equilibrium adjustment is due to serial correlation in the labour demand shocks
- in effect what may initially be temporary shocks are converted into persistent
shocks. In a similar vein, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017) show that the response
of Brazilian regions exposed to trade shocks is twice as strong ten years after the
shock than five years after the shock. They suggest that sluggish adjustment at
the firm level interacting with local agglomeration forces may be generating the
required serial correlation. However, given the regionally aggregated data, they
are not able to test their firm level hypothesis.
Secondly, the paper extends the agglomeration literature with dynamic, spatial
analysis of negative employment shock spillovers across a broad range of firms and
industries. Much of the agglomeration literature is focussed on the difficulty of
identifying static agglomeration spillovers, as clean sources of exogenous variation
approaches are difficult to come by (Moretti, 2011). Some use narrow policy
discontinuities in a particular subset of areas or firms.6 These have the advantage
of clean event study approaches, but often lack external validity to other areas,
policy designs or industries. At the other end of the spectrum, others use broad
Bartik instrument approaches - they cover a wide range of possible shocks but are
subject to well known identification concerns (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).
Gathmann et al. (2017) and others take a middle-ground approach, by pooling
a wide-range of masslayoffs into multiple event studies. Gathmann et al. (2017)
find substantial spillovers from masslayoffs at the German regional level. It is this
identification approach that I follow here.
5Recent empirical research on regional dynamics following labour shocks include Topalova
(2010), Autor et al. (2013), Kovak (2013), Dao et al. (2014), Hakobyan and McLaren (2016) and
Monte et al. (2018)
6Example research designs include using regions around the cutoff for regional funding grants
and tax subsidies, or a new large plant. See for example Devereux et al. (2007) and Busso et al.
(2013)
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As well as measuring the magnitude of spillovers, the literature also concerns
itself theoretically and empirically on possible sources of agglomeration. Since
Marshall (1890), economists have identified the theoretical importance of labour
market risk pooling, input-output linkages and knowledge spillovers as agglomer-
ation sources. There is an amount of empirical work demonstrating that these
agglomeration forces generate benefits to firms from the co-location of other firms.7.
Conversely, these generate a negative impact on firms when nearby firms reduce
operations, as quantified by Helm (2017) for German local employment shocks.
Again, however, the data and empirical strategies used, including for Helm (2017)
are aggregated so analysis is restricted to region-industry level.
The third literature stream focuses on the degree of localisation and the spatial
scale involved in economic forces. As yet, detailed questions about the spatial scale
and suitable analysis methods have not been applied to spillover effects of large,
negative employment events. Micro level effects of other processes as diverse as
job search, commuting, export learning behaviour, production spillovers and local
consumption amenities are often found to be highly localised.8 Such papers also
explore the heterogeneity in spatial scales, in recognition that market size or spatial
reach should not be imposed as constant across all applications. For example,
Hassink and Meekes (2018) estimates a wide variety in local labour market sizes
based on skill, gender and other individual characteristics. To analyse spatial
scales in detail, the literature is required to use much more detailed geographic
information and more complex analysis methods that move towards a continuous
treatment of space (Manning and Petrongolo (2018) and Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
provide two examples).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the conceptual
framework, in particular the treatment of space as a continuous concept, and
the empirical strategy and data used. Section 2.3 presents the empirical results
of the analysis of spillover spatial patterns on impact. Building on the impact
results, Section 2.4 outlines the costs of more standard analysis methods by
comparing the spillover spatial patterns with those using discretised geographic
units. Next, Section 2.5 presents the analysis of the dynamic responses to mass
layoffs. Section 2.6 evaluates possible spillover channels and Section 2.7 concludes
with a discussion.
7See for example Harhoff (1999), Devereux et al. (2004) and Graham et al. (2009)
8Example work includes Manning and Petrongolo (2018); Hassink and Meekes (2018); Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015); Kamal and Sundaram (2016); Bisztray et al. (2018). Spillovers often cascade into
other areas so the macro effects may operate on larger spatial scales.
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2.2 Framework and empirical strategy
The conceptual and empirical framework of the paper is based on treating space
as continuous. Traditionally, analysis has discretised space by dividing areas up
into mutually exclusive and exhaustive units. These may be arbitrary from an
economic point of view (e.g. politically demarcated administrative regions) or
have some economic principles defining them (e.g. commuting zones where a
certain fraction of the population both reside and work in).9 Either way, what is
naturally a continuous concept is divided into indepedent units.
The most common approach to empirical analysis of local economies is quasi-
experimental analysis of these discretised areas. For example, difference-in-
differences can be used to compare discrete units that have experienced the
event in question (e.g. a masslayoff, a rise in the minimum wage) to those that
have not.
(a) Discretised space (b) Continuous space
Figure 2.1: Measurement of spillovers across space
Panel A of Figure 2.1 demonstrates this approach using the issue of masslayoff
spillovers. Firms, denoted by a cross, are scattered across a space which is divided
up into four regions. Regions 1 and 4 on the diagonal experience a masslayoff
(ML) while regions 2 and 3 on the off-diagonal do not. The outcomes of firms
located in regions 1 and 4 are compared to firms in regions 2 and 3.
9It should be noted that there are substantial linkages between any commonly used local
labour market definition. For example, there are 320 travel to work areas (TTWAs) in the UK
defined as having at least 75% of the working residents work in the area and at least 75% of the
workers also live in the area. That means up to 25% flow across the boundaries for work every
day. These cannot be thought of fully separate geographic entities in any sense. Manning and
Petrongolo (2018) further discusses the limitations of discrete local labour market measures.
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Such an approach is prone to bias. Firstly, if the economic forces of interest
operate on a much more local scale than the unit of analysis, it is likely that they
will be undermeasured and potentially not identified at all. For example, if only
firms very close to the masslayoff (e.g. Firm B) are affected, while further away
firms (e.g. Firm A) are not, the estimate will provide some average of the two.
Implicitly, all firms within region 1 are assumed to be equally treated.
Secondly, the approach assumes that the spillover effects do not cross the unit
borders. All firms within regions 2 and 3 are assumed to be entirely unaffected by
the masslayoffs. This will be violated if an event occurs near the border (e.g. firm
C is affected by the first masslayoff) or if the spillovers operate on a larger scale
than the geographic units used. In either case, regions 2 and 3 cannot be used as
‘controls’ in empirical analysis.
The approach here avoids artificially discretising space. As I have individual
firm locations, I am able to retain the spatial structure. I can then use the
masslayoff as the centre of the treatment, and analyse how firms of varying
distances are affected. Panel B of Figure 2.1 demonstrates this approach. This
approach allows for Firms B and C to be approximately equally affected by the
first masslayoff, and Firm A to be unaffected.
2.2.1 The spillover distance function
The analysis uses masslayoffs as a localised employment shock. A masslayoff
will generate spillovers to nearby firms if a firm’s productivity is related to local
economic activity. Phrased differently, in the presence of local agglomeration
forces, a decrease in local employment will reduce the productivity, hence output
and employment, of other nearby firms.
Consider a simple price taking, profit maximising firm i with Cobb-Douglas
production choosing their optimal level of inputs. In the short run, capital, K = K¯
is fixed and only labour L is chosen:
max
L
{
AiL
αK¯β − wL− rK¯} (2.1)
Wages are denoted w, capital prices r, and output prices are normalised to
p = 1. Labour is chosen such that the marginal product of labour equals the
prevailing wage w = MPL = αAiLα−1K¯β. The optimal level of labour, in logs, is
therefore:
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lnL∗ =
1
1− α lnAi︸ ︷︷ ︸
object of interest
+
1
1− α
[
lnα + β ln K¯ − lnw] (2.2)
Spillovers occur when a firm’s log productivity lnAi is a function of local
employment - this empirical fact is well documented.10 The analysis here is partic-
ularly interested in whether lnAi is a function of distance-weighted employment,
and in particular what that distance function is.
Consider firm productivity as a function of distance-weighted local employ-
ment, and all other productivity characteristics unrelated to distance A¯i: Ai =
A¯ie
f(distance weighted employment). I assume the distance weighted local employment
function sums across all nearby firms, j. Inside the sum, the contribution of
nearby firm j to firm i’s productivity is some function, f , of the distance between
i and j, dij, multiplied by some function, g, of j’s employment size Ej.
lnAi = ln A¯i +
∑
j
f(dij).g(Ej) (2.3)
The current set up places no restriction on the function form of the distance
function to each nearby firm - and this distance function is the key function
of interest. The direct impact of the employment size of j is not constrained.
However, the set up does assume that the impact of distance is multiplicatively
separable to the employment size effect.
A masslayoff is a large change to the employment of some nearby firm, k. This
will affect the productivity of nearby firm i:
∆ lnAi = f(dik). ∆g(Ek)︸ ︷︷ ︸
masslayoff = 1
+
∑
j 6=k
f(dij).∆g(Ej) (2.4)
I can use the variation in distance to this masslayoff to identify the distance
function. As productivity itself is not observable, I revert back to the observed
short run employment change of firm i. Combining equation 2.4 with equation
2.2, I get a more estimable equation for short run log employment changes:
∆ lnLi = f(dik).masslayoffk︸ ︷︷ ︸
masslayoff distance effect
+
∑
j 6=k
1
1− αf(dij).∆g(Ej)︸ ︷︷ ︸
other local employment changes
− 1
1− α∆ lnw︸ ︷︷ ︸
local wage adjustment
(2.5)
10The spillovers and agglomeration literature discussed earlier documents the empirical
evidence.
40 CHAPTER 2. LOCALISED EMPLOYMENT SPILLOVERS
g(Ek) is not of direct interest here, so ∆g(Ek) ∗ 11−α is replaced with a binary
variable for a masslayoff in nearby firm k.
2.2.2 Empirical strategy
The analysis uses an event study approach based around localised mass layoffs.
As stated in more detail in Section 2.2.3, a masslayoff is defined as a single plant
losing 1000 or more workers in a year which is not associated with regularly
fluctuating employment or an ownership change. The masslayoff provides a shock
to nearby employment for all local firms.
I follow the extensive masslayoff literature with the identifying assumption
that large employment losses are unrelated to local factors, hence are exogenous
to the local area. They are assumed to be driven by national or international
forces such as trade shocks or industrial decline. Non-tradeable, locally consumed
goods that respond to local events are, in general, produced by firms too small to
generate a 1,000 person masslayoff. Such events are usually restricted to tradeable
services, manufacturing etc. The local exogeneity justification is a very standard
chain of logic, but one that does not come without its critics.
In this context, I have the added advantage of highly detailed firm level
microdata; much of the literature relies on aggregated data. These data mean I
am able to control for annual industry shocks up to the five digit level, leaving
only sub-national industry variation for all non-masslayoff firms. This removes
concern that other firms in the local area are laying off staff in response to the
same industry trend that generated the masslayoff. I am also able to control for
general local shocks, which could include local policy shifts or broad spending
shocks to hit the local economy. What remains is therefore sub-national, local
industry variation, primarily in distance to the masslayoff event.
Given the masslayoff event construction, I then construct distance measures
for each firm to the masslayoffs. As a result, each firm is linked to their closest
masslayoffs and key data on those masslayoffs, such as industry and employment
size.
I then estimate the relationship between employment changes in each non-
masslayoff firm and distance to the nearby masslayoffs, considering in turn contem-
poraneous masslayoffs and masslayoffs that occured in the previous years. Figure
2.2 demonstrates the timing of the event study approach. Our dependent variable
is some measure of employment change for firm i (local plant) between time t− 1
and t. The event generating the shock is the closest masslayoff in the period of
interest. A contemporaneous (lag 0) event would be a masslayoff that also occurs
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Figure 2.2: Timing of event study estimation strategy
between t − 1 and t: i.e. a local firm sheds at least 1,000 workers in the time
period. Lagged masslayoffs occur in preceeding time periods, as demonstrated in
the figure (2.2).
Using the event study approach and motivated by equation 2.5, the baseline
estimating equation is of the following form:
∆ lnLijlt = α + βf(dik).masslayoffk + γXijlt + cj + ct + cl + ijlt (2.6)
Where ∆ lnLijrt is the change in log employment at firm i in industry j at
location l between time t and time t− 1 and, as standard, can be approximated as
percentage changes. For firms that shut down over the period, ∆ lnLijrt is simply
− lnLijr,t−1.11 f(distik) is a function of the distance to the closest masslayoff, k.
Xijlt are relevant factors or controls such as the number of masslayoffs within
a certain distance during the year in question, or the distance of the second
closest masslayoff. A variety of fixed effects are used, including industry, time
and location, as well as industry-time and location-time fixed effects. Errors are
primarily clustered at the two digit industry level, although a variety of spatial
and industry-spatial errors structures are investigated.
The primary features of interest are the functional form of distance, f(distik),
and the strength and direction of the effects, β. Instead of imposing functional
forms on f , the baseline results take a non-parametric approach to estimating the
distance function. f is estimated using a collection of mutually exclusive dummy
variables of distance to the closest masslayoff, for example:
11Numerically, this is equivalent to the firm shedding all but its final employee. This is a
reasonable approximation of log employment loss for larger firms. As we see later, smaller firms
on whom the approximation might make a material impact are not the primary drivers of the
result. Therefore the assumption is unlikely to be particularly influential.
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∆ lnLijlt =α + β0dist
0−1
ik + β1dist
1−2
ik + β2dist
2−3
ik + β3dist
3−4
ik + β4dist
4−5
ik +
β5dist
5−10
ik + β10dist
10−20
ik + β20dist
20−40
ik + γXijlt + cj + ct + cl + ijlt
(2.7)
The dummy variable distx−yik equals 1 if the distance from firm i to the closest
masslayoff k lies between x and y kilometers. For firms who are not located
near any masslayoff - i.e. the closest masslayoff is further than the maximum
distance dummy - will have all dummy variables equal to zero. They are therefore
the baseline case, and the β coefficients (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β10, β20) plot non-
parametric estimates of the distance function.
It should be noted that two key terms in equation 2.5 are not included in
the estimating equations, 2.6 and 2.7. Firstly, the adjustment of local wages will
in part determine firm i’s short run employment adjustment. Local wages are
notoriously downwardly rigid empirically, but nonetheless analysis in section 2.3
confirms their zero response here.
Secondly, the responses of other non-masslayoff firms in the local area are
not included. Undoubtedly, they too will respond directly to the masslayoff, and
their responses will generate a standard reflection issue. The β coefficients should
therefore be interpreted as a sum of firm i’s direct adjustment to the closest
masslayoff, and the indirect adjustments to other nearby firms’ own adjustments
to the masslayoff. The inability to separate direct and indirect effects is a matter
of results interpretation, rather than fundamental to the approach. Provided
the masslayoff event itself is exogenous to the local area (the earlier identifying
assumption), other sources of local firm changes should be independent of the
masslayoff and not cause endogeneity problems.
Appendix B.2 outlines the variety of robustness check undertaken. Standard
event study checks such as a placebo check for anticipation effects are included.
Setting specific concerns around spatial sorting, the Global Financial Crisis and
spatial clustering of multiple masslayoffs, among others, are also addressed.
2.2.3 Data
The primary dataset used for analysis is the annual UK Business Structure
Database (BSD) from 1997-2017. The BSD encompasses almost the entire universe
of business entities in the UK, encorporating 99% of economic activity in the UK.
All firms in the UK who employ at least one staff member registered for PAYE tax
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collection and/or are eligible for Value Added Tax (VAT) are included in the BSD.
The BSD is available at both the parent company level (Enterprise Unit - EU)
and local plant level (Local Unit - LU). Each level provides birth and death dates,
tax information, five digit industry codes and employment counts. The EU level
dataset provides turnover of the company. I use the LU, plant level information
as the topics of concern relate to highly localised employment.
Crucially, extremely detailed location information down to the postcode level
is available for both the EU and LU. There are around 1.8million postcodes in
the UK for a population of approximately 66 million, with the average postcode
covering five properties.12 Postcodes therefore provide an almost exact pin-point
location. The postcodes are mapped to northings and eastings using the Office for
National Statistics Postcode Database, resulting in precise coordinates matched
to every plant and firm in the UK.
I exclude public sector employment entities and retain all companies, sole pro-
prietors and partnerships in the BSD. Due to the requirement for VAT registration
and/or at least one PAYE enrolled employee, the smallest of sole proprietors are
not included in the dataset. What remains is effectively the near-entirety of the
UK private sector, with an average of X plant observations annually totalling Y
observations overall.
I then define and identify every local mass layoff event in the UK from 1997-
2017. These are defined as a plant shedding at least 1000 net employees in a given
year. This can occur through either a plant of 1000 or more employees shutting
down or a larger plant firing 1000 workers and remaining active with a smaller
employment count. To avoid capturing seasonal workers or other types of highly
fluctuating employment, I exclude those firms which rehire 1000 workers in the
subsequent few years, and those who hire 1000 workers in the previous year. I
also check that the plant has not simply changed ownership, name or ID code by
using the demographic event information available in the dataset; a masslayoff
through plant death has to coincide with the BSD labelling the event as death too
(as opposed to merger, acquisition etc). Appendix B.1 presents key descriptive
statistics for the firm and masslayoff data.
One issue with the construction of the masslayoff variable is that it also captures
large, local employment outsourcing. For example, a large firm that restructures its
labour force by shifting many support jobs to external providers will be included
in the events. If the external providers are in close proximity geographically,
this is not a local negative employment shock in any sense. Unfortunately, the
12Details from BPH postcodes https://www.bph-postcodes.co.uk/guidetopc.cgi
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occurrence of such events cannot be measured with the data available. If such
events are not negligible in number, they will provide an attenuation bias in the
estimated treatment effect by mixing the pool of events into true treatments and
false treatments.
In section 2.3, the adjustment of local wages are considered. For this, I use the
UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), as the BSD does not contain
the required wage information. The ASHE is a one percent sample of UK workers,
based on national insurance (tax) numbers. It is compulsorily employer reported
from payroll information so is considered highly accurate relative to workers’
self-reported earnings. Sampled individuals are included in the dataset for each
year they are employed, even if changing employers. From the ASHE, I construct
an annual worker panel that includes hourly wages and employment postcode.
For individuals with multiple jobs in any given year, I take their reported main
job. The required postcode information is only reliably provided from 2004, so
the panel spans 2004-2017.
2.3 Spatial distribution of effects on impact
2.3.1 Baseline
The baseline results follow equation 2.7 by regressing employment change at the
non-masslayoff firm level on distance to the closest masslayoff in the same year.
Collections of mutually exclusive dummy variables are used as the non-parametric
distance function. These are labelled by the distance they refer to: for example,
‘dist 2-3km’ equals one if the closest masslayoff in the current year is between 2
and 3km from the plant in question. Industry (2 digit SIC), postcode (2 digit)
and year dummies are included in each regression as fixed-effect controls. All
standard errors are clustered at the two digit SIC industry level.
In all three specifications of Table 2.1 we find that plants located close to
a masslayoff experience substantial employment loss, and this mitigates as the
distance increases. The preferred specification is column three as it includes the
most detail for the closer distances. The coefficients on the distance dummies in
column three uncover strong but very localised employment spillovers. As we see,
the employment loss rapidly decays within a few kilometers; the impact on firms
between two and three kilometers from the event is approximately half that of
those between one and two kilometers, which in turn is half that of those located
within one kilometer. Employment losses become insignificant at approximately
the twenty kilometer mark.
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Table 2.1: Baseline estimates of spatial effects on impact
(1) (2) (3)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
dist 0-5km -0.0235∗∗∗
(0.00323)
dist 0-2km -0.0468∗∗∗
(0.00500)
dist 2-5km -0.00973∗∗∗
(0.00267)
dist 0-1km -0.0702∗∗∗
(0.00769)
dist 1-2km -0.0266∗∗∗
(0.00362)
dist 2-3km -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00305)
dist 3-4km -0.00813∗∗
(0.00269)
dist 4-5km -0.00792∗∗
(0.00254)
dist 5-10km -0.00641∗∗∗ -0.00656∗∗∗ -0.00683∗∗∗
(0.00178) (0.00179) (0.00179)
dist 10-20km -0.00415∗∗ -0.00407∗∗ -0.00424∗∗∗
(0.00121) (0.00121) (0.00119)
dist 20-40km -0.0000138 0.0000272 -0.0000507
(0.00122) (0.00123) (0.00121)
Cons -0.0434∗∗∗ -0.0427∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.00642) (0.00648) (0.00641)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Vari-
ables are a set of dummies indicating distance to closest masslayoff.
Fixed effects are 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year.
Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 2.3: Employment loss estimates from Table 2.1, contemporaneous masslayoff
Figure 2.3 plots the coefficients from Table 2.1 along with 95 percent confidence
intervals. Column three is plotted in black with circular points, column two is
plotted in blue with triangular points and column one is plotted in red with cross
points. The initial coefficient points are lower for the blue (Column 2) and red
(Column 1) specifications as the less detailed dummies provide weighted estimates
for the smaller distances.
Figure 2.4 maps the predicted employment impacts of a hypothetical masslayoff
centred in Cambridge, UK, using the decay estimates from the baseline regres-
sions.13 The map is a visual display of the high degree of localisation. Cambridge
is a very small city with a dense population of around 120,000 individuals. The
substantial employment spillovers would only be experienced by a subset of the
city area, before rapidly decaying further out.
These non-parametric estimates accurately demonstrate the magnitude and
speed at which localised spillovers propagate spatially. They suggest that employ-
ment spillovers are highly localised, affecting very close firms most strongly. At
least at the local firm level, they become negligible at fairly conservative distances,
approximately ten kilometers.
The rapid spatial decay patterns have several implications. In terms of mea-
surement, they mean that firm-level spillovers are highly localised. Standard
13The masslayoff is centred over the Faculty of Economics which is located next to the Faculty
of Law at the University of Cambridge. The hypothetical scenario is therefore at least 1,000
economists (and/or lawyers) being laid off. This may well be a net positive boost to the
local Cambridge economy, however I abstract from such a discussion by imposing the baseline
estimates.
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Figure 2.4: Map of predicted employment impacts from a hypothetical masslayoff in
Cambridge, UK
estimation strategies relying on larger administrative areas may therefore fail to
pick them up. As the more geographically aggregated specifications in Figure 2.3
show, larger geographic units provide a weighted average of the spillovers within
the area. Averaging across an administrative area ten or twenty kilometers around
a masslayoff would provide very small, potentially insignificant results given the
coefficients above.
Economically, the results also show that the firm-to-firm transmission mecha-
nisms must be highly localised in nature. A high degree of localisation is consistent
with much of the urban economics agglomeration literature - many economic link-
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ages from productivity spillovers to consumption amenity spillovers appear to
operate in a very localised way.14 The degree of localisation in these employment
spillovers can help elucidate the mechanisms at hand. Many have been discussed
hypothetically in the literature, and these results give more weight to those that
operate very locally around the masslayoff event. Section 2.6 continues down this
chain of logic further.
2.3.2 Impact on local wages
The baseline analysis has so far ignored impacts on local wages; implicitly I
have ignored price adjustments in favour of quantity adjustments for labour. As
touched on in Section 2.2, equation 2.5 demonstrates that local employment
adjustment will partly depend on the response of local wages to a masslayoff. One
might expect that a large reduction in local labour demand will depress local
wages. Wage adjustments exclusion from the picture has so far been driven by
the extensive literature finding strongly downwardly rigid wages.15
However, the same logic applied to the employment spillover analysis can be
applied to the local wage phenomenon. Perhaps existing results that find no effect
on local wages are driven by a mis-specification of distance. Wage analysis will
also suffer from the costs of discretising space, and the zero results may derive
from discretisation rather than genuinely zero effects.
I estimate the impact of a masslayoff on local wages using the same methodology
as for employment adjustments. The ASHE worker panel provides the required
hourly wage information. I use both hourly wages excluding overtime and hourly
wages including overtime to allow for possible impacts through changes in overtime
employment. The change in the individual worker level log wage, ∆ ln(wit), is
regressed on the distance to the closest masslayoff.16 Occupation, location and
year dummy control variables are included to keep the analysis consistent with
the firm level employment analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit
occupation level.
Table 2.2 displays the estimated wage impacts. Column 1 uses hourly wages
14See for example Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), Manning and Petrongolo (2018) and Hassink and
Meekes (2018).
15See Bewley (2009), Kahn (1997), Altonji and Devereux (1999) and Elsby (2009) for general
analysis of the downwardly rigid wage phenomenon. Kaur (2019) and de Ridder and Pfajfar
(2017) address downwardly rigid wages at the local level.
16Recorded changes will include an individual receiving a pay change from their existing firm,
and individuals switching firms. For individuals laid off, their change in log wages is recorded
as − ln(wi,t−1). For workers who have just entered employment, their change in log wages is
recorded as ln(wit)
2.3. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTS ON IMPACT 49
Table 2.2: Wage changes as a function of the distance to the closest masslayoff
(1) (2)
∆log(W1) ∆log(W2)
dist 0-1km 0.0862 0.0861
(0.0912) (0.0913)
dist 1-2km 0.00521 0.00532
(0.0192) (0.0190)
dist 2-3km -0.00133 -0.00174
(0.0224) (0.0223)
dist 3-4km -0.0180 -0.0182
(0.0199) (0.0198)
dist 4-5km -0.0162 -0.0160
(0.0167) (0.0166)
dist 5-10km 0.0161 0.0159
(0.0144) (0.0144)
dist 10-20km 0.00632 0.00613
(0.0103) (0.0103)
dist 20-40km -0.00694 -0.00693
(0.00799) (0.00799)
Cons 6.826∗∗∗ 6.818∗∗∗
(0.0992) (0.0994)
Controls Yes Yes
N 2,256,208 2,256,021
R2 0.148 0.147
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit occupa-
tion. Variables are a set of dummies indicating distance to
closest masslayoff. Controls are 2 digit occupation codes,
2 digit postcode, and year fixed effects. Years included are
2004-2017. Column 1 uses hourly wages excluding over-
time, W1, Column 2 uses hourly wages including overtime,
W2. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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excluding overtime, denoted W1, and Column 2 uses hourly wages including
overtime, denoted W2. As can be observed, at no distance are there significant
effects on wages from masslayoffs. The results here confirm the presence of strong
downward rigidities in wages. It appears that employment adjustment following
localised shocks occurs through the quantity of labour employed rather than the
price of labour.
2.3.3 Heterogeneity by firm type and location
I investigate heterogeneity by firm and location observables. These help deepen
the picture about features of the spatial spillovers and help assuage concerns
that the results are purely down to detailed spatial sorting and associated spatial
autocorrelation in shocks.
A natural starting point is to identify which firms are driving the spillover
results. Are smaller firms located near to mass layoffs more susceptible to employ-
ment spillovers, or are their larger counterparts the primary drivers of spillover
employment loss?
To do so, I segment the sample into larger and smaller non-mass layoff firms
using an employment cut-off of either 20 or 50 employees. I repeat the baseline
regressions on each sample in turn. I also pool the entire firm sample and include
the firm size variables both as a level term and as an interaction with the distance
function. Both approaches shed light on whether small or larger firms receive
stronger spillovers, and what the distance decay function for each is.
The results, displayed in Table B.6 in Appendix B.3, demonstrate that all firm
sizes experience employment spillovers if located in close proximity to a masslayoff
and all firm sizes exhibit a similar spatial decay rate. However, larger firms (those
with more than 20 or 50) employees do have proportionately stronger responses.
It appears that small firms respond less strongly but still exhibit employment
losses.
I next evaluate the specific role of the manufacturing industry. The advantage
of the data and empirical approach used here are that they are able to capture
a broader range of industries. However, much of the existing local spillovers
literature has restricted focus to the manufacturing sector so it is of value to see
how important the distinction is.
I broadly classify a firm (including a masslayoff firm) as in the manufacturing
sector if their 2 digit SIC codes are in the range 15-34 (based on the UK Data
Service SIC coding). The analysis that follows is in two parts; assessing the role
of a manufacturing mass layoff event (manufacturing is the ‘generating’ firm) and
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assessing the response of nearby non-mass layoff manufacturing firms to any mass
layoff event (manufacturing is the ‘receiving’ firm).
Results are similar to the firm size results and are displayed in Table B.7 in
Appendix B.3. Manufacturing firms incur larger employment losses from being
located very near (any) masslayoff. Non-manufacturing firms still have a loss
function that decays, but it is smaller in magnitude across all distances. This may
be inextricably tied up with the firm size results. Manufacturing firms tend to be
larger and as larger firms have larger losses (even proportionately) it is unclear
whether the key driver is firm size, manufacturing or some omitted covariate.
Whether or not the masslayoff itself is from a manufacturing plant does not
seem to meaningfully affect the spatial spillovers. Segmenting the sample into firms
located closest to a manufacturing masslayoff and those located closest to a non-
manufacturing masslayoff give similar results. If anything, the non-manufacturing
masslayoffs seem to generate slightly stronger spillover results.
I also consider whether a location’s employment density matters for the
observed spillovers. If a firm is located in a dense area economically, the presence
of a lot of additional economic activity may either amplify or mitigate the shock.
The latter would imply that density provides some insurance value against shocks
to a single large nearby employer.
The economic density each non-masslayoff firm’s location is measured at
the employment per square kilometer of a 3km by 3km grid around each firm.
For meaningful interpretation, this employment density measure is standardised.
Results, displayed in Tables B.8 and B.9 in Appendix B.3 suggest that a one
standard deviation increase in employment density has a very small level effect on
employment changes overall. However, there is a positive interaction term with
the distance function, suggesting that density somewhat mitigates the firm level
employment loss associated with locating very near a masslayoff. The insurance
value this provides is in the order of two percentage points less employment loss
for a firm located immediately next to a masslayoff.
Of course, these results are all for the individual firm’s employment loss. There
may be less employment loss at the firm level in a dense environment, but a denser
environment is associated with more firms. Once aggregating over all nearby firms,
it may still be the case that denser areas lose more employment overall from a
masslayoff, even if individual firms are somewhat insured.
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2.4 The costs of discretising space versus a con-
tinuous measure
The analysis so far has used continuous measures of distance to analyse the spatial
scale of masslayoff employment spillovers. The approach used is novel in part
because it relies on precise location data that are rarely available.
The more standard method for analysing spatial features is to discretise space
into mutually exclusive and exhaustive units. A difference-in-differences style
approach is typically used to compare those units that have experienced an event
to those that have not. As discussed in Section 2.2, such an approach will suffer
from two potential sources of bias. If the area affected by the spillovers exceeds
the geographic unit size used, control units will become contaminated. If the
spillover area is much smaller than the geographic unit size used, estimated results
will average out close to zero. Both can cause estimates that are biased towards
zero.
To demonstrate these costs more fully, I now shift to estimating spillovers
using discrete spatial methods. I begin by dividing the space spanned by the UK
landmass into grids of set unit sizes. In effect, I take the approach displayed in
Panel a) of Figure 2.1. The smallest discretisation of space divides the entire UK
up into 1km by 1km grid squares. The largest divides the UK up into 40km by
40km grid squares. A range of intermediate grid sizes are constructed as well.
For each grid square (of a given size), I sum up the number of masslayoffs
occuring in the grid square in the year in question. This equals zero for squares
with no masslayoff - the majority - and one for those that include a masslayoff.17
I then regress the change in firm level log employment on the presence of a
masslayoff in the firm’s grid square. This is standard difference-in-differences;
comparing the change of a firm in a unit that has experienced a masslayoff to
the change of a firm in a unit that has not. For consistency with the continuous
results, the same controls are used (controls for industry, year fixed effects and
two digit postcode fixed effects) and standard errors remain clustered at the 2
digit industry level.
It should be noted that the grid square sizes are not directly comparable to the
analogous distance dummies in the continuous analysis. The continuous analysis
effectively draws concentric circles centred around the masslayoff. The discrete
17Very occasionally, more than one masslayoff occurs within a grid square in a given year.
This is slightly more common when larger units (e.g. 30-40km are used). As a robustness check,
I also turn the masslayoff count into an indicator variable that equals zero if no masslayoff
occurs, and one if one or more occurs.
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Table 2.3: Discretising space into units: count of masslayoffs in unit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Unit size 1x1km 2x2km 3x3km 4x4km 5x5km
# ML in unit -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.00935∗∗∗ -0.00589∗∗∗ -0.00449∗∗∗ -0.00298∗∗∗
(0.00392) (0.00251) (0.00119) (0.000893) (0.000523)
Constant -0.0476∗∗∗ -0.0475∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗
(0.00662) (0.00657) (0.00659) (0.00661) (0.00664)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Unit size 10x10km 15x15km 20x20km 25x25km 30x30km
# ML in unit -0.00112∗∗ -0.000758∗∗ -0.000124 -0.000148 0.000101
(0.000329) (0.000248) (0.000223) (0.000203) (0.000173)
Constant -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0472∗∗∗ -0.0478∗∗∗ -0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0483∗∗∗
(0.00662) (0.00664) (0.00660) (0.00660) (0.00662)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522
R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls are 2 digit SIC
industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
54 CHAPTER 2. LOCALISED EMPLOYMENT SPILLOVERS
approach says nothing about where in the grid square the masslayoff occurs, which
is an inherent problem in the method. If the masslayoff is directly centred in the
square of size xxxkm, other firms in the same grid square will be located anywhere
between 0 and
√
(x
2
)2 + (x
2
)2 km from the masslayoff. But if the masslayoff is near
the corner of the grid square, a firm could be located up to
√
x2 + x2km from the
masslayoff. Naturally, a firm located immediately across the border in an adjacent
grid square will be closer.
The results illuminate the discretisation costs. For grid squares of very small
sizes (e.g. 1x1km, 2x2km), significant effects on firms within the same unit are
found. However, the magnitudes are much smaller than the continuous methods
would suggest because the effects ‘spillover’ into nearby units, contaminating the
controls. As the grid size is increased, the magnitude of the effects declines rapidly.
Once grid sizes of around 10-20km are used, the point estimates are tiny and
statistically insignificant.
In effect, estimates of the spillovers to nearby firms are zero. As the continuous
method shows, strong spillovers are in operation and will be experienced by many
firms within the ‘treated’ grid square. However, averaging across too large an area
means they fail to be picked up by the difference-in-differences methodology.
Interestingly, the point at which the results become statistically insignificant -
around 10x10km or 20x20km - is comparable in size to many administrative units
or commuting zone units used in typical analyses.
2.5 Dynamics in the spatial distribution of effects
One of the motivations for the analysis is the (recently documented) phenomenon
that very local shocks tend to generate larger impacts overtime as the effects
strengthen. The classic spatial equilibrium adjustment process whereby the impact
of shocks dissipates overtime is called into question. This section considers the
dynamic effects at the firm level. In particular, I investigate the magnitude of the
current firm level responses to masslayoff shocks that occurred in the past, and
the spatial distribution of these.
To do so, I repeat the analysis of Section 2.3 using lagged masslayoff events.
For each firm in time t, I calculate their change in log employment since t− 1. I
estimate a relationship between this current employment change and proximity to
a masslayoff occurring at some t−s, where s > 1. The results displayed here are for
the non-parametric distance function approach of equation 2.7, using a mutually
exclusive set of dummies for the distance to the closest (lagged) masslayoff. The
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distance is the euclidean distance in kilometers between firm i (at time t) and the
closest masslayoff at time t−s. Again, time, industry and postcode fixed effects are
included, and errors are clustered at the 2 digit industry level. The full regression
estimates are presented in Appendix B.4. Figure 2.5 summarises the distance
coefficients for one to five lags of masslayoffs, and includes the contemporaneous
results from Table 2.1 as T0 for comparison.
Figure 2.5: Year-to-year employment changes by distance to closest masslayoff in T0
As we see, significant negative employments impacts are present for firms
located close to a masslayoff event that occurred for all lags. The magnitude
does decline from the initial shock (T0) to the firm level impacts five years later
(T5). The spatial decay patterns are also remarkably persistent. The meaningful
impacts occur for firms within 5km of the event, and particularly so for those
within one or two kilometers.
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A few points should be considered when interpreting these results. Each set
of time results is for an annual firm level change (t− 1 to t) and the proximity
to an event that occurred in the past (t − s, with 1 < s < 5). Some firms will
therefore have been born since the event, particularly for the further back lagged
events. This is not conceptually problematic: the current impact on firms of a
lagged event is the question at hand.
More of concern is the weakening of a clean event study approach once further
lags are considered. Iterative spillovers (i.e. reflection) between other nearby
firms subsequently reducing their employment counts will be present. These are
likely to become more pronounced overtime. The total annual changes estimated
will therefore be a combination of the direct impacts from the masslayoff event
and the indirect, iterative spillovers from other firms adjusting their employment
in response. The method used here is unable to decompose the total effect into
the direct and indirect spillovers, and so the final figures should be read as a
combination of the direct and indirect effects.
A back of the envelope calculation is possible to calculate the cumulative
change, aggregating the initial impact and subsequent lagged impacts. The change
in log employment can be approximated with percentages, and multiplied out
over the five lags. Figure 2.6 displays the results this approximation. The black
line with circular points is the cumulative impact at the firm level after five years.
The dotted grey lines are the earlier cumulative impacts starting from the initial
impact (lowest line) and building up through the lags.
Figure 2.6: Cumulative firm level employment loss overtime, calculated from dynamic
estimates
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As is seen, the large annual impacts within one and two kilometers reinforce
each other substantially overtime. The cumulative impacts are very large in
close proximity to the event and decay very rapidly. The calculations are rough
approximations and should be viewed in a critical light. I am multiplying out
firm level impacts calculated for firms alive at each subsequent time period. As
the stock of firms exhibits churn year to year, I am not using the same set
of firms for each annual calculation. Therefore the results are not necessarily
representative of a firm that is present for the full five lags. Measurement error and
the aforementioned issues with reflection are also likely to be magnified with such
a calculation. Nonetheless Figure 2.6 provides an interesting visual approximation
of the amplified firm level effects overtime and their rapid decay rate.
2.6 Potential spillover channels
I now turn to considering some possible channels through which spillovers operate.
The sources investigated here are industrial closeness, labour market closeness,
industry input-output linkages and local demand spillovers.
2.6.1 Potential channel: Industrial closeness
I asses the degree to which industrial similarity matters for masslayoff spillovers.
If a nearby non-masslayoff firm shares the same industry as the closest masslayoff,
we might expect firm level employment spillovers to be stronger. This would occur
if knowledge sharing agglomeration was an important driver behind spillovers,
and if knowledge sharing is strongest between firms in similar industries.
To unpick this phenomenon, for each firm in the dataset I construct a set of
dummies equal to one if the firm’s closest masslayoff shares the same industry
SIC code to the one, two, three or four digit level. These are included in turn
as both level controls and interaction terms with a distance function. Using the
full set of non-parametric dummies and four different levels of industry gradation
would be difficult to interpret. To more succinctly capture the issue, I use an
exponential decay function (the exponential of the negative euclidean distance
to the closest masslayoff). This does place an imperfect parametric form on
the distance relationship, but nonetheless shows whether those firms close to
the mass layoff (exp(−dist) ≈ 1) have different spillovers to those further away
(exp(−dist) ≈ 0). The results are displayed in Table 2.4.
As can be seen, the point estimates for both the level and interaction are
negative but very rarely significant. It appears that whether or not firms are
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Table 2.4: Industry of closest masslayoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
exp(-dist) -0.114∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109)
1D match -0.00579∗∗
(0.00176)
exp(-dist) * 1D match -0.00885
(0.0174)
2D match -0.00802
(0.00454)
exp(-dist) * 2D match -0.0129
(0.0320)
3D match -0.0220
(0.0117)
exp(-dist) * 3D match -0.0885
(0.0676)
4D match -0.0402∗
(0.0194)
exp(-dist) * 4D match -0.201∗∗
(0.0750)
Cons -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗ -0.0440∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗
(0.00652) (0.00656) (0.00661) (0.00665)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Exp(-dist) is the exponential
of the negative distance to the closest masslayoff. XD match is a dummy equal to one if
plant SIC matches closest masslayoff SIC to the X digit level. Fixed effects are 2 digit SIC
industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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industrially related to the closest masslayoff is not a key determinant of spillovers.
Proximity dominates regardless of industrial closeness.
Only once the firm in question and its closest masslayoff share a four digit SIC
code - extremely closely related - do we see any significant and meaningful impact.
Extremely closely related firms that are also located very close to the mass layoff
appear to suffer additional employment loss. However, this is a very small and
specific subset of firms and so the result should not be interpreted as substantial.
The main message from the analysis appears to be that industrial closeness is not
a key determinant of the degree of spatial spillovers.
2.6.2 Potential channel: Labour market closeness
Similarly, one might expect knowledge spillovers to operate through the labour
market. Firms in industries that share similar labour forces as the masslayoff may
be more exposed to knowledge agglomeration externalities and therefore more
negatively affected by masslayoffs.
To measure the degree to which a firm shares labour markets with its closest
masslayoffs, I use the UK Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE). The
ASHE provides employer reported wage information for a 1% sample of UK workers,
selected based on National Insurance Numbers (tax identification numbers). Using
the worker panel dynamics of the ASHE, I construct a matrix of employment flows
between 2-digit industry codes (SIC07 codes). If a firm of industry A is located
closest to a masslayoff of industry B, I construct a measure of labour sharing as
the maximum of:
• The percentage of industry A’s employment that flows to industry B (labour
outflows) and;
• The percentage of industry A’s employment that originates from industry B
(labour inflows)
The maximum of these percentages is a measure of the firm’s (industry A)
reliance on the masslayoff’s (industry B) labour market. I then merge these
maximum flow measures back into the BSD employment-masslayoff panel. The
sample of firms is then segmented based on firm percentiles of the labour market
closeness measure. Three thresholds are used; the 50th percentile (top 50% of
firms), the 75th percentile (top 25% of firms) and the 90th percentile (top 10%
of firms) of labour market closeness. Firm’s are deemed to share the masslayoff
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Table 2.5: Segmenting sample on the ‘high’ degree of labour market closeness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Sample: 50% most 25% most 10% most Remaining
related related related 90 %
dist 0-1km -0.0740∗∗∗ -0.0777∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗∗ -0.0685∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0131) (0.0159) (0.00650)
dist 1-2km -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0272∗∗∗ -0.0212∗ -0.0265∗∗∗
(0.00585) (0.00600) (0.00865) (0.00335)
dist 2-3km -0.0148∗∗ -0.0133∗ -0.00783 -0.0148∗∗∗
(0.00545) (0.00601) (0.00879) (0.00275)
dist 3-4km -0.00794 -0.00637 -0.000412 -0.00825∗∗
(0.00493) (0.00557) (0.0100) (0.00264)
dist 4-5km -0.00738 -0.00523 -0.000967 -0.00789∗∗
(0.00465) (0.00457) (0.00748) (0.00257)
dist 5-10km -0.00651 -0.00489 0.000670 -0.00705∗∗∗
(0.00415) (0.00417) (0.00674) (0.00179)
dist 10-20km -0.00297 -0.00158 0.00146 -0.00414∗∗∗
(0.00376) (0.00336) (0.00614) (0.00118)
dist 20-40km -0.000580 -0.000261 0.00151 0.000445
(0.00324) (0.00257) (0.00542) (0.00166)
Cons -0.0380∗∗∗ -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0470∗∗ -0.0434∗∗∗
(0.00597) (0.0128) (0.0158) (0.00653)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 31,883,890 16,041,175 6,286,332 59,694,725
R2 0.022 0.025 0.028 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Variables are a
set of dummies indicating distance to closest masslayoff. Controls are 2 digit
SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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market to a ‘high degree’ if they are above the relevant percentile cutoff, and to a
‘lower degree’ if below.
The results are displayed in table 2.5. The distance estimates of spillover
effects do not vary significantly with the sample segmentation. Firms sharing
labour markets with their closest mass layoff are not more strongly affected by
spillovers than other firms. Labour market closeness, and the theorised knowledge
spillovers, do not appear to be operating strongly here.
2.6.3 Potential channel: Input-output related industries
Another commonly cited source of local agglomeration and employment spillovers
is vertical linkages between firms. Perhaps the employment spillovers found in
this analysis are down to input-output linkages between mass layoffs and very
local firms. Already the degree of localisation suggests this may not be the case
as it is unlikely that primary suppliers or buyers are located within a couple of
kilometers.
I repeat a similar analysis based on the degree of input-output linkages between
a firm’s industry (industry A) and the industry of their closest masslayoff (industry
B). To do use, I use the ONS input-output tables available at the 2 digit industry
level. From the 2006 industry I-O tables, I calculate the following percentages:
• Upstream degree: the percentage of an industry A’s output that is sold to
industry B. This is flow from A to B divided by the total output of A (final
demand of A).
• Downstream degree: the percentage of industry’s A’s intermediate inputs
that are sourced from industry B. This is the flow from B to A divided by
the total intermediate purchases by industry A.
These percentages are then merged back into the BSD firm panel using the 2
digit industry codes of the firm (industry A) and their closest masslayoff (industry
B). Similar to the labour market closeness analysis, I then use firm percentile
cutoffs to segment firms into those that are ‘highly upstream’, ‘highly downstream’
or ‘neither highly upstream nor highly downstream’ to their closest masslayoff.
Table 2.6 displays the non-parametric estimates of employment spillovers
for different input-output linked firms. Column one estimates the spillovers
of the 25% of firms in industries with the highest upstream linkages to their
closest masslayoff’s industry. (The firm’s industry sells a large proportion of their
output to the masslayoff’s industry). Column two estimates the spillovers for the
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Table 2.6: Segmenting the sample based on degree of upstream and downstream
relationship to closest masslayoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Sample 25% most 25% most Neither upstream All
upstream downstream nor downstream firms
dist 0-1km -0.0613∗∗∗ -0.0737∗∗∗ -0.0700∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗
(0.00854) (0.0150) (0.00678) (0.00769)
dist 1-2km -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0240∗∗ -0.0262∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗∗
(0.00573) (0.00713) (0.00345) (0.00362)
dist 2-3km -0.00748 -0.0109 -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00510) (0.00644) (0.00309) (0.00305)
dist 3-4km -0.000153 -0.00484 -0.0107∗∗∗ -0.00813∗∗
(0.00449) (0.00635) (0.00287) (0.00269)
dist 4-5km -0.000973 -0.00500 -0.00892∗∗ -0.00792∗∗
(0.00455) (0.00559) (0.00297) (0.00254)
dist 5-10km -0.000749 -0.00369 -0.00802∗∗∗ -0.00683∗∗∗
(0.00401) (0.00478) (0.00207) (0.00179)
dist 10-20km 0.000886 -0.00225 -0.00413∗∗ -0.00424∗∗∗
(0.00393) (0.00415) (0.00125) (0.00119)
dist 20-40km 0.00371 -0.000457 0.000655 -0.0000507
(0.00240) (0.00372) (0.00189) (0.00121)
Cons -0.0328∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗ -0.0468∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.00593) (0.00578) (0.00633) (0.00641)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14,838,080 14,451,151 38,779,548 66,014,522
R2 0.020 0.022 0.024 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Variables are a set of
dummies indicating distance to closest masslayoff. Controls are 2 digit SIC industry,
2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001
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25% of firms in industries with the highest downstream linkages to their closest
masslayoff’s industry. (The firm’s industry sources a large proportion of their
inputs from the masslayoff’s industry). For comparison, column three presents
the estimates for firms that are neither in the 25% upstream or 25% downstream
samples, and column four presents the pooled estimates across all firms.
Again, the results find no statistically different spillover measures between
these subsets of firms. The patterns are repeated when we restrict the cutoffs
further by comparing the top 10% of upstream and downstream firms with the
remainder. It would appear that industry input-output linkages are not driving
the strong, localised employment spillovers.
2.6.4 Potential channel: Local product demand spillovers
Finally, I look at whether or not firms in non-tradeable industries experience
stronger employment spillovers from masslayoffs. Non-tradeable goods are the
most responsive to local consumer spending. In turn, local consumer spending is
likely to be hit following a masslayoff as the newly laid off workers reduce their
consumption. Therefore, if firms in non-tradeable industries experience more
negative spillovers from masslayoffs, this would point towards local spending as a
transmission channel.
I calculate the degree of tradeability for industry A using the same two digit
input-output tables from the ONS. In short, the degree of tradeability measure
captures the international integration of each industry. The index measure is the
maximum of:
• Export fraction: the fraction of industry A’s total output that is exported
(rather than sold/consumed domestically).
• Import fraction: the fraction of industry A’s total intermediate inputs that
is sourced from imports (rather than domestic sources).
The measure is then merged back into the BSD firm panel using the firms’
2 digit industry codes. I segment the set of firms in the same way according to
percentile fractions. Firms above percentile cutoffs are considered in ‘tradeable’
industries, and firms below are considered in ‘non-tradeable’ industries.
Results are displayed in Table 2.7. As we see, the 10% of firms in the least
tradeable industries experience the strongest spillovers, particularly at the closest
distances to the mass layoff. Non-tradeable firms still exhibit employment spillovers
but to a lesser extent. Local demand channels are therefore likely to be one channel
contributing to the observed spillovers.
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Table 2.7: Highly non-tradeable vs not highly non-tradeable industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Sample 50% least 25% least 10% least Remaining
tradeable tradeable tradeable firms
dist 0-1km -0.0704∗∗∗ -0.0701∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0165) (0.00307) (0.00721)
dist 1-2km -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0201∗ -0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗
(0.00529) (0.00816) (0.00208) (0.00390)
dist 2-3km -0.00982∗∗ -0.00836 -0.0157∗ -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00353) (0.00393) (0.000811) (0.00353)
dist 3-4km -0.00515∗ -0.00490∗ -0.00717 -0.00833∗∗
(0.00236) (0.00169) (0.00391) (0.00320)
dist 4-5km -0.00500∗∗ -0.00466∗∗∗ -0.00511 -0.00825∗∗
(0.00170) (0.000963) (0.000603) (0.00306)
dist 5-10km -0.00312∗ -0.00227∗ -0.00217 -0.00747∗∗∗
(0.00129) (0.000894) (0.000548) (0.00212)
dist 10-20km -0.00330∗∗∗ -0.00289∗∗∗ -0.00351 -0.00438∗∗∗
(0.000699) (0.000564) (0.000660) (0.00146)
dist 20-40km -0.00129∗ -0.00123 0.00142 -0.0000346
(0.000468) (0.000658) (0.000855) (0.00138)
Cons -0.0424∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗∗
(0.00669) (0.00941) (0.00486) (0.00698)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 33,290,051 18,359,195 7,481,532 57,748,254
R2 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Variables are a
set of dummies indicating distance to closest masslayoff. Controls are 2 digit
SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.7 Conclusion
The paper has provided the first estimates of employment spillover decay rates
over space and time of masslayoffs. Spillovers on nearby firms are strongly negative
but very highly localised. They are also very persistent, despite the one-off nature
of the masslayoff shock. Individual firms in close proximity continue to reduce
their employment year-on-year for at least five years after the event.
The degree of localisation matters both for the measurement of the spillovers
and for policy targeting. As to the measurement issue, Section 2.4 explicitly
addresses the costs of measuring spillovers over large discrete units. With the
spillovers as localised as they are, averaging over large administrative or commuting
zone units, as is the common approach in spatial labour market analysis, will tend
towards estimating no spillover effects. This is clearly not the case as the zero
results stem from looking at a misleading area.
The localisation and their dynamics are important for policy responses too.
We do observe a large initial shock generating persistently negative local spillovers.
If a policy maker wishes to mitigate the negative ‘snowball effect’ the results
would imply that any intervention, such as support to nearby firms or workers
at the outset of the shock, should be very local in nature. Intervention over a
broader area would be more costly and poorly targeted. Beyond this observation,
I leave the evaluation of any particular policy intervention’s effectiveness to other
discussions.
Section 2.6 considers possible local firm linkages that could be contributing
to the local spillovers. No support is found for input-output spillovers, shared
labour market spillovers (which would indicate possible knowledge agglomeration
spillovers), or within-industry productivity spillovers. It should be noted that the
first two were only able to be measured at the two-digit industry level for data
availability reasons. The lack of findings must therefore be interpreted in this
light.
The results do however find some evidence of local product demand spillovers
as non-tradeable firms reduce their employment more strongly than their tradeable
counterparts. These local demand effects are found around the masslayoff, therefore
around the place of work of laid off workers. However, households are likely
to spend a large fraction of their income around their place of residence. An
interesting corollary of the local demand results would be to investigate whether
non-tradeable firms in residential areas are affected by local residents experiencing
a mass layoff. The data available do include place of residence from 2004 so such
an extension can be feasibly implemented.
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Chapter 3
Hours of work polarisation?
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between hours per worker and employment polari-
sation. Our core question is whether hours per worker follow the same polarisation
patterns as previously observed for employment, measured by either heads or
total hours. Using the occupational task index measures of Acemoglu and Autor
(2011), we find large relative declines in hours per worker in routine manual jobs
– precisely the occupations most negatively affected by employment polarisation
from routine-biased technical change. We also find a lower relative decline in
hours per worker for non-routine cognitive analytical jobs, which are growing
through polarisation. At the same time, hours per worker declined significantly
more than the trend for non-routine manual physical occupations. Instead of a
polarisation pattern, we find that hours per worker have been declining more in
manual jobs (routine manual and non-routine manual physical). These patterns
are observed across age, gender and education groups, with few exceptions and
changes in intensity. The decline in hours per worker occurred mostly within
sectors. Using a wage ranking of occupations instead of occupational task indices,
the decline in hours per worker is monotonically related to wages. The results
are specific to the European countries and the same patterns are not found using
data for the United States.
Keywords: job polarisation, hours per worker, routine-biased technical change
JEL codes: J23, J24, O33
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3.1 Introduction
Employment polarisation has emerged as a widespread phenomenon across ad-
vanced economies in the past three decades. It is characterised by a decline in the
share of middle-skill jobs and an increase in the share of high- and low-skill jobs
(conventionally defined by a one-on-one mapping of wages to skills), leading to the
well-known “hollowing-out” of employment. Polarisation has occurred alongside
a longer-term decline in the intensive margin of employment (hours per worker)
in European economies. Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of usual weekly average
hours of work per worker across EU-15 countries from 1992-2016, which have
fallen by almost two and a half hours during that period, generating substantial
aggregate effects on total hours in the economy. The fall is not isolated or confined
to small groups of countries. Instead, it forms part of a longer term trend of
declining hours worked per employed person across European economies. The two
labour market trends, while not necessarily sharing causal factors, are likely to
have interconnected implications and yet have only been analysed in isolation. We
investigate whether hours per worker exhibit polarisation patterns along similar
distributional lines as already documented employment polarisation.
Figure 3.1: Average weekly hours per worker in EU-15 countries, 1992-2016
Source: EU Labour Force Survey, authors’ own calculations. Hours refers to usual weekly hours
per worker.
The non-monotonic relationship between skills and employment that charac-
terises job polarisation first emerged in the 1990s. For the United States, Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) show that the process of employment polarisation occurred
largely over two periods. An initial period between 1989 and 1999 was charac-
terised by a strong increase in the share of high-skilled jobs, a smaller increase
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in the share of low-skilled jobs and a decline in middle-skilled jobs. A second
period followed, between 1999 and 2007, where the share of employment grew
most in the last third of the wage distribution. With a view to explaining the new
employment composition patterns, Autor et al. (2003) developed the hypothesis of
routine-biased technical change (RBTC). Traditionally middle-skilled jobs requir-
ing repetitive routine tasks – such as factory production lines or clerical work – are
vulnerable to increasing automation and have seen their wages and employment
shares decline. Low-skilled jobs, particularly those requiring in-person services
– such as cleaning and personal care – are less substitutable for technology and
as a consequence their relative employment share has increased slightly. At the
other end, high-skilled workers – such as managers and analysts - find their labour
complemented by technological progress, increasing their share of employment.
Since the seminal work of Autor et al. (2003), a large body of literature
emerged around the theme of employment polarisation. Autor et al. (2006)
related the observed employment polarisation in the United States with the
changing distribution of in-job task demands related to technological advancement
and outsourcing. Goos and Manning (2007) showed evidence of job and wage
polarisation in the United Kingdom, while Goos et al. (2009) and Goos et al.
(2014) broadened their scope and showed evidence of pervasive job polarisation
in 16 European countries. Evidence of job polarisation is also available for other
large advanced economies (e.g Coelli and Borland, 2015, for Australia; Green and
Sand, 2015, for Canada; Furukawa and Toyoda, 2018, for Japan).
A complementary branch of the literature has focused on specific drivers of
employment polarisation. This includes, for example, the role of low-service
occupations in the rise of polarisation (Autor and Dorn, 2013), the contribution
of ICT to the polarisation of the labour market via an increase in demand for
high-skilled labour (Michaels et al., 2014), the types of workers who transit from
routine to non-routine cognitive and non-routine manual jobs (Cortes, 2016), the
role of specific demographic groups in shaping employment polarisation (Cortes
et al., 2017) and the relationship between polarisation patterns and inter-industry
wage differentials (Shim and Yang, 2018). More recently, vom Lehn (2019) tests
the hypothesis of substitutability and complementarity of different workers with
machines and found that patterns of polarisation do not always conform to that
hypothesis over time. He hypothesises that more recent technological change could
have evolved to replace also analytical tasks.
A key observation is that existing work on employment polarisation focuses on
either headcount or total hours worked. To our knowledge, the internal margin
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of adjustment – hours per worker – has not been analysed, and that is what we
study in this paper. Contrary to employment, which has been increasing during
our sample, hours per worker are on a long-term declining trend. Employment
polarisation and the decline in hours per worker are far apart in time but they
may both have, as many other changes in labour markets, a common underlying
pattern: technological progress.
Taking the manufacturing sector alone, in the period 1913-1997 hours worked
annually per person declined by 31% in the United States, 38% in the United
Kingdom, 42% in France and 45% in Germany (Cahuc et al., 2014). The trend
has not been uniform over time and across countries. Periods of sharp decline
in average hours worked have been followed by periods of stabilisation or even
an increase in average hours worked. Average hours worked per person also
tend to be substantially higher in low- than in high-income countries (Bick et al.
(2018)). Various factors could be at play in the determination of hours worked per
person such as, for example, labour laws, unionisation, taxation and home sector
productivity. However, Vandenbroucke (2009) argues that these forces appear of
secondary importance relative to technology.
The evolution in hours worked also appears to be heterogeneous across skill
groups. Since the 1980s, the average hours of low-skilled workers have dropped
significantly whereas those of high-skilled workers have remained high (Aguiar
and Hurst, 2007 and Boppart and Ngai, 2018). The timing of change in hours
worked by educational group coincides with the increase in inequality in wages
and consumption (Katz and Autor, 1999); it is also in the neighbourhood of the
early stages of the process of job polarisation (Autor et al., 2003).
Our framework models a statistical rather than causal relationship between
hours per worker and job polarisation. We ask whether hours per worker follow the
same distributional patterns as employment, and less formally investigate possible
mechanisms. We also try to infer the possible income distribution consequences
of the observed patterns in hours per worker. There are good reasons why
polarisation in employment could also affect hours per worker. First, hours
per worker could be affected by the same demand forces affecting employment
polarisation. Second, technological advancements may change the degree of
substitutability between capital and labour. For instance, technological advances
have allowed for better monitoring of consumer demand and scheduling of labour.
This might be particularly relevant in services sectors.
The value of uncovering a relationship between hours of work and job polar-
isation is twofold. In a purely mechanical sense, a pattern of hours per worker
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polarisation would exacerbate already documented employment and wage polari-
sation. Arguably, it is overall income polarisation – rather than hourly wage or
headcount employment - that is of primary concern to policy makers concerned
with distributional issues. Total income is the multiplicative function of employ-
ment (extensive margin), wages and hours of work (the intensive margin). The
third contributing variable – hours – has been absent from the polarisation litera-
ture. If hours polarise along similar lines as wages and employment, that would
have an exacerbating effect of polarisation. Higher employment with lower hours
worked per person in lower-paying occupations together with higher employment
with relatively more hours worked per person in high-paying occupations could
increase concerns about the quality of jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution
and would exacerbate wage inequality.
The second motivating factor for studying patterns in hours per worker is
to gain a better understanding of how the relatively new phenomenon of job
polarisation is related to the long-term trend decline in hours worked per person.
A fundamental difference between the analysis of job polarisation based on em-
ployment or total hours and average hours is that while employment and total
hours have been increasing, average hours have been declining. An empirical
question we attempt to answer is whether hours per worker are declining across
all skill levels or they exhibit patterns of polarisation similar to those observed for
employment and wages.
Our empirical analysis uses the EU-LFS data for the period 1992-2016 for the
EU-15 countries.1 We follow the recommendation of Autor (2013) that researchers
use, as far as possible, available measures of tasks classification, and utilise
available indices of job task and skill content – particularly routinisation – to
explain trends in hours per worker. We use six indices to classify job tasks instead
of the common three categories. Non-routine cognitive jobs are divided between
analytical and interpersonal; routine jobs are divided between cognitive and manual
and non-routine manual jobs are divided between physical and (inter)personal.
In particular, we match occupation indices from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) to
EU-LFS microdata from 1992 to 2016, focusing on EU-15 countries. In addition,
we also use their index of offshorability to account for the potential of outsourcing.
The task indices are shown to explain employment and wage polarisation in both
1The EU-15 countries comprise Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. Data exist for all 15 countries for the period 1992-2016, with the exception of Austria,
Finland and Sweden where data start in 1995. Further, occupation identifiers are available for
Belgium from 1993 and for Finland and Sweden from 1997, and so these countries enter our
sample then.
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the US and the EU. We investigate whether they additionally explain the level
and, more importantly, trend in hours per worker.2
We find that workers in highly routine manual jobs are working fewer hours
relative to other occupations over time – the interaction term between a high
degree of routinisation and a time trend is negative and significant. However, this
result is only observed for routine manual jobs and is broadly absent for routine
cognitive jobs. We also find that workers are working relatively more hours in
non-routine cognitive analytical jobs, although the evidence there is somewhat
weaker. Taken together, these two patterns give partial support to the hypothesis
that hours per worker follow the same polarisation patterns as employment at the
top. For non-routine manual jobs the evidence is more mixed. While we observe a
relative increase in hours per worker in non-routine manual interpersonal jobs, we
see the opposite for non-routine manual physical jobs. The two effects combined
make hours per worker for non-routine manual jobs relatively neutral as compared
to the trend in hours. However, for non-routine manual jobs the occupational task
indices also do not give the typical polarisation patterns for total employment.
Overall, instead of a polarisation pattern, our results show that hours per work
declined more in manual jobs (routine manual and non-routine manual physical
jobs). Our results remain robust to the partition of the sample between full-time
and part-time, between male and female and across education and age groups.
Hours worked per person also declined more than the trend in jobs that are highly
offshorable. The main patterns are also consistent across the EU-15 countries
with few exceptions.
Additionally, we analyse patterns in hours per worker along the wage distribu-
tion, instead of the occupational indices. While for total employment we see the
typical U-shaped polarisation pattern, for hours per worker the pattern is inverted
L-shaped. Put differently, the share of employment declined in middle-wage occu-
pations in relation to bottom and top occupations, whereas hours per worker show
a monotonic relationship with wages: hours per worker declined more in low-wage
occupations, followed by middle-wage occupations and high-wage occupations
have experienced almost no decline in hours per worker. If we partition the wage
distribution in six quantiles instead of three, we observe a U-shaped pattern for
most of the distribution, but with a lower decrease in hours per worker at the top
2As is standard, we assume skills are increasing in wages. For convenience, we also assume
the conventional mapping carries over to tasks, whereby occupations intensive in non-routine
cognitive tasks are high-skilled, occupations intensive in routine tasks are middle-skilled, and
those intensive in non-routine manual tasks are low-skilled. Throughout the text, we retain this
implicit mapping and refer to individuals in jobs with a high content of non-routine cognitive as
high-skilled, and similarly for other tasks.
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quantile. Thus, contrary to occupational indices where hours declined more in
the middle, the wage ranking of occupations shows that hours declined more at
the bottom.
Taken together, our results suggest that patterns in hours per worker exacerbate
the impact of polarisation on wage inequality. High-skilled workers increased their
share of employment and work relatively more hours; medium-skilled workers
saw a decline in the share of employment and a decline in hours per worker; and
low-skilled workers saw a substantial decrease in hours per workers and a smaller
increase in their share of employment. The analysis based on the wage ranking of
occupations makes this point even clearer: hours per worker declined significantly
more in low-paying occupations.
The contributions of this paper are threefold. First and foremost, we docu-
ment a new stylised fact: trends in hours per worker vary substantially across
occupational task indices – taking together the two constituents of each index, at
the top (non-routine cognitive) and the middle (routine), hours per worker evolved
similarly to employment polarisation patterns, while at the bottom (non-routine
manual) they declined. If we instead use a wage rank of occupations, hours
per worker decline monotonically with wages. The difference between the two
approaches is that the decline in the middle-skill jobs happens via a decline in
routine manual jobs which are in fact low paid. This also shows the importance of
a finer disaggregation of skills suggested by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), which we
employ in this paper. The direct effect of these mechanisms has been to exacerbate
overall earnings polarisation. Second, we contribute to the empirical literature
relating the long-term decline in hours worked with technological advancement.
Third, we provide detailed level country results that show broadly similar patterns
across EU-15 countries, and across a variety of demographic groups.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) data, the construction of the
occupational task indices used and shows main descriptive statistics. Section 3.3
presents baseline results for hours per worker across task indices while Section
3.4 considers additional contributing factors. The latter includes demographic
shifts over the past few decades, offshorability of jobs, part-time employment and
industrial change. Section 3.5 decomposes overall employment polarisation into
the hours-per-worker channel and head-count employment channel. Section 3.6
turns to country-level analysis – the individual EU-15 countries and a comparison
with the United States. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
The main dataset used in this paper is the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS). The
EU-LFS is a microdataset of repeated cross sections of household level observations
(in our case, of annual frequency). As the EU-LFS data are collected based on a
harmonised methodology they are suitable for cross-country analyses. Additionally,
we use the EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in order to
obtain information on wages, as wage variables are missing in our version of the
EU-LFS dataset.
Two key variables in our analysis are hours worked per person and individuals’
occupations. Hours worked are reported in reference to the week prior to the
survey. Individuals are asked about the hours usually worked and the hours
actually worked. Differences between the two measures include, among others,
overtime or downtime, holidays and sick leave. We focus on working individuals
reporting positive usual hours worked per week in the EU-15 countries, during
the period 1992-2016, and will only refer to usual hours for the remainder of the
paper, unless otherwise stated.
Occupations are codified according to the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO). Each individual worker’s occupation is classified with
3-digit ISCO occupation codes: ISCO88 codes for observations up until 2010, and
ISCO08 codes for observations from 2011 onwards.3 The EU-LFS also provides
detailed demographic information such as age, gender, education attainment,
family status, etc. It also provides other employment information, such as size of
firm and, also important for our analysis, the worker’s sector of economic activity,
according to the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European
Community (NACE).
Our analysis centres on measures of occupational skill and task content. We
base our analysis on the job skill measures created by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
They use O*NET data on work abilities, work activities, work context and skills to
have composite measures to classify each occupation according to their propensity
for use of five tasks, and a measure of offshorability. The skill characteristics
form three broad groupings - non-routine cognitive, routine, non-routine manual –
approximating the top, middle and lower ends of the labour market respectively.
Much of the polarisation literature explicitly or implicitly finds that three skill
categories – high, medium and low - are insufficient to capture structural changes
in the labour market, as technological impacts are heterogeneous within each skill
3Wage analysis is based on 2-digit ISCO occupation codes.
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Figure 3.2: Mapping of skills, tasks and occupations
grouping. For example, Autor and Dorn (2013) find that the growth in lower skill
employment is driven by in-person, service sector jobs. In the middle segment of
the labour market, routine manual labour on factory production lines was largely
automated in an initial round of RBTC. Arguably, a second round of RBTC, in
the form of computerisation, is in the process of replacing routine cognitive jobs,
such as cashiers and law clerks. In an attempt to capture richer technological
impacts on heterogeneous tasks, we opt for the finer gradation of Acemoglu and
Autor (2011). We additionally create a sixth measure that separates lower skilled,
non-routine manual jobs into personal services and physical jobs.4 Figure 3.2
displays the six task indices, paired by skill level, their corresponding tasks and an
example occupation that requires high levels of the relevant index. Throughout
the text, we refer to the six task indices as occupational task indices.
The occupations used in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) are the SOC2000 measures
and each index is distributed approximately standard normal. We use a number
of crosswalks to match the indices to the 3-digit ISCO codes used in the EU-LFS.5
4The category of non-routine manual personal is not part of Acemoglu and Autor’s 2011
handbook chapter, but it is available in their online data programmes. We have complemented
their measures with other O*NET context and ability task measures (Appendix C.1). We impose
a further restriction and remove from the index all occupations with codes below 300 (managers
and professionals). This was done because doctors, veterinarians, midwifery professionals and
other similar professionals were ranking high in the newly constructed non-routine manual
personal index, which made it difficult to distinguish from non-routine analytical personal jobs.
The results we report in this paper relate to our modified measure. Results for the original
measure by Acemoglu and Autor can be found in Appendix C.4
5We use a crosswalk from SOC2000 to ISCO88 to transform the indices to ISCO88 codes.
Where multiple SOC2000 occupations match ISCO88, we take the weighted mean of each index
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The final result is a table of ISCO occupation codes and the corresponding values
for each of the six indices, for each occupation. A note on terminology: all jobs
are characterised by a combination of several different skills and tasks. For brevity,
we will refer to jobs characterised by a high content of, e.g., routine cognitive
tasks as routine cognitive jobs.
Figure 3.3: Occupational task indices and personal characteristics
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations.
Figure 3.3 shows some characteristics of our sample. Weekly hours per worker
declined by 2.4 hours between 1992 and 2016, primarily in routine manual and
non-routine manual jobs. By contrast, hours per worker declined only marginally
using the US 2000 Census weights provided by Acemoglu and Autor (2011). To match the
indices to ISCO08 codes, we again use a crosswalk from ISCO88 to ISCO08 and take the mean
of each index for multiple matches.
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in routine cognitive and non-routine cognitive analytical jobs. These patterns
show the importance of differentiating occupational task indices by more than
three categories. The share of part-time work increased across all occupational
task indices but more so in routine manual jobs, suggesting that the increase
in part-time may have played some role in the accentuated decline in hours per
worker in these occupations.6 The share of part-time is higher among non-routine
manual personal tasks, which is also the occupational task index with the largest
share of female workers. At the same time, there is no fixed threshold of work-time
status; individuals who work sufficiently fewer hours may self-classify as working
part-time. In that sense, lower average hours almost mechanically imply more
part-time work.
Figure 3.3 also shows the well-known pattern of an ageing workforce and, more
importantly for our analysis, that average age increased more in routine jobs. The
education shares across the six indices provide additional information of the skills
required. Non-routine cognitive tasks are those employing the largest share of
highly educated workers. At the bottom, with the lowest shares of highly educated
workers, are the non-routine manual physical and routine manual occupations,
which are those that display the largest reduction in hours per worker. Routine
cognitive jobs stay at the middle of the skill distribution.
Our wage rankings come from individual data from EU-SILC. We construct
an hourly wage variable by dividing gross annual employee cash earnings by
annual total hours, for both full-time and part-time work, excluding self-employed
individuals and family workers, as well as individuals with zero earnings. We pool
data across the EU-15 by normalising individual wages by the weighted country
average. We then calculate average hourly wages for each of the two-digit ISCO88
occupations in 2008. We use a weighted average using EU-SILC weights, but
the unweighted measure is very similar. Other years give similar results, but
2008 gives the largest coverage across countries for the ISCO88 classification.
We then link the task indices at the 3-digit ISCO88 with the wage ranking at
2-digit ISCO88, ending up with around 130 occupations for each index, except
for non-routine manual personal, which we restrict to not include managerial or
professional occupations (100 and 200 level).
Figure 3.4 displays the relationship between occupational task indices and
the occupational wage rank, fitted with a quadratic curve. There is a positive
relationship between wages and the level of non-routine tasks. By contrast, routine
6The share of involuntary part-time is higher among part-time workers in routine manual
and non-routine manual physical jobs, which is suggestive evidence that part of the decline in
hours per worker is demand driven.
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Figure 3.4: Occupational task indices versus wage ranking
Source: EU-LFS, EU-SILC, index construction data from Acemoglu and Autor (2011), O*NET
task data and authors’ calculations. Wage ranks are calculated using weighted and pooled 2008
EU-SILC data for EU-15 countries.
tasks display the expected inverse U-shaped pattern, highlighting their prevalence
in the middle segment of the labour market. The non-routine manual physical
index is decreasing in wages, as expected, while the non-routine manual personal
is slightly increasing, albeit with a low R2.
Overall, the descriptive patterns show a more subtle categorisation of the
occupational task indices than the usual trichotomy of abstract, routine and
manual tasks. In fact, routine manual jobs show characteristics more typical of
low-skilled jobs: the share of high-education workers is as low as for non-routine
manual physical occupations, as is the wage rank. Conversely, non-routine manual
personal occupations appear to be more middle- than low-skilled: the share of
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high education is similar to routine cognitive jobs, while the wage rank cuts across
almost the entire distribution. Indeed, "personal" seems more challenging to
pin down using the occupational task indices compared to other jobs - though it
emerges clearly that "personal" occupations have a large share of female workers.
3.3 Baseline results
In this section we estimate a reduced form model to analyse the relationship be-
tween the indices discussed in the previous section – known to explain employment
and wage polarisation – and weekly hours of work per worker. We are interested
primarily in whether the indices can account for the trend in hours per worker,
which is decreasing at the aggregate level.
We run the following empirical model:
Yikct = α0 + α1Ii + α2t+ α3Ii ∗ t+ βXict + ck ∗ cc + ikct (3.1)
This specification fits the outcome of interest - hours per worker, Y , for individual
i in industry k in country c at time t to an intercept, the index value of the
individual’s occupation, Ii, a linear time trend t and an interaction between the
index in question and the time trend. For ease of interpretation, we convert the
continuous index measures into dummy variables that equal one if the occupation
has a high index score, above the 66th percentile for occupations in each year, and
zero if it has a low score.7 Coefficient α1 accounts for level differences between
different occupations that occur regardless of any trends, while α2 controls for the
aggregate trend. The main coefficient of interest is α3, which captures the extent
to which hours for occupations in a given index trend in a way that differs from
the aggregate. Given the overall aggregate trend, a positive value for α3 indicates
that occupations with high values of the index in question have exhibited a milder
decline, and opposite for a negative value.
Additional covariates include country and industry fixed effects, demographics
(gender, age, education) and controls such as firm size, whether the interview was
conducted with the person in question or by proxy. Country and industry fixed
effects account for time-invariant heterogeneity in average hours worked across
countries or industries. Two-way country and industry fixed effects assume the
7We calculate the 66th percentile of each index, each year using the weighted EU-15 LFS
observations for the relevant year. This method ensures that for each index, one third of the
observations each year will have the dummy variable equal to one. This method thereby abstracts
from classification changes over time. As a robustness check, we also repeat the analysis using a
constant 66th percentile i.e. the threshold for a given index is the same across years.
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industry effect is identical across countries, while an interacted country-industry
fixed effect allows for the possibility of heterogeneity across countries within the
same industry. Unless stated otherwise, errors are clustered at the country-industry
level, in a total of 240 clusters. All regressions are weighted using EU-LFS weights,
as provided by Eurostat.
The results are based on the estimation of specification 3.1 one time per index on
the total sample. We start by analysing the explanatory ability of the non-routine
cognitive indices for hours per worker. Table 3.1 presents baseline regressions of
hours per worker on the time trend, a dummy for the individual working in a high
index score occupation, the interaction and covariates as specified above. The
first three columns refer to the non-routine cognitive analytical index and the
final three to the non-routine cognitive personal index. Columns 1 and 4 present
results without controls, columns 2 and 5 with the standard controls, country
and sector fixed effects, and columns 3 and 6 with controls and country-sector
interacted fixed effects.
Table 3.1: Baseline results for non-routine cognitive (analytical and personal) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
————- Analytical ————- ————- Personal ————-
High Index*t 0.0500* 0.0873** 0.0410 -0.0089 0.0352 0.0129
(0.0272) (0.0366) (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0317) (0.0269)
High Index 2.5290*** 1.6709* 2.8334*** 2.2450*** 1.7544** 3.2951***
(0.8698) (0.9351) (0.7622) (0.8324) (0.8500) (0.6076)
t -0.1182*** -0.0957*** -0.0818*** -0.1006*** -0.0856*** -0.0790***
(0.0154) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0159) (0.0118) (0.0117)
Constant 37.9281*** 39.6241*** 41.7552*** 38.0525*** 39.1187*** 41.1743***
(0.5777) (1.2525) (0.5693) (0.5342) (1.2703) (0.5475)
Observations 21561515 16754427 16754427 21561515 16754427 16754427
R-squared 0.0193 0.1575 0.2082 0.0103 0.1530 0.2086
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FEs No Yes No No Yes No
County-Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Note: All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from
1992-2016, hours variable is ‘usual’ hours of work.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
High non-routine cognitive analytical and high non-routine cognitive personal
jobs are both associated with higher initial hours per worker. The interaction
term with the time trend is positive but only weakly significant for the first two
specifications for non-routine cognitive analytical jobs. When the most stringent
country-sector interaction fixed effects are included, removing more variation,
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Table 3.2: Baseline results for routine (cognitive and manual) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
————- Cognitive ————- ————- Manual ————-
High Index*t 0.0769*** 0.0215 0.0187 -0.2083*** -0.1799*** -0.1246***
(0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0390) (0.0264) (0.0192)
High Index -2.2284*** -0.2970 -0.9371*** 4.9924*** 2.6383*** 0.9427***
(0.4875) (0.4780) (0.2667) (0.7305) (0.4884) (0.3129)
t -0.1254*** -0.0878*** -0.0895*** -0.0328** -0.0228 -0.0380***
(0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0115)
Constant 39.4774*** 39.2672*** 41.1425*** 37.1057*** 38.3900*** 41.2568***
(0.5409) (1.1400) (0.5592) (0.4864) (1.1607) (0.5575)
Observations 21561515 16754427 16754427 21561515 16754427 16754427
R-squared 0.0061 0.1460 0.1946 0.0139 0.1485 0.1961
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country FEs No Yes No No Yes No
County-Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Note: All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from
1992-2016, hours variable is ‘usual’ hours of work.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the result becomes insignificant (although the result is statistically significant for
most of the EU-15 countries in country-level regressions). Overall, there is some
evidence that workers in highly non-routine cognitive analytical occupations work
slightly more hours over time relative to other occupations with a low non-routine
cognitive analytical index. In contrast, the interaction term for high non-routine
cognitive personal tasks - such as managerial occupations - is not significantly
different from zero across all specifications. It thus appears that such occupations
are not experiencing differential trends.
Turning to the analysis of jobs with high routine characteristics, we observe
a stark difference in the routine indices between routine cognitive and routine
manual occupations (Table 3.2). Individuals working in high routine cognitive
occupations have no statistically distinguishable level or trend differences in hours
of work relative to others, once covariates are included. However, high routine
manual occupations - those most susceptible to automation - have a strongly
negative and significant trend interaction term. Such jobs are reducing their
hours per worker relative to other jobs. It appears that the well-documented
reduction in employment (headcount and total hours) in routine jobs is matched
with employment reductions on the intensive margin too, although that appears
to be driven by routine manual jobs only.
Non-routine manual jobs also exhibit contrasting patterns between physical
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and personal. Table 3.3 shows a statistically significant negative interaction trend
term for high non-routine manual physical occupations, indicating declining hours
relative to other occupations. By contrast, results are not statistically significant
for high non-routine manual personal jobs. The latter encompass the service
sectors growing (in total employment and total hours) with job polarisation. Our
results do not show the same patterns for hours. Using the definition in the online
programmes underlying the results in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the interaction
term becomes statistically significant when only country fixed effects are used
(Appendix C.4, Table C.10).8
Table 3.3: Baseline results for non-routine manual (physical and personal) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———— Physical ———— ———— Personal ————
High Index*t -0.0679** -0.0658*** -0.0449** 0.0387 0.0017 0.0045
(0.0287) (0.0236) (0.0177) (0.0305) (0.0347) (0.0288)
High Index 4.1315*** 1.6831*** 0.5127 -4.9628*** -1.6103 -1.2700
(0.6982) (0.4911) (0.3404) (0.9497) (1.0041) (0.9071)
t -0.0763*** -0.0622*** -0.0683*** -0.1110*** -0.0837*** -0.0866***
(0.0139) (0.0152) (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0124)
Constant 37.3183*** 38.4413*** 41.1664*** 39.7527*** 39.6616*** 41.5287***
(0.4992) (1.1758) (0.6041) (0.3980) (1.0881) (0.5212)
Observations 21561515 16754427 16754427 21831786 16959719 16959719
R-squared 0.0197 0.1470 0.1941 0.0240 0.1483 0.1945
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country No Yes No No Yes No
County-Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
Note: All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from
1992-2016, hours variable is ‘usual’ hours of work.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Overall, our baseline results show only some signs supporting the pattern of
8If a restriction of limiting our definition to occupations above 299 had not been imposed, the
interaction term would have been positive, meaning that non-routine manual personal jobs would
display increasing hours per worker in relation to other occupations scoring lower in this index.
That result did not seem to be picking up trending hours in well-paid occupations categorised
as highly non-routine manual personal. Such occupations include doctors, veterinarians and
midwifery professionals – all jobs that require in-person, non-routine care work. To test the
sensitivity of the results to these professions, we first exclude them from the analysis, or
recategorise them as low non-routine manual personal, and find that the results, if anything,
strengthen. In addition, we tested the results for the lower half of the wage distribution, omitting
all occupations above the median wage. The interaction between the time trend in hours and
the dummy for high non-routine manual personal jobs strengthens again, suggesting that the
positive interaction trend term is driven by low-paid high non-routine manual personal jobs.
Such jobs are exactly the kind of in person services and care work associated with the Autor
and Dorn (2013) polarisation in employment and total hours. Results available upon request.
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polarisation in the intensive margin. Hours per worker are declining across all six
skill indices, but the slope varies, leading to differences in the evolution in hours
per worker across jobs. On the one hand, we see a typical pattern of polarisation
when comparing the evolution of hours per worker among non-routine cognitive
analytical (declined less than the trend) and routine manual (declined substantially
more than the trend), while the pattern for non-routine manual personal is less
clear but tends to be not statistically significant. On the other hand, we do not
find statistically significant results for non-routine cognitive personal and routine
cognitive tasks, while hours declined more than the trend in non-routine manual
physical occupations.
Aggregating into three skill categories, we find patterns consistent with po-
larisation in non-routine cognitive jobs, and in routine jobs. That, however, is
not the case in non-routine manual jobs, as we do not find strong evidence in
favour of a relative increase in personal jobs, which in any case would be offset by
the decline in physical jobs. Our most robust result is thus the strong relative
decline in hours per worker in routine occupations driven by routine manual jobs.
Additionally, instead of a polarisation pattern we observe that hours declined
more in manual jobs (routine manual and non-routine manual physical jobs).
Our results also show that a finer disaggregation of task classification is im-
portant to understand hours per worker patterns across occupations. This finding
for hours per worker is consistent with the pattern of employment polarisation
uncovered by Fonseca et al. (2018) for Portugal. That paper also distinguishes
between routine manual and routine cognitive jobs and shows a sharp decline
in routine manual employment but only a modest decline in routine cognitive
employment. The authors explain the difference between the two routine jobs by
the large expansion of the service sector, which employs many workers in routine
cognitive jobs.
In the following sections we explore in more detail factors that could help
explain our results, beyond (or together with) polarisation associated with technical
change. In addition to the analysis we will show in the next sections, we undertook
a battery of robustness checks on the main results. First, we replicated all central
results with an alternative measure of hours of work: actual hours worked rather
than usual hours. Actual hours can vary from usual due to annual leave, sick
leave, public holidays and overtime, among other reasons. On average, actual
hours are lower than usual hours in levels but the trend remains comparable over
time. We replicated the baseline regressions using actual hours of work and found
no qualitative changes to the results. In addition, we varied the hours criterion
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for sample inclusion, at time including or removing observations with zero hours
worked, and at others including only those who worked a minimum number of
hours (e.g. five hours). These checks yielded broadly the same results as the
baseline. Second, we implemented a variety of fixed effects, including country
level, industry level and industry-country level interaction. The latter is the
most stringent - by retaining only within country industry variation - and as
such causes standard errors to increase for some results. The point estimates are,
however, essentially unchanged - reassuringly suggesting that failing to remove
country-industry fixed effects does not introduce noticeable bias (in the remaining
sections we use country-industry fixed effects).
3.4 Potential contributing factors
Routine-biased technical change may be only one of several contributing factors
to the patterns in hours per worker uncovered in our baseline results. From
1992-2016, several demographic shifts have taken place in the European labour
markets. Most notable are the ageing of the workforce, the increased participation
of women, and the increased level of education. In addition, international trade
and global supply chains have increased over the same period. Occupations that
require little face-to-face interaction have been vulnerable to offshorability, and
this may in turn have affected hours of work. Related to both globalisation and
technical change, changes in industrial structure and reallocation have occurred
over the relatively long period covered in this paper. The distinction between
occupational change (jobs and tasks) and industrial change (type of output) is
thus important. Moreover, there has been an increasing trend towards part-time
work. We consider the impacts of demographic change, offshorability, industrial
change and trends in part-time work in turn below.
3.4.1 Demographic trends
We analyse separately three main demographic changes that impacted the Euro-
pean labour markets during the time frame of our analysis: an ageing work force,
increased participation of women in the labour market and an ever-more educated
workforce.
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Age trends: ageing population
Existing work (Autor and Dorn, 2009) finds an increase in the average age of
workers in shrinking industries. The outcome is likely a consequence of a standard
stock-flow phenomenon – new, younger workers are less likely to enter shrinking
industries while older workers, with built-up human capital, remain. From a
different perspective, Moreno-Galbis and Sopraseuth (2014) argue that ageing
populations can explain the increase in demand for services. Ageing could then
be an additional factor that complements technological change in explaining the
increase in demand for services via the change in the relative prices of goods and
services, as argued by Autor and Dorn (2013). We investigate whether our main
results are observed along age and cohort lines. Descriptive statistics from our
sample show that individuals work more hours, on average, as they age but there
is some concavity to the age profile.
We segment first the sample on both age (at the time of survey) and date
of birth. The former compares 25 year olds in 1992 with 25 year olds in 2016,
while the latter tracks two different generations – those born between 1953 and
1967, (“Baby Boomers” – oldest aged 65 at end of sample) and 1968 and 1980
(“Generation X” – youngest aged 18 at start of sample) – across time. We then
repeat the same regressions from specification 3.1 as for the baseline results.
Selected tables are presented in Appendix C.3, Tables C.1-C.3. Within each of the
segmented samples the regression results are similar to the overall results and to
each other. Put differently, the hours polarisation patterns within age and cohort
groups are the same relative to each other and the overall population. The result
implies that our baseline results are also observed within age group.
However, the above within-group analysis ignores any group reallocation across
occupations. We also regress occupation average age on index specific intercepts
and time trends. The results show that occupations with high degrees of routine
manual tasks have a lower age than the average occupation but are also growing
older over time, relative to other occupations. In short, those occupations have
reduced hours of work but increasing average ages. The reverse is true for growing
industries – those with high non-routine cognitive tasks and high non-routine
personal tasks. In addition to their average hours increasing, their average age is
becoming younger.
Taken together, the results suggest that while we do observe shrinking industries
"getting old", as per Autor and Dorn (2009), the reallocation across occupations
is not driving the hours patterns. Each group is experiencing hours-per-worker
patterns trending along routinisation lines.
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Gender: increasing female labour force participation
The past two decades have seen a substantial increase in female participation
in the labour market. Women accounted for 46% of employment in 2016, up
from 41% in 1992, but they have accounted for 70% of the employment growth
during this period. At the same time, they work, on average, fewer hours than
men (Figure 3.3). A question remains as to whether the increase in female labour
participation can explain patterns in hours per worker, rather than just the overall
hours trends.
We estimate specification 3.1 for women and men separately for each of the
six skill indices. The declining patterns of hours per worker across skill indices do
not seem to differ substantially between men and women, but some interesting
patterns emerge with the split of the sample. Selected tables are presented in
Appendix C.3, Tables C.4-C.6, for the specification with country-sector fixed
effects. Within non-routine cognitive jobs, both women and men have a positive
interaction term, meaning that hours per worker in these occupations are declining
less than the overall declining trend in hours per worker, but the result is never
significant. For routine cognitive tasks, there is a statistically significant positive
coefficient for men only; for routine manual tasks, instead, the steep overall decline
occurs for both men and women, but the coefficient is much stronger for women
than it is for men. Similarly, for non-routine manual physical tasks the faster
decline in hours worked per person is stronger for women than men. For high
non-routine manual personal occupations the positive coefficient of the interaction
term is determined by female, but remain not statistically significant. If we instead
use the Acemoglu and Autor (2011) definition, then the coefficient is positive for
female and negative for male and statistically significant for both (Table C.11).
The decline in hours per worker for women is then an important driving force
for the strong decline in hours per worker in routine manual jobs. Taking these
results together one can conclude that there may be some additional composition
effects from women entering the labour market in certain occupations, but within
each group hours per worker patterns tend to conform with the patterns identified
for the whole sample.
Education: increasing educational attainment
The most surprising finding of the polarisation literature was that, contrary to pre-
vious decades, technological change was not simply skill-biased, but routine-biased;
as such, occupational content was a more important predictor of employment loss
than skill (captured in years of education). At the same time, it remains true
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that most employment gains have come at the occupations mostly typical of the
highest skilled categories. Educational attainment was steadily increasing over
our sample period. Here we examined whether higher educational attainment
is behind our baseline results, or whether our baseline results are also observed
within each educational category. We split the sample across three education
categories: individuals with low education have achieved a lower secondary school
education or less; medium education refers to senior secondary school qualification
or some tertiary education; and high education refers to an undergraduate degree
or above. We then estimate specification 3.1 for each category for each of the six
skill indices. As before, this approach does not take into account between group
changes but is only suggestive of within group patterns.
The stratification of our sample into three education categories sheds further
light on our baseline results. For the non-routine cognitive tasks we find no
statistically significant results, meaning that within each group hours per worker
decline at broadly the same rate as for other task indices (Table C.7). More
importantly – our main result -, the strong decline in routine manual jobs is not
driven by education. Hours per worker are declining faster in routine manual jobs
than in other jobs for all education groups (Table C.8). By contrast, education
does play a role in the observed decline in hours per worker in non-routine manual
physical jobs. The estimated decline is driven by high education workers (Table
C.9). For non-routine manual personal tasks, results are not statistically significant
but the coefficient turns negative for high-education workers. With the Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) definition, there is a relative increase in hours per worker for
low and medium education while hours per worker decline for workers with high
education (Table C.12).
3.4.2 Offshorability
Technological progress, particularly in the area of information and communication,
has made it easier to outsource tasks previously performed by middle-skilled
workers. In particular, jobs that require little face-to-face interaction, or other
on-site requirements, are more at risk of outsourcing. Blinder and Krueger (2013)
estimated that about 25% of jobs in the United States could be offshored. Oldenski
(2014) found that offshorability has contributed to relative employment gains
among high-skilled and relative losses in middle-skilled workers. Goos et al. (2014)
have found that offshorability is a contributing, albeit second-order, driver of
employment polarisation.
To investigate the impact of offshorability on hours of work, we match the
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Table 3.4: Baseline results for offshorability index
(1) (2) (3)
Hours per worker
High Index*t -0.0040 -0.0522** -0.0375**
(0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0171)
High Index -0.4611 1.4272*** 0.7517*
(0.5150) (0.5145) (0.3980)
t -0.0990*** -0.0606*** -0.0699***
(0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0112)
Constant 38.8962*** 38.9168*** 41.0480***
(0.5409) (1.1347) (0.5263)
Observations 21561515 16754427 16754427
R-squared 0.0039 0.1469 0.1941
Controls No Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes No
Country-Sector FE No No Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors
clustered at country-sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational
level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry controls
are 1 digit NACE. High Offshorability is a dummy that takes value 1 if
the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the offshorability index.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
measure of offshorability created by Acemoglu and Autor (2011) to the EU-LFS
dataset using the same series of crosswalks for our six earlier task measures.9
The index measures the potential for offshoring in an occupation based on the
task requirements, rather than the actual degree of offshoring. Analysing the
relationship between the offshorability index and average wage we conclude that the
potential for offshorability cuts across the entire wage distribution: the quadratic
relationship between the offshorability index and average wages is essentially flat
with an R-squared value of only 4%.
Similar to the analysis for the task skill indices, we regress hours per worker
on an intercept and time trend specific to highly offshorable occupations. Errors
are clustered at the country-industry level and a variety of fixed effects and
controls are used. The key results, given in Table 3.4, conform to the hours of
9Measures of offshorability can vary widely and there is no consensus about the ideal measure.
For example, Blinder and Krueger (2013) report three measures of offshorability based on
microdata: one self-reported, another being a combination of self-reported measures made
internal consistent, and a last and preferable measure by the authors which is based on the
assessment of the coders trained by the authors. Using a different approach Firpo et al. (2011)
construct three measures based on O*NET. They consider that occupations are more offshorable
if: 1) they require little face-to-face communication; 2) they do not require on-site presence;
3) they do not require decision making. Our measure of offshorability based on Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) is more closely correlated with the second measure of Firpo et al. (2011).
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work polarisation narrative once the full set of controls are added; occupations
that have a high degree of offshorability, known to be associated with wage
and employment polarisation, have decreasing hours per worker relative to less
offshorable occupations. This shows up as a negative and significant coefficient
interaction term between time and high offshorability.
In sum, occupations that are highly exposed to technological change and
globalisation are experiencing declining average hours. Our results support the
view that the intensive margin of employment (hours per worker) seems to be an
important adjustment margin for such occupations.
3.4.3 Industrial change
Another important driver of hours per worker could be changing industrial struc-
ture, whereby rising sectors tend to be characterised by lower average work hours
than contracting sectors. If that is the case, our framework is simply capturing the
fact that these rising sectors have a higher composition of expanding skills than
contracting skills (i.e. at the poles rather than the middle), and not necessarily
the results of divergence across skills per se. While it is not possible to fully
disentangle these effects, we attempt to shed light into this issue by separating
the within- and between-effects at the sectoral level. In other words, we compare
the evolution of average hours from 1992 to 2016 within each 1-digit sector to the
shift of employment between sectors, using a standard shift-share analysis.
As the sectoral classification of LFS changed from NACE1 to NACE2 in 2008,
it is not straightforward to perform a decomposition for the whole sample, so we
instead consider the two subperiods. For the 1992-2007 period, out of a fall of
4% in average (usual) hours worked (from 38.8 to 37.2), 2.8% was attributed to
the within-sector component, around 70% of the total. Results for the 2008-2016
period are very similar: approximately 72% of the average (usual) hours decline
from 37.1 to 36.3 (1.96%) is a result of a fall within sectors, and only 27% from
sectoral shifts. Taking the whole period together, and matching NACE2 to NACE1
sectors (at the letter level) gives a very similar picture, as can be seen in Table
3.5, Panel A.
Overall, the bulk of the hours decline can be accounted for by a decline within
each sector, rather than industrial change. This result provides further support
to our hypothesis that technological change, manifesting through occupational
polarisation, also drives the hours decline. Another way to see this is to relate
hours decline for each sector with our task content measures. Panel B of Table
3.5 shows the correlation of the change in usual hours worked over different time
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Table 3.5: Sectoral changes of hours worked
(a) Panel A: Shift-share decomposition
Period Total Within Between Interaction Absolute Initial Final
% change change period period
1992-2007 -4.02 -2.82 -0.88 -0.29 -1.56 38.76 37.20
2008-2016 -1.96 -1.41 -0.54 -0.02 -0.73 37.12 36.39
1998-2016 -4.59 -3.41 -0.98 -0.20 -1.75 37.78 36.39
1992-2016 -6.11 -4.19 -1.20 -0.71 -2.37 38.76 36.39
(b) Panel B: Correlation of sectoral hours changes with tasks
NR Cognitive Routine NR Manual Offshore
Analytical Personal Cognitive Manual Physical Personal
1992-2007 0.748 0.348 0.420 -0.147 -0.097 0.279 -0.019
2008-2016 0.876 0.506 0.317 -0.307 -0.203 0.449 -0.048
1998-2016 0.756 0.378 0.349 -0.113 -0.063 0.282 -0.059
1992-2016 0.682 0.290 0.289 -0.084 -0.013 0.185 0.007
intervals with the sectoral average of each of our content measures (over the whole
period covered). The change in hours worked is most highly correlated with the
non-routine cognitive analytical task content, implying that sectors with a high
content of such tasks showed the highest increase in hours (equivalently, the lowest
reduction). The opposite holds for sectors characterised by a high concentration of
routine manual and non-routine manual physical tasks. Indeed, for the 2008-2016
period, the only industries with increasing average usual hours were the ICT
sector, utilities, and education, all considered part of the knowledge economy. The
ICT sector and education have much higher than average share of occupations
with high non-routine analytical content.
3.4.4 Work-time status
Another potential driver of our results may be a rise in part-time employment,
a prominent feature of labour markets in Europe during the period studied, as
the share of part-time workers in the labour force in the EU-15 countries grew
from only 16% in 1995 to 24% in 2016. Of course, the rise of part-time work is
itself, at least to some extent, part and parcel of lower average hours. A sufficient
reduction in hours may be such that individuals switch from full- to part-time
status. That is true whether there is a pre-defined threshold or whether work-time
status is self-reported (as it is in the LFS). The forces then that have allowed for
workers to work fewer hours on average may have also partially contributed to
the rise of part-time work (together of course with changing societal norms, such
3.4. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 91
as higher female participation).
Table 3.6: Full versus part-time status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Hours per worker
NR Cognitive Routine NR Manual Offshore
Analytical Personal Cognitive Manual Physical Personal
Panel A - FT workers
High Index * t 0.008 0.008 0.027** -0.037*** -0.026** 0.002 0.027***
(0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.007)
High Index 1.843*** 2.330*** -1.871*** 0.087 0.314 -0.824*** -0.911***
(0.403) (0.461) (0.262) (0.243) (0.298) (0.303) (0.218)
t -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.046*** -0.023* -0.029** -0.039*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant 53.37*** 53.03*** 52.97*** 53.19*** 52.98*** 53.29*** 53.08***
(0.51) (0.50) (0.57) (0.56) (0.58) (0.56) (0.55)
Panel B - PT workers
High Index * t 0.081*** 0.066*** -0.010 -0.206*** -0.106*** 0.049** -0.075***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.026) (0.030) (0.020) (0.019)
High Index 0.039 -0.0687 1.131*** 2.866*** 1.479*** -0.245 1.594***
(0.468) (0.404) (0.310) (0.471) (0.535) (0.346) (0.331)
t 0.0112 0.003 0.028* 0.075*** 0.044*** 0.011 0.051***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Constant 11.44*** 11.30*** 11.02*** 10.16*** 10.86*** 10.98*** 10.49***
(0.86) (0.86) (0.86) (0.84) (0.81) (0.82) (0.87)
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level. All
regressions include controls for age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status, and
country-sector fixed effects. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Offshorability is a dummy that takes
value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the offshorability index. FT regressions have 13,362,253
observations and PT regressions have 3,344,858 observations. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Table 3.6, we repeat our main exercise separately for full- and part-time
workers, shown in Panels A and B respectively. For both highly non-routine
cognitive occupations, the results are diametrically antithetical. There is a relative
increase in hours for part-time workers in these occupations, relative to no effect
for full-time workers. This is consistent with the idea that some individuals work
fewer hours and drop off the full-time group, raising average hours in the part-time
group. The same pattern holds for occupations with high non-routine manual
personal content. As shown in the next section, these three task groups are the
ones that have gained in employment shares over the past two decades.
By contrast, for the two main losers in employment, routine manual and non-
routine manual physical-intensive occupations, average hours exhibit a relative
decline for both full- and part-time workers, although the magnitude is much
stronger for part-time. For routine cognitive-intensive occupations, in turn, average
hours show a relative increase in full-time workers, but no effect for part-time
workers. Finally, for the offshorable occupations, the index-trend interaction term
is positive and significant for full-time, and negative and significant for part-time.
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Overall, for growing occupations, the decline in average hours is driven by a
combination of lower hours for full-time workers and a rising share of part-time
workers, likely also comprised of formerly full-time workers who work sufficiently
less to reclassify their work-time status.10 For shrinking occupations, both types
of workers work fewer hours. The reduction of average hours attributable to
lower hours for full-time workers is around 1⁄3, depending on the initial date.11
It should be noted that these figures most likely underestimate the within effect.
The fluid boundary between part- and full-time work and the likely truncation
below of the distribution of hours for full-timers, there is a likely underestimate
of the true reduction of full-time hours. Indeed, not only have average hours for
part-timers risen, but this increase is driven by higher hours at the upper half of
the distribution (75th percentile).
3.5 Employment and hours polarisation?
We have shown that falling hours per worker in Europe exhibit some of the main
patterns of RBTC, with large reductions in hours worked for routine manual and
some increase in non-routine cognitive analytical (both in relative terms). At the
same time, other patterns we found do not necessarily conform to the trichotomy
of abstract, routine and manual tasks. Routine cognitive tasks have exhibited
little, if any, reduction in hours worked, and non-routine manual physical tasks
have exhibited a reduction as large as routine manual. Here we examine how the
higher-dimension approach we take compares with what is already established in
the literature.
The dashed line in the left panel of Figure 3.5 replicates the analysis of
Goos et al. (2014) (henceforth GMS), who show the evolution of employment
shares for four low, nine middle and eight high-paying occupations (based on
2-digit ISCO88 classification). The pattern closely resembles the familiar U-
shaped pattern identified in GMS qualitatively.12 The solid line in the left panel
10In the absence of panel data, this hypothesis is untestable. However, the hours decline for
full-time workers comes from a compression at the right tail; average hours for those working
less than 50 hours a week have not changed from 2004 to 2016. Assuming the decline is not
limited to the top, it is possible that such behaviour occurs.
11This number is constructed comparing the actual reduction in average hours versus the one
that would have occurred had the employment shares of full- and part-time workers remained
constant. A shift-share analysis to gauge the importance of each margin is not very informative,
since average hours for part-time workers rose during the period studied.
12Some quantitative differences remain. Namely, we find no increase at the lower end, while
GMS do. There are two possible reasons for this discrepancy. First, our 1992 sample does not
include Austria, Belgium, Finland and Sweden; if instead our initial year is 1998, the first year
of data for all our 15 countries, the pattern is identical to GSM. Second, GSM use a different
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repeats the same exercise, but instead of manually classifying occupations into
categories, we group occupations into three quantiles, based on wage ranking in
2008, normalised for each country, with almost identical results.13 The right panel
instead uses a breakdown into six quantiles, and shows that the bottom 1⁄6 of the
wage distribution also experiences a small reduction in employment.
Figure 3.5: Change in employment share by wage category, % share of total employment,
1992-2010
(a) Three categories
(b) Six categories
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations. GMS uses the categorization of Goos et al. (2014)
into low-, middle- and high-paying occupations. Ranking refers to the classification into quantiles
by occupation wage ranking in 2008. The left chart is based on a breakdown into three quantiles,
and the right chart into six. Employment is measured by aggregate hours.
We then examine whether the patterns identified for average hours also hold
sample for Germany. Note that we also include codes 61 and 92 (agricultural and fisheries
workers) to the low-wage category for GMS. Without these sectors there is indeed an increase in
employment at the low end.
13We use EU-SILC for occupational wages, which start in 2004 but have good coverage for all
countries in 2008. We do not expect the ranking to fluctuate substantially, and the similarity
with the GMS classification is reassuring.
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for total employment. Figure 3.6 shows the task content of the mean job in
the sample, from 1992-2016, for each of our six categories, plus offshorability,
standardized to zero in 1992. Our aim is to identify the overall employment
trends without imposing any structure on the classification (as we do in our
main analysis where we classify the top third of each task-intensity into our high-
content categories). The results are quite stark; the decline of routine manual (and
secondarily cognitive) and non-routine manual physical content in the job-pool
is substantial. Conversely, equally substantial is the increase in the non-routine
cognitive personal (and secondarily analytical) and non-routine manual personal
tasks in the content of the average job. While the increasing categories are in line
with the trichotomous classification, the decline in non-routine manual physical
content is not; there seems to be a stark difference in the employment trends
within the non-routine manual category, for physical and personal, for employment
levels (shown here) and average hours worked. This is also reflected in the right
panel of Figure 3.5; the bottom category, which has exhibited a fall in employment,
has a high content of both routine manual and non-routine manual physical tasks.
Figure 3.6: Evolution of task content, 1992-2016 (1992=0)
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations. Each line shows the task content of the mean job in
the sample, for each task.
The common trends for total employment and average hours across each
occupational task index is summarised in Table 3.7, where we show the evolution
of total employment shares and average hours for the occupations with a high
content of each task, as defined previously. We see that while average hours fell
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Table 3.7: Evolution of employment share and average hours
NR Cognitive —— Routine —— —– NR Manual —– Offshorable
analytical personal cognitive manual physical personal
Share of total employment in jobs with high content of each task
1992 31.5 33.0 30.6 32.6 33.6 15.6 30.1
1998 34.9 37.1 30.2 31.1 32.4 16.5 31.8
2007 39.2 41.2 28.7 27.8 29.3 16.4 33.3
2016 38.7 43.0 30.2 23.1 24.6 19.6 39.6
1992-2010 8.9 10.2 -2.7 -6.9 -6.1 1.6 3.4
1992-2016 7.2 10.0 -0.4 -9.5 -9.0 4.0 9.5
Average hours in jobs with high content of each task
1992 40.3 39.1 37.2 40.9 40.9 35.4 38.0
1998 40.1 39.9 36.9 40.3 40.5 34.3 37.8
2007 39.7 39.3 36.8 39.3 39.4 32.8 37.0
2016 38.4 36.9 36.0 36.1 37.8 33.7 35.8
1992-2010 -0.9 -0.1 -0.8 -3.8 -2.1 -2.5 -0.9
1992-2016 -1.9 -2.2 -1.2 -4.8 -3.2 -1.7 -2.2
across tasks, they fell more for those tasks that suffered employment losses. It
should be noted that when calculating the total employment shares, we fix the
task content cut-offs at their levels in 1992; we cannot let the cut-off vary by
year, otherwise there would not be meaningful variation in employment shares
across time. On the other hand, the cut-off for average hours does vary by year;
since fewer jobs had, for instance, high non-routine cognitive analytical content
in 1992 than in 2016, using a fixed cut-off may classify into the high non-routine
cognitive analytical content category jobs that we would not necessarily consider
as possessing this attribute.14 Conversely, shrinking occupations, such as those
with high routine manual content may not be classified as such using a fixed
cut-off, even though they would meet conventional criteria to be classified as
such.15
We then consider how average hours evolve by wage categories, to gauge
whether the U-shaped pattern of employment holds. The left panel of Figure
3.7 repeats the analysis of Figure 3.5 for the GMS classification and the ranking
based on wages by occupation in 2008, for three quantiles. We see that in this
case, the choice of classification does play a role in the results. In the GMS
classification, there is a hump-shaped response: the fall in hours is higher for the
lowest-paid occupations, then for the highest, and the smallest reduction is shown
by the middle categories. However, using a quantile-based ranking using three
14Examples include medical technicians, technical/medical sales professionals, credit and loan
officers, insurance and sales representative, broadcasting technicians, travel consultants, and
electrical installers and servicers.
15Examples include bank tellers and related clerks, cashiers and ticket clerks, vehicle repairers.
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quantiles, we see an inverse L-shaped pattern, with the losses in average hours
being monotonically negatively related to wages. As such, while employment may
be polarising, with more jobs created at high- and low-wage occupations, average
hours are falling more in low-wage occupations.
As it appears that the results for average hours are sensitive to the wage
classification, we further consider the distribution of hours losses using a six
quantile wage grouping in the right panel of Figure 3.7, which shows an inverse
U-shaped pattern of average hours losses until the 83rd percentile and lower losses
thereafter. The overall conclusion remains with finer categorisations, namely that,
by and large, there is no polarisation in hours losses, but rather lower losses at
higher wages. That is, while employment gains are characterized by a U-shaped
pattern, hours losses are characterized by an inverse L-shaped pattern.
Since the literature typically considers total hours as a measure of total
employment when considering polarisation, it follows that this pattern is at least
partially driven by changes in the patterns of average hours. An interesting
exercise is to consider whether the polarisation pattern would differ were it not
for the change in the hours pattern. Figure 3.8 repeats the exercise of Figure 3.5
but now considers the wage ranking classification for an aggregate employment
measure based on heads, as well as total hours. While both of these broadly follow
the same pattern, the main differences are in the low- and high-wage categories.
For the low-wage category, the change in hours-based employment share is almost
2 percentage points (pp) lower than in the heads definition, reflecting the fact that
average hours have fallen for routine manual and non-routine manual physical
tasks. For the high category, higher average hours reflect a gain in employment
share of over one percentage point more with the total hours measure.16 The
six-quantile ranking reveals that the additional gain at the top with the total
hours measure is driven by the very top, where the employment share gain is over
1.2 percentage points higher with the total hours measure.
3.6 Country comparisons
In this section we analyse country specific patterns on the polarisation of hours
worked per person. First, we analyse whether the results obtained for the aggre-
gation of the EU-15 countries hold for most of the individual countries. Then, we
16Absolute differences are less important, as they are quite sensitive to the classification used.
With the updated version of the GMS classification defined above, a 2.1 percentage point gain
in employment share for the low group with the heads definition is 0.1 with the total hours
definition. With the original GMS classification these figures are 3.5 and 1.9, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Change in average hours by wage category, 1992-2010
(a) Three categories
(b) Six categories
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations. GMS use the categorization of Goos et al. (2014)
into low-, middle- and high-paying occupations. Ranking refers to the classification into
quantiles by occupation wage ranking in 2008. The left chart is based on a breakdown into
three quantiles, and the right chart into six. Employment is measured by aggregate hours.
analyse whether the patterns uncovered for the EU-15 countries are also observed
for the United States.
3.6.1 Individual EU-15 countries
The level and developments of hours worked per person across the EU-15 countries
are very heterogeneous (e.g. Ohanian and Raffo 2012). Thus, it is important to
carry out a country level analysis to determine whether the results obtained for
the EU-15 are common to most individual countries or are driven just by a few.
We carry out the same analysis as for our baseline results to each of the EU-15
countries. Here we focus on our baseline results relating to non-routine cognitive
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Figure 3.8: Employment growth by wage category, % share of total employment,
1992-2010
(a) Three categories
(b) Six categories
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations. The left chart is based on a breakdown into three
quantiles, and the right chart into six. Total hours refers to employment being measured by
aggregate hours, while heads uses a headcount measure.
analytical jobs and routine manual jobs. Table C.13 in Appendix C.5 shows the
results for all six indices and offshorability.
The results described in Section 4 are broadly consistent across countries. A
visual representation is very helpful to summarise the main results by country.
Hours per worker in routine manual jobs are declining faster than trend hours in
all countries with the exception of Austria. For non-routine cognitive analytical
jobs, hours per worker are increasing in most countries with the exception of
Denmark, Sweden and the UK, while estimates are not statistically significant for
Germany, Finland and Luxembourg (Figure 3.9).
This results show that our baseline results are observed for a large set of
countries and not driven by just a set of a few countries. In particular, the decline
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Figure 3.9: Country specific results
Source: EU-LFS and authors’ calculations. All results statistically significant with exception of
DE, FI and LU for non-routine analytical tasks.
in hours per worker in routine manual jobs is very robust. However, more research
is necessary to uncover the reasons for different patterns across countries for the
other indices.
3.6.2 United States
We extend our analysis to compare the EU-15 hours per worker across occupational
task indices with the US labour market. The US has not experienced the large
decline in average hours of work since the Great Recession, in contrast to Europe. It
has, however, exhibited well documented employment and wage polarisation. The
lack of a decline in average hours does not, by itself, preclude hours polarisation:
routine jobs may reduce their average hours but be outweighed by high skilled
and low-skilled hours increases.
We repeat our analysis for the US using the Current Population Survey (CPS)
– the US equivalent to the EU-LFS. Interestingly enough, the baseline results
presented in Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 uncover the polar opposite to the EU-15
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Table 3.8: US results for non-routine cognitive (analytical and personal) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———— Analytical ———— ———— Personal ————
High Index*t -0.0296** -0.0241** -0.0430*** -0.0230 -0.0186 -0.0287**
(0.0141) (0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0170) (0.0141) (0.0127)
High Index 5.0834*** 3.2788*** 3.3540*** 5.0665*** 3.7217*** 4.3557***
(0.1891) (0.1291) (0.1190) (0.2217) (0.1697) (0.1508)
t -0.0445*** -0.0641*** -0.0498*** -0.0471*** -0.0675*** -0.0494***
(0.0135) (0.0099) (0.0076) (0.0168) (0.0122) (0.0086)
Constant 37.6631*** 33.1511*** 36.0557*** 37.6752*** 33.0519*** 36.1736***
(0.1971) (0.4420) (0.4716) (0.2306) (0.4857) (0.4691)
Observations 1683460 1641808 1641808 1683460 1641808 1641808
R-squared 0.0288 0.0902 0.1082 0.0294 0.0951 0.1179
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
All regressions weighted with CPS weights, and standard errors clustered at state-sector level. Controls: age,
educational level, sex, size of firm, marital status. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation
is above the 66th percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in the
CPS sample from 1995-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3.9: US results for routine (cognitive and manual) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———— Cognitive ———— ———— Manual ————
High Index*t 0.0723*** 0.0606*** 0.0387*** 0.0115 0.0181 0.0390***
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0167) (0.0132) (0.0114)
High Index -2.3558*** -1.2937*** -1.9043*** -1.4834*** -1.1819*** -1.8206***
(0.1261) (0.1341) (0.1077) (0.2475) (0.1832) (0.1415)
t -0.0791*** -0.1009*** -0.0868*** -0.0582*** -0.0843*** -0.0850***
(0.0134) (0.0098) (0.0062) (0.0104) (0.0087) (0.0063)
Constant 40.2408*** 33.5315*** 36.9692*** 39.9215*** 34.0500*** 37.9422***
(0.1917) (0.4641) (0.4692) (0.1524) (0.4564) (0.4770)
Observations 1683460 1641808 1641808 1683460 1641808 1641808
R-squared 0.0039 0.0824 0.1034 0.0029 0.0826 0.1026
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
All regressions weighted with CPS weights, and standard errors clustered at state-sector level. Controls: age,
educational level, sex, size of firm, marital status. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation
is above the 66th percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in the
CPS sample from 1995-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
results. Highly routine occupations - both routine cognitive and routine manual -
have experienced increasing hours trends relative to other occupations. This is in
direct contrast to the strongly negative routine manual results for EU-15 countries.
Also contrasting the EU results are the negative and significant interaction trends
for high skilled, non-routine analytical occupations and the lower-skilled non-
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Table 3.10: US results for non-routine manual (physical and personal) indices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———— Personal ———— ———— Physical ————
High Index*t -0.1323*** -0.0676*** -0.0357*** -0.0264** -0.0177* -0.0130
(0.0114) (0.0100) (0.0097) (0.0128) (0.0103) (0.0088)
High Index 1.9452*** 1.2127*** 1.9347*** 0.4366** 0.1581 -0.5700***
(0.1628) (0.1434) (0.1397) (0.1810) (0.1573) (0.1341)
t -0.0092 -0.0568*** -0.0571*** -0.0457*** -0.0748*** -0.0690***
(0.0130) (0.0083) (0.0052) (0.0133) (0.0093) (0.0066)
Constant 38.7755*** 32.8718*** 36.4226*** 39.2958*** 33.1101*** 37.3402***
(0.1794) (0.4541) (0.4667) (0.1963) (0.4720) (0.4928)
Observations 1683460 1641808 1641808 1683460 1641808 1641808
R-squared 0.0019 0.0822 0.1032 0.0008 0.0818 0.1013
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State FEs No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes No No Yes
All regressions weighted with CPS weights, and standard errors clustered at state-sector level. Controls: age,
educational level, sex, size of firm, marital status. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation
is above the 66th percentile for the index in that year. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in the
CPS sample from 1995-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
routine manual personal occupations. Both of these had positive hours trends
relative to other occupations in the EU.17
The results are robust to a variety of clustering and fixed effects specifications
(industry, state, industry-state interactions), and sample inclusion criteria (strictly
positive hours worked, zeros, and minimum hours).
The contrasting results between the US and Europe may not be too surprising.
We posit that the differences are possibly due to employment regulations governing
firms’ labour adjustment. US employment law does not contain the same labour
protections, particularly with regard to firing restrictions, as European employment
law. As a result, it is less costly for American firms to reduce headcounts of
workers in shrinking industries. European firms, by contrast, must perhaps rely
more on intensive margin hours adjustments. An additional hypothesis possibly
underlying the results is the marketisation of home production which occurred
earlier in the US and explains much of the EU-US employment and hours gap
(e.g. Freeman and Schettkat 2005).
17For non-routine manual personal tasks the results for the US comprise all occupations while
for the EU-15 they concern only ISCO codes above 299.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper we analysed whether hours per worker were an additional margin of
employment polarisation. Our results suggest a relation between hours per worker
and employment polarisation patterns. The level and, more importantly, the trend
in hours per worker vary considerably across each occupational task index. This is
a new fact that has not been previously considered in the polarisation literature.
We find large declines in routine manual jobs – precisely the occupations most
negatively affected by employment polarisation from RBTC. Additionally, we find
a lower decline in hours per worker for non-routine cognitive analytical jobs, which
are growing through polarisation. At the same time, hours per worker declined
significantly more than the trend for non-routine manual physical occupations
and that decline has not been compensated by an increase in hours per worker
in non-routine manual personal jobs. However, for non-routine manual jobs the
occupational task indices also do not give the typical polarisation patterns for
total employment. Overall, instead of a polarisation pattern our results show that
hours per worker declined more in manual jobs (routine manual and non-routine
manual physical).
Our results remain robust to estimation across age, gender and education
groups, although the intensity may vary and some subtle patterns may emerge.
For example, the decline in hours per worker in routine manual jobs and non-
routine manual physical jobs is stronger for women. The decline in hours per
worker occurs mostly within sectors. The increase in part-time seems important.
However, that increase may be partly a consequence of the decline in hours per
worker, as the classification into full-time and part-time is self-reported.
Using a wage ranking of occupations instead of the occupational task indices,
the decline in hours per worker is monotonically related to wages. First, the
results we obtained for employment changes using a wage ranking is a U-shaped
curve, in line with the empirical literature. However, when the wage ranking is
divided in six quantiles instead of three, we observe that the bottom quantile
experiences employment losses similar to the middle. Second, hours per worker
appear monotonically related to wages: using three quantiles of the wage ranking
of occupations we observe a sharper decline in the bottom quantile, a milder
decline in the middle and almost no decline at the top; using six quantiles for the
wage ranking of occupations we observe an inverse U-shaped pattern for most of
the distribution, but with lower decrease in hours per worker in the top quantile.
Thus, while employment gains are characterised by a U-shaped pattern, the decline
in hours per worker is characterised by an inverse L-shaped pattern.
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Taken together, these results suggest that patterns in hours per worker exac-
erbate the impact of employment polarisation on wage inequality. High-skilled
workers increased their fraction of employment and work relatively more hours,
medium-skilled workers saw a decline in the share of employment and a decline in
hours per worker and low-skilled workers saw a substantial decrease in hours per
worker. The analysis based on the wage ranking of occupations makes this point
even clearer; hours declined significantly more in low-paying occupations.
The patterns in hours per worker uncovered for the EU-15 aggregate are
observed in most of each of the individual countries. The results for the United
States are fundamentally different. We tentatively suggest that labour market
institutions can play a role. In addition, the earlier marketisation of household
production in the United States can additionally help to explain the differences
found between the EU-15 and the Unites States.
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Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Search theory background
A.1.1 Baseline search model
In a standard search model, a la Pissarides (1990, 2000), unemployed workers
searching for a job receive a flow value characterised by the following Bellman
equation:
ρVU = b+ λ
∫
ρVU
[VE(w(θ))− VU ]dF (θ) (A.1)
Where b is an unemployment benefit, ρ the discount rate, and λ the probability
that the worker is matched to an employer. Job offer matches have heterogeneous
productivities, θ following distribution F (θ). Workers only accept employment
offers that yield higher utility than their current state. As a result, there is some
critical productivity value, θˆ = ρVU , for which all matches at least as great as θˆ
are accepted.
Workers employed at a job have the following flow value:
ρVE = w(θ) + η(VU − VE((θ))) (A.2)
They receive a wage that is specific to the match productivity θ. With
some exogenous probability η the match is terminated and the worker becomes
unemployed.
Firms with a filled position receive the productivity value of the match, θ, pay
wages w(θ) and face the same exogenous probability η of a terminated contract.
ρVF = θ − w(θ)− ηVF (A.3)
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Vacancies cost c and are filled with probability λV . Free-entry of vacancy
creation is assumed, pushing the value unfilled vacancies to 0:1
ρVV = −c+ λV (VF − VV ) = 0 (A.4)
The number of matches is a constant returns to scale matching technology
that depends positively on the stocks of unemployed workers, u, and vacancies, v.
M(u, v) = M(
u
v
, 1) = vq(k) (A.5)
where k = u
v
and the partial derivatives are positive ∂M
∂u
, ∂M
∂v
> 0.
Wages are determined through Nash bargaining between workers and firms
where α is the relative bargaining power of workers.
w(θ) = argmax
w
[VE − VU ]α[VF ]1−α (A.6)
The system of the equations can be solved for the equilibrium unemployment
level u:
u =
η
η + (1− F (θˆ))q(k)/k (A.7)
A.1.2 Search intensity
Search intensity is a primary features of interest in the paper. To model search
intensity, the job finding rate of a worker becomes a function of their search effort
si, the aggregate search effort of all job seekers and the number of vacancies.2
λi =
siM(su, v)
su
= M(s,
v
u
) (A.8)
The job finding rate is increasing in individual search and decreasing in
aggregate search, i.e. ∂λi
∂si
> 0 and ∂λi
∂s
< 0. Additional search effort is costly for
the individual. The cost of search, σi(si), is modelled as a strictly increasing and
convex function to ensure an interior solution.
σi(si) where σs > 0, σss ≥ 0 (A.9)
1The probability the vacancy is filled is the product of the probability of a match (see
equation A.5) times the probability the job offer is accepted 1− F (ρVU ) = 1− F (θˆ), i.e. the
probability that the productivity of the match, θ exceeds an unemployed workers reservation
level
2As per Pissarides (2000).
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The value function for an unemployed worker is adapted to take into account
the search intensity tradeoff. For a simplification that demonstrates the essence
of the problem, all job matches are assumed homogeneous. There is therefore a
single value VE for employment and a single wage w.
ρVUi = b− σ(si) + λ(si, q)(VE − VUi) (A.10)
The optimal search intensity maximises the value of unemployed search, trading
off the gains of greater search (increased job finding rate) with the increased cost.
The first order condition (applying the envelope theorem) is:
−σs(si) + ∂λ(si, q)
∂si
[VE − VUi] = 0 (A.11)
The partial derivative of λ is evaluated by using the functional form assumption
from equation A.8 and imposing a symmetric equilibrium si = s as follows:
∂λi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si=s
=
λi
s
(A.12)
Finally we can substitute the term for VE − VUi into the first order condition
to obtain an expression for optimal search intensity:
−σs(si) + w − b+ σ(si)
ρ+ η + λ(si, q)
λ(si, q)
s
= 0 (A.13)
Two possible effects of minimum can be observed through this equation. Firstly,
search effort is increasing in the offered wage. Minimum wages that raise the
offered wage provide a stronger incentive to find employment, increasing the return
to search. Secondly, however, search effort is decreasing in the ratio of vacancies
to unemployed searchers. If minimum wages increase the number of searching
individuals, v/u falls, generating a congestion externality and decreasing search
effort of existing searchers.
A.1.3 On-the-job search
When including on-the-job search, the stock of job seekers is now the sum of
unemployed workers, u and workers searching on-the-job e. The matching function
therefore becomes:
M = M(u+ e, v) = M(
u+ e
v
, 1) = vq(k) (A.14)
Where v is the stock of vacancies, u is the stock of unemployed workers and e
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the stock of employed workers searching for a new job. Inverse market tightness
is now k = u+e
v
. For analytical tractability, it is assumed that unemployed
and employed job seekers contribute equally to the matching function and have
the same job finding rates.3 The job offer rate for all job seekers is therefore
λ = M(u+ e, v)/(u+ e) = q(k)/k.
Employed workers choose whether or not to search on-the-job. Searching
provides the chance to switch to a higher productivity job but also incurs a direct
cost of search, σ. These two features are traded off in the workers decision to search
or not. The value function for searching, superscripted s, in job of productivity θ
is:
ρV sE(θ) = w
s(θ)− σ + λ
∫
θ
(VE(x)− V sE(θ))dF (x) + η(VU − V sE(θ)) (A.15)
λ is the probability of a new job offer. Only offers from jobs of greater
productivity are accepted, i.e. x > θ. Therefore with probability λ(1 − F (θ))
on-the-job search results in a job-switch and resulting value change VE(X)−V sE(θ).
As before, a match may be terminated for exogenous reasons with probability η.
If a workers opts not to search they save the cost σ but lose the opportunity
to switch to a better job. The value function, superscripted ns, in such cases is:
ρV nsE (θ) = w
ns(θ) + η(VU − V nsE (θ)) (A.16)
Workers in job θ will choose to search on-the-job if the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. The benefit is the expected gain from a new job multiplies by
the probability it occurs. The cost constitute the direct search cost σ and any
wage differential wns(θ)− ws(θ).4
λ
∫
θ
(VE(x)− V sE(θ))dF (x) ≥ wns(θ)− ws(θ) + σ (A.17)
The first order implication of binding minimum wages is the reduction in the
value of switching jobs arising from compression in the wage distribution. For jobs
with low values of θ, where the minimum wage binds, the current employment
value is higher, and the expected gain from a new job is lower. As a consequence
we are likely to see fewer job-to-job transitions in particular from low-productivity
3Pissarides (2000)
4In Pissarides (2000), wages are higher for non-searchers than searchers because searching
imposes the cost of a potential quit on the firm. Firms observe whether their workers are
searching so can adjust the wage to recoup some of this cost.
A.2. CLASSIFYING ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE SEARCH 117
jobs. Phrased differently, there is concern that minimum wages disrupt the start
of the job-ladder model.
A.2 Classifying active versus passive search
Active measures
1. Visit a Job Centre
2. Visit a Careers Office
3. Visit a Jobclub
4. Advertise in newspapers or journals
5. Answer job advertisements
6. Apply directly to employers
7. Look for premises or equipment (self-employment)
8. Seek any kind of permit (self-employment)
9. Try to get a loan or other financial backing (self-employment)
Passive measures
1. On books of a private employment agency
2. Study situations vacant in newspaper or journals (but not answer)
3. Wait for results of application for job
4. Ask friends, relative, colleagues or unions
5. Do anything else to find work
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A.3 Additional descriptive statistics
Table A.1: Position in the wage distribution prior to 2010
minimum wage change
Age 21 21-23 18-25 16-64
Below % 0.66 0.75 1.43 0.91
N 18 68 334 1,547
Youth Spike % 2.62 0.87 2.96 0.53
N 71 79 691 898
Between % 7.24 2.85 5.34 1.29
N 196 259 1,249 2,197
Adult Spike % 11.08 10.78 10.03 4.34
N 300 979 2,344 7,396
Above % 78.39 84.75 80.24 92.94
N 2,122 7,697 18,750 158,534
Total % 100 100 100 100
N 2,707 9,082 23,368 170,572
Table discretises the wage distribution into five groups: those
earning below the youth minimum wage, those earning within
±2% of youth minimum wage, those earning between 2% above
youth minimum wage to 2% below adult minimum wage, those
earning within ±2% of adult minimum wage and those earning
more than 2% above adult minimum wage. Sample: individuals
within 24 months of Oct 2010. Spike means earning within 2% of
respective minimum wage. Source: ASHE 2010.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for search intensity
Type of Searching No. methods
Passive Active 1 2-14
Unemployed search N 3,963 3,105 6,410 658
% 56.07 43.93 90.69 9.31
OJS N 3,362 1,167 4,232 297
% 74.23 25.77 93.44 6.56
Total N 7,325 4,272 10,642 955
% 63.16 36.84 91.77 8.23
Sample: 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change,
searching for a job
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A.4 Additional results for non-employed search
A.4.1 Additional baseline estimates
Table A.3 presents additional baseline estimates for the impact of higher minimum
wages on extensive margin non-employed search. The table includes students in
the regressions, including as a separate dependent variable category, and has no
controls. To meet statistical disclosure requirements of the UK Data Service, the
constant is withheld.
Table A.3: Unemployed search estimates, no controls, including
students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working Unemployed Inactive Student
Post -0.0114∗ 0.00736∗ 0.00807∗ -0.00402
(0.00675) (0.00395) (0.00439) (0.00456)
Age 21 -0.0877∗∗∗ 0.00798 -0.00784 0.0876∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.00637) (0.00591) (0.0148)
Post*Age 21 -0.0144 0.0153∗∗ -0.0142∗∗ 0.0133
(0.0127) (0.00708) (0.00644) (0.00927)
Constant —————————[Witheld]—————————
Observations 53381 53381 53381 53381
Controls No No No No
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is
21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. The constants
are witheld to conform to UK Data Service statistical disclosure control
requirements.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
A.4.2 Sub-population analysis
An amount of analysis was undertaken to test if the treatment estimates varied
by educational attainment and region of residence. One would expect minimum
wage policy to impact less educated groups more strongly than highly educated
groups. Individuals were classified as high-education or low-education using
QLFS information on their highest qualification. A variety of different definitions
were constructed for robustness checking and all gave broadly the same results.
The results presented here define low education as individuals with a highest
qualification of A-level and equivalent or below and no post-school education.
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High education is considered to be individuals with any post-school education (i.e.
above A level).
Two main approaches for testing for differential treatment estimates were used.
Firstly, educational attainment was interacted with the treatment interaction
term (with the education variable also included as a first order effect) using the
whole sample of 21-23 year olds. Secondly, the sample was stratified into high
and low education individuals and separate difference-in-differences regressions
were run. Both methods gave the same story: the headline results appear to be
driven by low education individuals. No statistically significant treatment effects
are estimated for highly educated individuals. The second approach, using split
samples, is more easily interpretable and so is shown here in Table A.4.
A second additional formulation brings geography into the equation - one
would expect the same minimum wage to have more significant consequences in a
low wage area relative to a high wage area. The QLFS and ASHE both include
numerous geographic classifications. Two sets of geographic delineations are used
here: travel-to-work-areas (TTWAs), commonly considered the best measure of a
local labour market in the UK, and NUTS Level 2 (Nomenclature of Units for
Territorial Statistics).5 For a given set of geographical classifications, the ASHE
is used to calculate the mean and median regional hourly income.6 The local
Kaitz index - the adult minimum wage divided by local average hourly wage - is
calculated for each region.
Geographic variation is used in two ways, similar to the education investigation
above. Firstly, I interact the local Kaitz index with the treatment interaction
term (Treatment ∗ Age21) and include the relevant first order effect separately.
Secondly, I stratify the sample into those individuals living in below average
income areas and those in above average income areas. Both approaches give
the same results: no statistically significant differences in treatment effects are
estimated based on regional income.
5TTWAs are defined as: at least 75% of the area’s resident workforce work in the area,
and at least 75% of the people who work in the area also live in the area. There are over 200
TTWAs and some contain very small numbers of sampled individuals. As a consequence, the
ASHE calculates average income with a non-negligible degree of sampling error in the small
TTWAs, introducing noise into the estimates. In response, I also use a second, larger geographic
definition, NUTS2. NUTS2 categorises the UK into 39 separate regions in 2010 (6 for Scotland,
2 for Wales, 1 for Northern Ireland and 30 for England).
6Two measures of hourly income are used: all paid income divided by paid hours worked
excluding overtime and all paid income divided by hours worked including overtime.
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Table A.4: Unemployed search estimates by education levels
Low education individuals High education individuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Working Unemp Inactive Working Unemp Inactive
Post -0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ -0.00241 0.00136 0.00105
(0.00847) (0.00564) (0.00620) (0.00913) (0.00750) (0.00748)
Age 21 -0.0144 0.0150∗∗ -0.000604 -0.0733∗∗∗ 0.0627∗∗∗ 0.0107
(0.00983) (0.00690) (0.00707) (0.0163) (0.0138) (0.00906)
Post*Age 21 0.00239 0.0189∗ -0.0213∗∗ -0.0139 0.0208 -0.00690
(0.0131) (0.00976) (0.00954) (0.0220) (0.0211) (0.0143)
Constant 0.704∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.0849∗∗∗
(0.0383) (0.0179) (0.0283) (0.0318) (0.0265) (0.0189)
Observations 33463 33463 33463 11685 11685 11685
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23 year olds,
24 months either side of 2010 policy change split by educational attainment. Columns 1-3
are for low education individuals, columns 4-6 for high education individuals. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.5: Unemployed search estimates by regional income - NUTS2 regions
—— Poorer regions —— —— Richer regions ——
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Working Unemp Inactive Working Unemp Inactive
Post -0.0218∗∗ 0.00658 0.0152∗∗ -0.0210∗∗ 0.0148∗∗ 0.00620
(0.00878) (0.00578) (0.00656) (0.00847) (0.00660) (0.00627)
Age 21 -0.0435∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0131∗ -0.0180∗ 0.0226∗∗ -0.00455
(0.0113) (0.00833) (0.00780) (0.0105) (0.00910) (0.00658)
Post*Age 21 0.00508 0.0177 -0.0228∗∗ -0.0145 0.0224∗ -0.00792
(0.0139) (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0174) (0.0127) (0.0108)
Constant 0.572∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0149) (0.0207) (0.0319) (0.0189) (0.0247)
Observations 21701 21701 21701 21408 21408 21408
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23 year olds,
24 months either side of 2010 policy change, split by regional income in 2010. Income
measured median hourly wage, excluding overtime, of each NUTS2 region (from ASHE).
Poorer (richer) regions are the 50% of NUTS2 regions with the lowest (highest) median
hourly wage. Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status,
education, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Unemployed search estimates by regional income - TTWA regions
—— Poorer TTWAs —— —— Richer TTWAs ——
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Working Unemp Inactive Working Unemp Inactive
Post -0.0230∗∗ 0.00900 0.0140∗ -0.0194∗ 0.0118 0.00759
(0.00973) (0.00657) (0.00775) (0.0101) (0.00826) (0.00713)
Age 21 -0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.00425 -0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.00350
(0.0103) (0.00828) (0.00786) (0.00863) (0.00746) (0.00754)
Post*Age 21 0.0134 0.000993 -0.0143 -0.0160 0.0291∗∗ -0.0131
(0.0152) (0.0126) (0.0114) (0.0184) (0.0136) (0.0121)
Constant 0.596∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0187) (0.0257) (0.0478) (0.0305) (0.0549)
Observations 20010 20010 20010 18599 18599 18599
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24
months either side of 2010 policy change, split by TTWA income in 2010. Income measured
median hourly wage, excluding overtime, of each TTWA region (from ASHE). Poorer
(richer) TTWAs are the 50% of TTWAs with the lowest (highest) median hourly wage.
Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, education,
ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
124 APPENDIX A. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A.7: Unemployed search intensity by education - correcting for selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active Active >1 m. >1 m. # m. # m.
Low High Low High Low High
Post -0.0526∗∗∗ -0.0455 0.0131 0.000819 0.00722 0.0683
(0.0183) (0.0278) (0.0107) (0.0166) (0.0555) (0.0933)
Age 21 0.00881 0.0451 0.0244∗∗ -0.0447∗∗ 0.101∗ -0.197∗
(0.0202) (0.0355) (0.0118) (0.0212) (0.0615) (0.119)
Post*Age 21 -0.0328 0.0464 -0.0395∗∗ 0.00424 -0.153∗ -0.0686
(0.0281) (0.0498) (0.0163) (0.0297) (0.0852) (0.167)
Constant 0.673∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.146∗ 2.327∗∗∗ 2.174∗∗∗
(0.0685) (0.131) (0.0399) (0.0783) (0.209) (0.441)
Selection eq.
Post 0.0489 -0.00553 0.0489 -0.00553 0.0500 0.00278
(0.0319) (0.0585) (0.0319) (0.0585) (0.0319) (0.0585)
Age 21 0.0884∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.0884∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.0730∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.0351) (0.0775) (0.0351) (0.0775) (0.0351) (0.0775)
Post*Age 21 0.108∗∗ -0.0563 0.108∗∗ -0.0563 0.135∗∗∗ -0.0634
(0.0492) (0.109) (0.0492) (0.109) (0.0493) (0.109)
Constant 0.330∗∗∗ 0.344 0.330∗∗∗ 0.344 0.280∗∗ 0.334
(0.114) (0.258) (0.114) (0.258) (0.114) (0.258)
Lambda -0.113∗∗∗ -0.0395 -0.0423∗∗∗ -0.0277 -0.241∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0285) (0.0132) (0.0170) (0.0686) (0.0958)
Observations 15375 4236 15375 4236 15375 4236
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of
2010 policy change who are not in work, split by educational attainment. Low refers to
individuals with a maximm of A level / High school education. High refers to individuals
with some post-school education. Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter,
proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity. The selection equation includes all controls and
treatment variables alongside a variable for studying - the exclusion restriction. Heckman
selection model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Unemployed search intensity by regional income - correcting for selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Active Active >1 m. >1 m. # m. # m.
Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich
Post -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0450∗∗ 0.0153 -0.00462 0.0773 -0.0297
(0.0320) (0.0201) (0.0174) (0.0121) (0.0989) (0.0636)
Age 21 -0.0126 0.0344 0.0000848 0.0101 0.0478 0.0407
(0.0335) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0126) (0.104) (0.0667)
Post*Age 21 0.0313 -0.0123 -0.0157 -0.0163 -0.0773 -0.0878
(0.0498) (0.0318) (0.0270) (0.0191) (0.154) (0.101)
Constant 0.709∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 2.345∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.112) (0.0577) (0.0671) (0.334) (0.353)
Selection eq.
Post 0.0189 0.0100 0.0189 0.0100 0.0270 0.0120
(0.0576) (0.0368) (0.0576) (0.0368) (0.0577) (0.0368)
Age 21 0.150∗∗ 0.0715∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.0715∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.0653∗
(0.0610) (0.0385) (0.0610) (0.0385) (0.0611) (0.0386)
Post*Age 21 -0.0381 0.0824 -0.0381 0.0824 -0.000157 0.0963∗
(0.0916) (0.0584) (0.0916) (0.0584) (0.0916) (0.0584)
Constant 0.309∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.309∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.241 0.472∗∗
(0.176) (0.202) (0.176) (0.202) (0.176) (0.202)
Lambda -0.188∗∗∗ -0.0446∗∗ -0.0541∗∗ -0.0383∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0208) (0.0246) (0.0124) (0.140) (0.0656)
Observations 4329 12350 4329 12350 4329 12350
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010
policy change who are not in work, split by average income of their resident TTWA. Poor
refers to the poorest half of TTWAs, rich to the richest half of TTWAs. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity. The selection
equation includes all controls and treatment variables alongside a variable for studying - the
exclusion restriction. Heckman selection model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Unemployed search duration by education - correcting for
selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: TimeA TimeA TimeB TimeB
Education Low High Low High
Post 2.153∗∗∗ 0.249 1.737∗ -0.105
(0.813) (0.298) (0.957) (0.485)
Age 21 -1.220∗ -0.830∗ -1.629∗∗ -0.415
(0.688) (0.478) (0.767) (0.669)
Post*Age 21 1.589 1.138 2.368∗ 0.427
(1.099) (0.743) (1.248) (0.931)
Constant 22.05∗∗∗ 10.21∗∗∗ 19.15∗∗∗ 9.840∗∗∗
(2.198) (1.487) (2.298) (1.392)
Selection eq.
Post 0.0306 -0.0185 0.186∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0768) (0.0360) (0.102)
Age 21 0.0411 0.118 0.0670 -0.0237
(0.0463) (0.0810) (0.0478) (0.0870)
Post*Age 21 0.145∗∗ 0.0173 0.167∗∗ 0.333∗∗
(0.0595) (0.130) (0.0652) (0.150)
Constant 0.434∗∗∗ 0.0319 0.511∗∗∗ 0.449
(0.111) (0.346) (0.117) (0.316)
ρ -0.0870∗∗∗ 0.00446 -0.0507 -0.0711∗∗
(0.0280) (0.0628) (0.0394) (0.0334)
ln(σ) 2.677∗∗∗ 1.791∗∗∗ 2.683∗∗∗ 1.774∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0540) (0.0256) (0.0689)
Observations 15375 4236 15375 4236
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity and
occupation. TimeA refers to self-reported unemployment searching duration.
TimeB is a separate self-reported measure of time spent job-seeking.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: Unemployed search duration by regional income - cor-
recting for selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: TimeA TimeA TimeB TimeB
Regional income: Poor Rich Poor Rich
Post 1.235 1.514∗ 0.487 1.659
(0.869) (0.789) (1.046) (1.056)
Age 21 -1.234 -1.268∗ -2.002∗∗ -1.133
(0.776) (0.763) (0.867) (0.950)
Post*Age 21 2.153 2.031∗∗ 3.857∗∗ 2.010
(1.397) (1.028) (1.533) (1.261)
Constant 15.75∗∗∗ 16.66∗∗∗ 13.26∗∗∗ 16.45∗∗∗
(2.091) (2.296) (2.524) (3.094)
Selection eq.
Post 0.000589 0.0333 0.210∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0495) (0.0435) (0.0478) (0.0452)
Age 21 0.0712 0.0511 0.0630 0.0688
(0.0533) (0.0540) (0.0590) (0.0511)
Post*Age 21 0.112 0.132∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.182∗∗
(0.0768) (0.0652) (0.0805) (0.0825)
Constant 0.324∗∗ 0.309∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.151) (0.130) (0.142) (0.131)
ρ -0.0936∗∗∗ -0.0386 -0.0713∗∗∗ 0.00106
(0.0219) (0.0324) (0.0171) (0.0597)
ln(σ) 2.602∗∗∗ 2.504∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ 2.538∗∗∗
(0.0334) (0.0389) (0.0350) (0.0386)
Observations 9048 9689 9048 9689
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity and
occupation. TimeA refers to self-reported unemployment searching duration.
TimeB is a separate self-reported measure of time spent job-seeking. Model
is a Heckman Selection model, estimated by maximum likelihood.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.5 Additional results for on-the-job search
Table A.11: On-the-job search estimates by education
Any OJS Replacement job only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low High Low High
Post 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗
(0.00648) (0.0132) (0.00539) (0.0118)
Age 21 0.00409 -0.0413∗∗ 0.00114 -0.0468∗∗∗
(0.00790) (0.0180) (0.00704) (0.0164)
Post*Age 21 0.00605 0.00570 0.00475 0.00462
(0.0130) (0.0292) (0.0115) (0.0256)
Constant 0.148 0.458∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.0914) (0.184) (0.0916) (0.184)
Observations 23556 9476 23541 9453
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity and
occupation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.12: On-the-job search estimates by regional income - NUTS2
regions
Any OJS Replacement job only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor Rich Poor Rich
Post 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0136 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗
(0.00836) (0.00852) (0.00689) (0.00658)
Age 21 0.00346 -0.0175 -0.00458 -0.0156
(0.0106) (0.0122) (0.00961) (0.00986)
Post*Age 21 0.00493 0.0152 0.00231 0.0135
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0160) (0.0141)
Constant 0.149 0.280∗∗ 0.172 0.273∗∗
(0.133) (0.127) (0.132) (0.128)
Observations 15777 15650 15756 15635
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity, education
and occupation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.13: On-the-job search estimates by regional income - TTWA
regions
OJS Replace
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor Rich Poor Rich
Post 0.0199∗∗ 0.0154∗ 0.0133 0.0219∗∗∗
(0.00906) (0.00911) (0.00823) (0.00820)
Age 21 0.00824 -0.0200∗ -0.00169 -0.0158
(0.00949) (0.0118) (0.00846) (0.00973)
Post*Age 21 0.00601 0.0213 0.00666 0.0126
(0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0174) (0.0151)
Constant 0.108 0.332∗∗ 0.133 0.344∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.129) (0.133) (0.129)
Observations 13777 14490 13757 14479
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is 21-23
year olds, 24 months either side of 2010 policy change. Controls included:
sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status, ethnicity, education
and occupation.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: On-the-job search intensity estimates by education - correcting for
selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Active Active >1 m. >1 m. # m. # m.
Education: Low High Low High Low High
Post 0.130 -0.0261 0.412 0.0851 1.247 0.0339
(0.606) (0.119) (1.375) (0.146) (4.348) (0.282)
Age 21 0.0320 0.0682 0.0936 -0.0978 0.296 -0.184
(0.143) (0.143) (0.325) (0.177) (1.029) (0.340)
Post*Age 21 0.0602 -0.0376 0.0926 -0.0102 0.385 0.0484
(0.170) (0.0522) (0.386) (0.0863) (1.220) (0.141)
Constant -2.556 0.119 -6.230 -1.195 -18.76 -0.376
(9.468) (1.718) (21.50) (2.076) (67.99) (4.049)
Selection eq.
Post 0.105∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0354) (0.0285) (0.0354) (0.0285) (0.0354)
Age 21 0.0206 -0.135∗∗ 0.0206 -0.135∗∗ 0.0206 -0.135∗∗
(0.0326) (0.0554) (0.0326) (0.0554) (0.0326) (0.0554)
Post*Age 21 0.0238 0.000176 0.0238 0.000176 0.0238 0.000176
(0.0460) (0.0782) (0.0460) (0.0782) (0.0460) (0.0782)
Constant -0.774∗∗∗ -0.659∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -0.659∗ -0.774∗∗∗ -0.659∗
(0.264) (0.360) (0.264) (0.360) (0.264) (0.360)
Lambda 2.114 0.174 4.800 1.027 15.18 1.259
(6.969) (1.321) (15.82) (1.579) (50.04) (3.101)
Observations 23593 9482 23593 9482 23593 9482
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010
policy change who are in work. The selection equation includes all controls and treatment
variables. Heckman selection model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.15: On-the-job search intensity estimates by regional income - correcting
for selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome: Active Active >1 m. >1 m. # m. # m.
Region: Poor Rich Poor Rich Poor Rich
Post -0.0462 0.0444 0.00566 -0.0273 -0.108 0.150
(0.0629) (0.143) (0.0402) (0.0645) (0.175) (0.347)
Age 21 0.0122 -0.0160 -0.0228 0.0120 -0.0601 -0.163
(0.0631) (0.0876) (0.0408) (0.0381) (0.176) (0.213)
Post*Age 21 -0.0248 0.0832 0.00532 0.00484 0.111 0.313
(0.0858) (0.109) (0.0563) (0.0460) (0.241) (0.265)
Constant 1.227 -1.143 0.831 0.459 4.109 -2.042
(2.037) (2.186) (1.234) (1.004) (5.586) (5.323)
Selection eq.
Post 0.0464 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0464 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0464 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0476) (0.0286) (0.0476) (0.0286) (0.0476) (0.0286)
Age 21 0.0428 -0.0606∗ 0.0428 -0.0606∗ 0.0428 -0.0606∗
(0.0527) (0.0338) (0.0527) (0.0338) (0.0527) (0.0338)
Post*Age 21 0.0504 0.0699 0.0504 0.0699 0.0504 0.0699
(0.0806) (0.0503) (0.0806) (0.0503) (0.0806) (0.0503)
Constant -0.927 -0.797∗∗∗ -0.927 -0.797∗∗∗ -0.927 -0.797∗∗∗
(0.626) (0.261) (0.626) (0.261) (0.626) (0.261)
Lambda -0.497 1.130 -0.472 -0.124 -1.616 2.752
(1.345) (1.580) (0.807) (0.730) (3.680) (3.846)
Observations 8163 20157 8163 20157 8163 20157
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses. Sample is 21-23 year olds, 24 months either side of 2010
policy change who are in work. The selection equation includes all controls and treatment
variables. Heckman selection model estimated by two-step maximum likelihood. Controls
included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, education, marital status, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.6 2016 new age tier
Table A.16: Unemployed search extensive margin estimates - 2016
new age tier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working Unemployed Inactive Student
Post 0.00816 -0.00823∗ 0.000692 -0.000623
(0.00813) (0.00491) (0.00526) (0.00471)
Age 25+ 0.0671∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ 0.00923∗∗ -0.0563∗∗∗
(0.00769) (0.00395) (0.00457) (0.00470)
Post*Age 25+ 0.00140 -0.0000717 -0.00416 0.00284
(0.00936) (0.00564) (0.00657) (0.00510)
Constant 0.410∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.0199
(0.0827) (0.0178) (0.0765) (0.0233)
Observations 47651 47651 47651 47651
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sample is
22-28 year olds, 12 months before and 9 months after 2016 policy change.
Controls included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital status,
education, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.17: Unemployed search extensive margin estimates,
excluding students - 2016 new age tier
(1) (2) (3)
Working Unemployed Inactive
Post 0.00762 -0.00883∗ 0.00121
(0.00761) (0.00533) (0.00570)
Age 25+ 0.0216∗∗∗ -0.0257∗∗∗ 0.00410
(0.00626) (0.00433) (0.00488)
Post*Age 25+ 0.00369 0.000496 -0.00419
(0.00875) (0.00605) (0.00695)
Constant 0.424∗∗∗ 0.0655∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.0801) (0.0196) (0.0772)
Observations 45096 45096 45096
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on age-region level. Sam-
ple is 22-28 year olds, 12 months before and 9 months after 2016
policy change, not excluded from labour force due to studying. Con-
trols included: sex, region (NUTS2 level), quarter, proxy, marital
status, education, ethnicity.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Descriptive statistics
Table B.1 displays basic descriptive statistics for the Business Structure Database
firm (plant) level dataset used. Key variables displayed include the plant level
employment, number of masslayoffs within 20km of the plant, distance to the
closest mass layoff in the year in question (if there exists a mass layoff within
50km), the number of firms not located within 50km of a mass layoff, and the
employment change at the firm level.
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics: firms (plants)
Firm Variable Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N
Employment 7.679 83.243 1 2 5 71,128,244
# ML within 20km 5.136 11.2371 0 1 4 71,128,248
Dist to closest ML if <50km 15.689 13.134 4.7 11.9 24.2 58,755,900
No ML within 50km - - - - - 12,372,348
Employment change -.699 41.479 0 0 0 67,482,554
ML refers to mass layoff in the year in question. Sample is 1997-2017 of the BSD
Table B.2 displays descriptive statistics for the sample of mass layoffs. On
average, there are 100 mass layoffs of more than 1,000 workers per year over the
sampled period. These are spread across a range of industries, as displayed by
the 1 digit industry percentage counts.
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Table B.2: Descriptive statistics: masslayoffs
Masslayoff Variable Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 N
Employment change -2732 5567 -1200 -1500 -2300 2,009
1 digit industry Count Percent
0-1 72 3.58%
2 140 6.97%
3 104 5.18 %
4 123 6.12%
5 305 15.18%
6 496 24.69%
7 662 32.95%
8 21 1.05%
9 86 4.28%
B.2 Robustness checks
I build up the analysis using a variety of fixed effects, eliminating sources of
variation one-by-one to assuage some concerns about endogeneity. The baseline
formulation uses 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode and time fixed effects. This
removes industry trends, location fixed effects and non-parametric time-specific
shocks shared by all firms. The variation driving the results remains proximity to
masslayoffs, absent all these fixed effects.
Concern remains that individual industries or regions may have time varying
shocks, correlated with proximity, that are driving these results. I therefore add
industry-year interactions, to control for national industry shocks in each year.
This would remove endogeneity stemming from masslayoff and non-masslayoff
firms spatially sorting close together based on industry. The employment loss
observed would be from correlated shocks, rather than true proximity spillovers.
The results remain robust to this. The apparent lack of concern with industrial
spatial sorting is consistent with the industrial closeness results of section 2.6.1 -
all industries, whether close or not, appear to be affected by spatial spillovers.
Furthermore, I add location-year interactions. However, as 2 digit postcode
locations cover a several kilometer radius these remove a lot of the year-to-year
variation I am interested in. The results, unsurprisingly, are therefore substantially
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weakened.
Next, I check for robustness around other mass layoffs. Table B.3 displays
several robustness checks. Column 1 controls for serial correlation in the mass
layoff treatment variable, by controlling for the distance to the closest mass layoff
in the previous year. For simplicity of display, the parametric form exp(−dist) is
used for the lagged mass layoff, which is approximately one for very close firms and
approximately zero for far away firms. The negative coefficient implies negative
employment spillovers that decay with distance - as expected. Importantly, the
spillover distance estimates for the current year’s closest mass layoff are not
significantly altered.
Columns 2 and 3 control for other mass layoffs in the same year. Column
two controls for the distance to the second closest mass layoff, again using the
parametric form exp(−dist). A negative coefficient implies negative but decaying
employment spillovers from the second closest, but the estimated impact of the
first closest is only very slightly weakened. Column three controls for the number
of mass layoffs within 20km - checking for the possibility that the estimates are
contaminated by spatial clustering of mass layoffs. The employment spillover
distance decay estimates are unaffected.
Lastly, column four displays a standard placebo check - the analogue of
the parallel trends assumption used in difference-in-differences approaches. The
distance dummies are replaced by the distance to the closest mass layoff one period
in the future. Significant results would call into question the event study approach
- either by demonstrating anticipation effects or indicating that the shocks may not
be as exogenous as hoped. We see no significant estimates, assuaging endogeneity
concerns.
There may also be concern that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) was the
driving force behind the results. The sampled period of 1997-2017 includes the
timeframe, and the pooled results may simply be an average of large GFC effects
and zero effects at other times. Table B.4 segments the sample into different time
periods and runs separate regressions on each. We see that negative employment
spillovers in close proximity to mass layoffs were somewhat stronger in the GFC
year (approximately 2007-2012) but present and significant during all time periods.
Lastly, I also consider a variety of alternative corrections for non-spherical
errors. Results remain significant in all instances. Table B.5 displays some of the
forms: clustered errors at the two digit industry level (allowing for national shocks
correlated across related industries), at the regional level (allowing for shocks
correlated within regions) and at the industry-regional interaction level.
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Table B.3: Controlling for other mass layoffs in the spatial distribution of effects on
impact
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Extra controls: ML Lag 1 2nd closest ML # ML in 20km Placebo
Dep. var. ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0696∗∗∗ -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0716∗∗∗ 0.00127
(0.00769) (0.00615) (0.00739) (0.000981)
dist 1-2km -0.0260∗∗∗ -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗∗ 0.000728
(0.00357) (0.00338) (0.00354) (0.000665)
dist 2-3km -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ 0.000256
(0.00298) (0.00304) (0.00296) (0.000369)
dist 3-4km -0.00740∗∗ -0.00984∗∗∗ -0.00860∗∗ 0.000473
(0.00263) (0.00270) (0.00264) (0.000518)
dist 4-5km -0.00718∗∗ -0.00985∗∗∗ -0.00787∗∗ -0.0000525
(0.00250) (0.00256) (0.00267) (0.000398)
dist 5-10km -0.00606∗∗∗ -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.00630∗∗ -0.0000811
(0.00171) (0.00180) (0.00201) (0.000401)
dist 10-20km -0.00349∗∗ -0.00490∗∗∗ -0.00351∗ -0.000233
(0.00117) (0.00118) (0.00145) (0.000376)
dist 20-40km 0.000539 -0.000310 0.000589 -0.000539∗
(0.00120) (0.00119) (0.00136) (0.000241)
exp(-dist) lagged -0.00594∗∗∗
(0.00122)
exp(-dist) 2nd closest -0.0999∗∗∗
(0.0162)
# ML in 20km 0.000385∗
(0.000170)
Constant -0.0410∗∗∗ -0.0425∗∗∗ -0.0439∗∗∗ -4.155∗∗∗
(0.00659) (0.00643) (0.00645) (0.405)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522 54,990,618
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.001
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls are 2 digit SIC
industry, 2 digit postcode, and year, plus the additional mass layoff controls displayed. Column
1 controls for the distance to the closest mass layoff in the previous year, column 2 for the
distance to the second closest in the current year and column 3 for the number of mass layoffs
within 20km in the current year. Column 4 is a placebo regression, where the distance dummies
are the distance to the closest mass layoff one year in the future. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4: Global Financial Crisis segmentation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years: < 2007 ≥ 2007 2007-2012 2013-2017
Dep. var. ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0585∗∗∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0905∗∗∗ -0.0564∗∗∗
(0.00455) (0.0109) (0.0140) (0.00606)
dist 1-2km -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0284∗∗∗ -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0329∗∗∗
(0.00275) (0.00460) (0.00654) (0.00313)
dist 2-3km -0.0134∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗
(0.00290) (0.00380) (0.00587) (0.00201)
dist 3-4km -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.00584 -0.00736 -0.00133
(0.00273) (0.00331) (0.00542) (0.00157)
dist 4-5km -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.00582 -0.00576 -0.00328
(0.00277) (0.00308) (0.00499) (0.00177)
dist 5-10km -0.0102∗∗∗ -0.00461∗ -0.00549 -0.000438
(0.00256) (0.00201) (0.00320) (0.00155)
dist 10-20km -0.00753∗∗∗ -0.00167 -0.000474 -0.00183
(0.00217) (0.00135) (0.00191) (0.00194)
dist 20-40km -0.00335∗ 0.00269 0.00523 -0.000128
(0.00139) (0.00208) (0.00302) (0.00150)
Constant -0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗ -0.0387∗∗∗
(0.00624) (0.00901) (0.00950) (0.00465)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27,759,558 38,254,964 21,671,828 16,583,136
R2 0.017 0.028 0.040 0.010
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls
are 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Full sample is 1997-2017,
subsamples indicated in column headers.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.5: Error clustering: industry, region, industry-region two way
(1) (2) (3)
Clustering: Industry Region Ind-Reg
Dep. var: ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗ -0.0702∗∗∗
(0.00769) (0.00559) (0.00316)
dist 1-2km -0.0266∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗∗
(0.00362) (0.00300) (0.00201)
dist 2-3km -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00305) (0.00269) (0.00182)
dist 3-4km -0.00813∗∗ -0.00813∗∗ -0.00813∗∗∗
(0.00269) (0.00278) (0.00177)
dist 4-5km -0.00792∗∗ -0.00792∗∗ -0.00792∗∗∗
(0.00254) (0.00264) (0.00181)
dist 5-10km -0.00683∗∗∗ -0.00683∗∗ -0.00683∗∗∗
(0.00179) (0.00261) (0.00160)
dist 10-20km -0.00424∗∗∗ -0.00424 -0.00424∗∗
(0.00119) (0.00264) (0.00142)
dist 20-40km -0.0000507 -0.0000507 -0.0000507
(0.00121) (0.00187) (0.00129)
Constant -0.0426∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗ -0.0426∗∗∗
(0.00641) (0.00912) (0.00904)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,014,522 66,014,522 66,014,522
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 clusters the errors at
2 digit industry level, column 2 at the 2 digit region level (the
letters only for UK postcodes - effectively a small-medium sized
city + hinterland), and column three at the 2 digit industry-region
interaction level. Controls are 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode,
and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B.3 Additional results for section 2.3: spatial re-
sults on impact
B.3.1 Comparing baseline results to parametric functions
Much of the spatial literature (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)) use exponential decay
functions to capture the effects of distance. Figure B.1 overlays two candidate
exponential decay functions to the graphed non-parametric estimates. As can
be observed, a single exponential decay function cannot accurately capture the
spatial spillovers: the effects decay far more rapidly at short distances than they
do at further distances. The rapid decay patterns, up to about 4km in distance,
can be roughly captured by the red line which plots a scale parameter of 10 and a
decay parameter of −0.75. After about 5km from the masslayoff, the decay rate
is much less rapid, albeit the magnitude of the effects are much smaller. A scale
parameter of 1.5 and a much slower decay parameter of −0.1 provide a better fit.
Figure B.1: Exponential decay functions versus non parametric estimates.
The black line plots the column three non-parametric estimates from Table 2.1,
including 95% confidence intervals. The red line overlays an exponential decay function
of the form 10 exp(−0.75 ∗ dist). The blue line overlays a second exponential decay
function of the form 1.5 exp(−0.1 ∗ dist)
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B.3.2 Firm type heterogeneity tables
Table B.6: Partitioning the sample based on firm size (employment count)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm size: < 10 < 20 > 50 > 100 20-50
Dep. Var ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0391∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗ -0.0902∗∗∗
(0.00461) (0.00576) (0.0383) (0.0480) (0.0233)
dist 1-2km -0.00734∗∗ -0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0654∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗ -0.0321∗∗∗
(0.00220) (0.00276) (0.0166) (0.0255) (0.00800)
dist 2-3km -0.00496∗ -0.00844∗∗∗ -0.0261∗ -0.0354 -0.0186∗
(0.00201) (0.00242) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.00840)
dist 3-4km -0.00323 -0.00500∗ -0.00391 -0.0102 -0.00248
(0.00203) (0.00234) (0.0121) (0.0178) (0.00599)
dist 4-5km -0.00352 -0.00469∗ -0.0102 -0.0267 -0.0131∗∗
(0.00199) (0.00229) (0.00788) (0.0134) (0.00464)
dist 5-10km -0.00354∗ -0.00454∗∗ -0.00416 -0.0166 -0.00615
(0.00145) (0.00162) (0.00619) (0.00837) (0.00680)
dist 10-20km -0.00284∗∗ -0.00323∗∗ -0.00335 -0.0106 -0.00473
(0.00102) (0.00111) (0.00564) (0.00806) (0.00395)
dist 20-40km -0.000455 -0.000168 0.00484 0.000681 0.00206
(0.00112) (0.00125) (0.00401) (0.00609) (0.00351)
Constant -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.606∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗∗
(0.00430) (0.00500) (0.0302) (0.0438) (0.0137)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 57,353,827 61,900,460 1,403,569 613,127 2,710,493
R2 0.023 0.024 0.048 0.050 0.043
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls are 2 digit
SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year fixed effects. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.7: Partitioning sample based on whether firm or closest mass layoff was in the
manufacturing industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type: Man ML Non-man ML Man firm Non-man firm
Dep. var ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0508∗∗∗ -0.0721∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.0672∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.00733) (0.0154) (0.00740)
dist 1-2km -0.0168∗ -0.0275∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗
(0.00767) (0.00343) (0.00419) (0.00376)
dist 2-3km -0.0124 -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0235∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗
(0.00740) (0.00287) (0.00358) (0.00312)
dist 3-4km -0.00844 -0.00793∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.00776∗∗
(0.00788) (0.00245) (0.00205) (0.00279)
dist 4-5km -0.00633 -0.00758∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.00737∗∗
(0.0105) (0.00217) (0.00229) (0.00260)
dist 5-10km -0.00687 -0.00642∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.00645∗∗
(0.00660) (0.00178) (0.00266) (0.00185)
dist 10-20km -0.000360 -0.00422∗∗ -0.00508∗ -0.00413∗∗
(0.00465) (0.00143) (0.00187) (0.00127)
dist 20-40km 0.00410 0.0000103 0.00225 -0.000347
(0.00356) (0.00148) (0.00153) (0.00131)
Constant -0.0548∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗∗ -0.0393∗∗∗
(0.00902) (0.00668) (0.0164) (0.00625)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10,072,080 55,909,683 4,125,366 61,889,156
R2 0.029 0.022 0.026 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls are 2
digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year fixed effects. Years included are
1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.8: Employment density around the firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L) ∆log(L)
Impact Lag 1 Impact Lag 1
exp(-dist) -0.101∗∗∗ -0.0717∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.0847∗∗∗
(0.000606) (0.000607) (0.000627) (0.000635)
Dens -0.00664∗∗∗ -0.00909∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗
(0.000112) (0.000111) (0.000174) (0.000162)
exp(-dist) * Dens 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗
(0.000300) (0.000300)
Cons -0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0492∗∗∗ -0.0486∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗
(0.000813) (0.000813) (0.000813) (0.000813)
FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,016,397 66,016,397 66,016,397 66,016,397
R2 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Exp(-dist) is the expo-
nential of the negative distance to the closest masslayoff. Dens is the standardised
employment per square km in a 3by3km grid around the plant. Controls are 2 digit
SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year fixed effects. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.9: Partitioning the firm sample based on employment density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Emp. density Top 50% Bottom 50% Top 25% Bottom 25%
Dep. var ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0515∗∗∗ -0.0420∗∗∗ -0.0465∗∗∗ -0.0271∗∗
(0.00645) (0.00529) (0.00671) (0.00980)
dist 1-2km -0.0113∗∗∗ -0.0102∗∗ -0.00834 -0.00482
(0.00298) (0.00324) (0.00429) (0.00537)
dist 2-3km -0.00162 -0.00701∗ -0.000987 -0.00829∗
(0.00234) (0.00311) (0.00387) (0.00352)
dist 3-4km 0.00372∗ -0.00588∗ 0.00451 -0.00270
(0.00175) (0.00285) (0.00310) (0.00275)
dist 4-5km 0.00134 -0.00500 -0.00104 -0.00472
(0.00200) (0.00276) (0.00381) (0.00321)
dist 5-10km -0.00305 -0.00438 -0.00932∗∗ -0.00438
(0.00160) (0.00231) (0.00295) (0.00249)
dist 10-20km -0.00666∗∗∗ -0.00298∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ -0.00321∗
(0.00143) (0.00141) (0.00284) (0.00153)
dist 20-40km -0.000199 -0.000912 0.00291 -0.00115
(0.00280) (0.000601) (0.00553) (0.000832)
Constant -0.0834∗∗∗ -0.0320∗∗∗ -0.0971∗∗∗ -0.0282∗∗∗
(0.00974) (0.00489) (0.0100) (0.00466)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 32,794,533 33,219,989 16,267,241 16,665,832
R2 0.024 0.021 0.026 0.021
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Sample is segmented
based on the standardised employment per square kilometer in a 3km-by-3km grid
around the plant. Controls are 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year fixed
effects. Years included are 1997-2017.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B.4 Dynamic results table
Table B.10: Estimates for the dynamic impacts of mass layoffs: up to five time periods
after the event
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km -0.0590∗∗∗ -0.0595∗∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗ -0.0480∗∗∗
(0.00510) (0.00520) (0.00270) (0.00270) (0.00326)
dist 1-2km -0.0254∗∗∗ -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0195∗∗∗
(0.00321) (0.00197) (0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00173)
dist 2-3km -0.0137∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00236) (0.00173) (0.00143) (0.00143) (0.00188)
dist 3-4km -0.00866∗∗∗ -0.00694∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.00566∗∗∗
(0.00171) (0.00168) (0.00123) (0.00123) (0.00159)
dist 4-5km -0.00878∗∗∗ -0.00723∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗ -0.00344
(0.00165) (0.00176) (0.00137) (0.00137) (0.00197)
dist 5-10km -0.00802∗∗∗ -0.00742∗∗∗ -0.00834∗∗∗ -0.00834∗∗∗ -0.00340
(0.00161) (0.00164) (0.00111) (0.00111) (0.00206)
dist 10-20km -0.00654∗∗∗ -0.00565∗∗∗ -0.00574∗∗∗ -0.00574∗∗∗ -0.00173
(0.00124) (0.00130) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00204)
dist 20-40km -0.00372∗∗∗ -0.00355∗∗ -0.00186 -0.00186 -0.000112
(0.000938) (0.00128) (0.00102) (0.00102) (0.00164)
Constant -0.0447∗∗∗ -0.0561∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ -0.0641∗∗∗ -0.0454∗∗
(0.00681) (0.00763) (0.00750) (0.00750) (0.0155)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,014,522 63,245,479 60,450,337 60,450,337 54,824,033
R2 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.026
Years included are 1998-2017 for T1, 1999-2017 for T2, 2000-2017 for T3, 2001-2017 for T4,
2002-2017 for T5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 2 digit industry. Variables are a
set of dummies indicating distance to closest masslayoff. Fixed effects are 2 digit SIC industry,
2 digit postcode, and year. The estimates are plotted in figure 2.5 in section 2.5.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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B.5 Firm churn and aggregate local impacts
The analysis so far estimates the employment response of existing firms to a
nearby masslayoff. We see existing firms in close proximity to a mass layoff reduce
their employment substantially. However, a related margin of adjustment is the
impact on firm churn. Firm churn may be a large part of local adjustment to
masslayoffs - some firms may shut down while new firms may establish in their
place. Another way of phrasing this is that firm dynamism may rise in response
to masslayoffs. Here, I estimate the direct impact on firm birth and death of mass
layoff proximity.1
Table B.11 displays estimates of the impact on firm birth and death. Columns
1 and 2 are linear probability models where the dependent variable equals one if
the life event (birth or death respectively) occurred and zero if it did not (i.e. the
firm existed in both t− 1 and t). We see that both birth rates and death rates are
higher in close proximity to a mass layoff. However, the increase in death rates is
relatively larger - approximately four times the increase in birth rates for firms
located within 1 kilometre of the mass layoff. In short, churn increases, but the
increase in firm death outweighs firm birth.
Column 3 extends the baseline analysis by including firms born implicitly
in the analysis. The dependent variable, ∆ logLt = (logLt − logLt−1) is set to
(logLt) for those firms born between t− 1 and t. In effect, this sets their lagged
employment to 1 to avoid the log 0 issue. We see that the overall firm level
employment effect close to mass layoffs is still negative, but weakened once firm
birth is included in the picture.
The baseline analysis estimates firm level adjustment, not regional or aggregate
level adjustment. Regional or aggregate estimates would require aggregation, and
therefore the firm level estimates to be weighted by firm size. Table B.12 therefore
weights the firm level changes in a variety of ways. Column 1 is the baseline,
unweighted estimates, column 2 weights the baseline estimates by firm employment
levels, and columns 3 and 4 weight the firms by their log employment. Columns 1-3
are the baseline samples, including only those firms alive at the start of the period.
Column 4 adds in firms born during the time period. The weighted regressions
have more negative point estimates than their unweighted counterparts. This is
consistent with earlier estimates that larger firms respond more strongly.
1Existing firms that die during the time period in question are included implicitly in the
baseline analysis. Those firms have their ∆ logLt = (logLt − logLt−1) set to (− logLt−1), i.e.
logLt = 0. In effect, this assumes that all but one of their employees leave the firm, so as to
avoid the log 0 issue. However, the direct effect on firm death is not estimated, while firm birth
has been entirely abstracted from so far.
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Table B.11: Firm churn: the impact on firm birth and death
(1) (2) (3)
Dep var: Birth Death ∆ log(L)
dist 0-1km 0.00527∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0243∗∗∗
(0.00119) (0.00411) (0.00589)
dist 1-2km 0.00682∗∗∗ 0.00748∗∗ -0.00310
(0.00163) (0.00220) (0.00272)
dist 2-3km 0.00489∗∗ 0.00287 -0.00370
(0.00143) (0.00191) (0.00227)
dist 3-4km 0.00455∗∗ 0.00129 -0.000548
(0.00135) (0.00178) (0.00166)
dist 4-5km 0.00314∗ 0.00194 -0.00184
(0.00122) (0.00149) (0.00135)
dist 5-10km 0.00250∗∗ 0.000380 -0.00173
(0.000907) (0.00140) (0.001000)
dist 10-20km 0.00336 -0.00150 -0.000901
(0.00250) (0.00107) (0.000912)
dist 20-40km 0.00107 0.000373 0.00109
(0.00101) (0.00126) (0.000768)
Constant 0.0742∗∗∗ 0.0627∗∗∗ -0.0102
(0.00865) (0.00429) (0.00600)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 76,505,519 76,505,519 74,739,307
R2 0.014 0.064 0.009
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level.
Controls are 2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year fixed
effects. Years included are 1997-2017. Columns 1 and 2 are linear
probability models for the probability of firm birth and death
respectively, in the year of the mass layoff. Column 3 is the combined
effect on the change in log(L) including firm birth and death.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.12: Weighted firm level employment regressions
(1) (3) (5) (6)
Dep. Var ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L) ∆ log(L)
Weighting: None L log(L) log(L)
Firm birth No No No Yes
dist 0-1km -0.0702*** -0.174*** -0.113*** -0.0484***
(0.00769) (0.0401) (0.0166) (0.0127)
dist 1-2km -0.0266*** -0.0762*** -0.0462*** -0.00994
(0.00362) (0.0177) (0.00752) (0.00545)
dist 2-3km -0.0147*** -0.0513* -0.0251*** -0.00837
(0.00305) (0.0230) (0.00530) (0.00522)
dist 3-4km -0.00813** 0.0153 -0.0124*** -0.000274
(0.00269) (0.0179) (0.00333) (0.00353)
dist 4-5km -0.00792** -0.0221 -0.0130*** -0.00210
(0.00254) (0.0176) (0.00270) (0.00257)
dist 5-10km -0.00683*** -0.0125 -0.00778*** 0.000131
(0.00179) (0.0153) (0.00221) (0.00216)
dist 10-20km -0.00424*** -0.0280 -0.00230 0.00180
(0.00119) (0.0221) (0.00199) (0.00214)
dist 20-40km -0.0000507 0.00165 0.00309** 0.00434***
(0.00121) (0.00945) (0.00115) (0.00114)
Constant -0.0426*** -0.337*** -0.146*** -0.0825***
(0.00641) (0.0688) (0.00949) (0.0122)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,014,522 66,014,522 42,470,811 47,214,972
R2) 0.023 0.045 0.031 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at 2 digit industry level. Controls are
2 digit SIC industry, 2 digit postcode, and year. Years included are 1997-2017.
Columns 1,2 and 3 include only firms alive at the start of the period, column 4
also includes firms born during the period.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 O*NET tasks used to construct indices
Sourced from Acemoglu and Autor (2011): O*NET task measures used in this
paper are composite measures of O*NET importance scales of work abilities, work
activities, work context and skills:
Non-routine cognitive: Analytical
• 4.A.2.a.4 Analyzing data/information
• 4.A.2.b.2 Thinking creatively
• 4.A.4.a.1 Interpreting information for others
Non-routine cognitive: Interpersonal
• 4.A.4.a.4 Establishing and maintaining personal relationships
• 4.A.4.b.4 Guiding, directing and motivating subordinates
• 4.A.4.b.5 Coaching/developing others
Routine cognitive
• 4.C.3.b.7 Importance of repeating the same tasks
• 4.C.3.b.4 Importance of being exact or accurate
• 4.C.3.b.8 Structured v. Unstructured work (reverse)
Routine manual
• 4.C.3.d.3 Pace determined by speed of equipment
• 4.A.3.a.3 Controlling machines and processes
• 4.C.2.d.1.i Spend time making repetitive motions
Non-routine manual physical
• 4.A.3.a.4 Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment
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• 4.C.2.d.1.g Spend time using hands to handle, control or feel objects, tools or controls
• 1.A.2.a.2 Manual dexterity
• 1.A.1.f.1 Spatial orientation
Non-routine manual interpersonal – adapted from Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
• 2.B.1.a Social Perceptiveness
• 4.C.1.a.2.l Face-to-face discussions (Added by current authors)
• 4.A.4.a.5 Assisting and Caring for Others (Added by current authors)
Offshorability
• 4.A.4.a.8 Performing for or Working Directly with the Public (reverse)
• 4.A.4.a.5 Assisting and Caring for Others (reverse)
• 4.C.1.a.2.l Face-to-face discussions (reverse)
• 4.A.1.b.2 Inspecting Equipment, Structures, or Material (reverse)
• 4.A.3.a.2 Handling and Moving Objects (reverse)
• 4.A.3.b.4 0.5*Repairing and Maintaining Mechanical Equipment (reverse)
• 4.A.3.b.5 0.5*Repairing and Maintaining Electronic Equipment (reverse)
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C.2 Top 10 of occupations for each skill index, or-
dered
Non-routine Cognitive Analytical Non-routine Manual Personal
212 Mathematicians, actuaries andstatisticians 112 Managing Directors and Chief Executives
261 Legal professionals 342 Sports and Fitness Workers
112 Managing Directors and Chief Executives 133 Information and CommunicationsTechnology Services Managers
252 Database specialists and systemsadministrators 122
Sales, Marketing and Development
Managers
211 Physicists, chemists and relatedprofessionals 143 Other Services Managers
251 Software and applications developers andanalysts 134 Professional Services Managers
225 Veterinarians 222 Nursing and Midwifery Professionals
231 University and higher education teachers 233 Secondary Education Teachers
216 Architects, Planners, Surveyors andDesigners 322
Nursing and Midwifery Associate
Professionals
214 Engineering professionals 132 Manufacturing, Mining, Construction andDistribution Managers
Routine Cognitive Routine Manual
523 Cashiers and Ticket Clerks 814 Rubber, Plastic and PaperProducts Machine Operators
431 Numerical Clerks 834 Mobile Plant Operators
421 Tellers, Money Collectors and RelatedClerks 815
Textile, Fur and Leather Products
Machine Operators
422 Client Information Workers 752 Wood Treaters, Cabinet-makersand Related Trades Workers
324 Veterinary Technicians and Assistants 812 Metal Processing and Finishing PlantOperators
251 Software and Applications Developersand Analysts 817
Wood Processing and Papermaking Plant
Operators
413 Keyboard Operators 816 Food and Related Products MachineOperators
441 Other Clerical Support Workers 811 Mining and Mineral Processing PlantOperators
541 Protective Services Workers 961 Refuse Workers
821 Assemblers 813 Chemical and Photographic ProductsPlant and Machine Operators
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Non-routine Manual Physical Non-routine Manual Personal
833 Heavy Truck and Bus Drivers 322 Nursing and Midwifery AssociateProfessionals
835 Ships’ Deck Crews and Related Workers 342 Sports and Fitness Workers
834 Mobile Plant Operators 531 Child Care Workers and Teachers’ Aides
723 Machinery Mechanics and Repairers 514 Hairdressers, Beauticians and RelatedWorkers
931 Mining and Construction Labourers 532 Personal care workers in health services
831 Locomotive Engine Drivers andRelated Workers 341
Legal, social and religious
associate professionals
741 Electrical Equipment Installersand Repairers 541 Protective services workers
811 Mining and Mineral Processing PlantOperators 325 Other health associate professionals
961 Refuse Workers 511 Travel attendants, conductors and guides
711 Building Frame and Related TradesWorkers 516 Other personal services workers
Non-routine Manual Personal
(Acemoglu and Autor definition) Offshoring
233 Secondary Education Teachers 952 Street and related sales and service workers
222 Nursing and Midwifery Professionals 431 Numerical Clerks
322 Nursing and Midwifery AssociateProfessionals 251
Software and applications developers and
analysts
232 Vocational Education Teachers 212 Mathematicians, actuaries and statisticians
342 Sports and Fitness Workers 241 Finance professionals
261 Legal professionals 112 Managing Directors and Chief Executives
235 Other teaching professionals 261 Legal professionals
263 Social and religious professionals 215 Electrotechnology engineers
511 Travel attendants, conductors and guides 264 Authors, journalists and linguists
531 Child Care Workers and Teachers’ Aides 331 Financial and mathematical associateprofessionals
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C.3 Additional tables
C.3.1 Age
Table C.1: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along age lines - non-routine
cognitive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—- Analytical —- —– Personal —–
Younger Older Younger Older
High Index 2.9047*** 4.2682*** 3.3435*** 4.4218***
(0.6380) (0.8704) (0.5133) (0.7733)
t -0.0833*** -0.0324* -0.0731*** -0.0313**
(0.0130) (0.0167) (0.0118) (0.0154)
High Index * t 0.0304 0.0187 -0.0215 -0.0105
(0.0244) (0.0321) (0.0263) (0.0336)
Constant 41.6335*** 50.7438*** 40.8304*** 49.7384***
(0.6122) (1.7956) (0.6120) (1.8354)
Observations 3741843 2209524 3741843 2209524
R-squared 0.1326 0.1614 0.1294 0.1583
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along age lines - routine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—- Cognitive —- —- Manual —
Younger Older Younger Older
High Index -2.0383*** -2.2006*** 2.0963*** 3.1891***
(0.3613) (0.3745) (0.3921) (0.5554)
t -0.1118*** -0.0547*** -0.0624*** 0.0180
(0.0151) (0.0144) (0.0126) (0.0144)
High Index * t 0.0623*** 0.0390** -0.1003*** -0.2008***
(0.0175) (0.0170) (0.0224) (0.0309)
Constant 40.7816*** 50.1531*** 39.4683*** 48.6488***
(0.6457) (1.9100) (0.6980) (1.9206)
Observations 3741843 2209524 3741843 2209524
R-squared 0.1182 0.1428 0.1167 0.1422
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.3: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along age lines - non-routine
manual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—– Physical —– —- Personal —-
Younger Older Younger Older
High Index 2.4243*** 2.8672*** -2.3102*** -3.3677***
(0.4614) (0.6288) (0.8280) (1.1271)
t -0.0832*** -0.0299* -0.0904*** -0.0644***
(0.0128) (0.0163) (0.0130) (0.0131)
High Index * t -0.0492** -0.0728*** -0.0035 0.0650
(0.0208) (0.0260) (0.0299) (0.0407)
Constant 38.7660*** 48.1199*** 41.3585*** 50.8499***
(0.7630) (1.9367) (0.6556) (2.0225)
Observations 3741843 2209524 3794069 2228632
R-squared 0.1197 0.1430 0.1196 0.1432
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.3.2 Gender
Table C.4: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along gender lines - non-routine
cognitive
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—- Analytical —- —- Personal —-
Female Male Female Male
High Index 2.9570*** 2.4960*** 2.6978*** 3.5570***
(1.0006) (0.5438) (0.7407) (0.5402)
t -0.0752*** -0.0877*** -0.0827*** -0.0773***
(0.0206) (0.0105) (0.0174) (0.0106)
High Index * t 0.0542 0.0326 0.0307 0.0020
(0.0385) (0.0198) (0.0309) (0.0242)
Constant 35.7355*** 42.6126*** 34.9511*** 42.1078***
(0.9896) (0.5160) (1.0092) (0.5239)
Observations 7800573 8953854 7800573 8953854
R-squared 0.1572 0.1138 0.1532 0.1194
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along gender lines - routine
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—- Cognitive —- —- Manual —-
Female Male Female Male
High Index 0.1940 -1.7092*** 2.8824*** -0.2462
(0.3842) (0.2155) (0.4888) (0.2425)
t -0.0710*** -0.0996*** -0.0179 -0.0619***
(0.0188) (0.0127) (0.0149) (0.0135)
High Index * t -0.0096 0.0419*** -0.2684*** -0.0515***
(0.0188) (0.0119) (0.0320) (0.0129)
Constant 34.8137*** 42.1432*** 34.4231*** 42.5968***
(0.9307) (0.5634) (0.9209) (0.5379)
Observations 7800573 8953854 7800573 8953854
R-squared 0.1415 0.1016 0.1465 0.1012
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.6: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along gender lines - non-routine
manual
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—- Physical —- —- Personal —-
Female Male Female Male
High Index 1.9800*** -0.3299 -0.8496 -1.3211
(0.4901) (0.2741) (0.7523) (0.9165)
t -0.0616*** -0.0732*** -0.0802*** -0.0869***
(0.0159) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0123)
High Index * t -0.1089*** -0.0267* 0.0049 -0.0122
(0.0314) (0.0141) (0.0296) (0.0236)
Constant 34.3051*** 42.6849*** 35.2386*** 42.2921***
(0.9264) (0.5703) (0.7979) (0.5367)
Observations 7800573 8953854 7846974 9112745
R-squared 0.1420 0.1001 0.1422 0.0987
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
C.3. ADDITIONAL TABLES 159
C.3.3 Education
Table C.7: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along education - non-routine
cognitive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———- Analytical ———- ———- Personal ———-
Low Mid High Low Mid High
High Index 4.9619*** 2.8143*** 2.8265*** 4.6360*** 4.0738*** 3.3599***
(1.1206) (0.6866) (0.6825) (0.5753) (0.7001) (0.6549)
t -0.0939*** -0.0849*** -0.0228 -0.1000*** -0.0789*** -0.0016
(0.0160) (0.0112) (0.0176) (0.0148) (0.0115) (0.0117)
High Index * t 0.0065 0.0244 0.0229 -0.0095 -0.0497 -0.0024
(0.0467) (0.0250) (0.0239) (0.0252) (0.0322) (0.0283)
Constant 39.3707*** 44.6373*** 43.6233*** 39.1210*** 44.0347*** 42.7427***
(0.5843) (0.4598) (0.9699) (0.5668) (0.4626) (0.8291)
Observations 4945745 7384674 4424008 4945745 7384674 4424008
R-squared 0.2629 0.2107 0.1815 0.2620 0.2116 0.1820
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along education - routine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———- Cognitive ———- ———- Manual ———-
Low Mid High Low Mid High
High Index -0.4515 -1.2496*** -2.2887*** 0.9152** -0.1222 -0.6108
(0.3016) (0.2867) (0.5821) (0.3760) (0.2943) (0.4560)
t -0.1278*** -0.1185*** -0.0218 -0.0372** -0.0653*** -0.0140
(0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0238) (0.0163) (0.0141) (0.0172)
High Index * t 0.0677*** 0.0601*** -0.0102 -0.1185*** -0.0634*** -0.1003***
(0.0167) (0.0146) (0.0280) (0.0238) (0.0188) (0.0235)
Constant 40.3039*** 44.8883*** 42.9483*** 39.4692*** 45.0335*** 44.2822***
(0.5724) (0.4366) (1.0153) (0.6274) (0.4210) (0.9760)
Observations 4945745 7384674 4424008 4945745 7384674 4424008
R-squared 0.2473 0.1975 0.1742 0.2484 0.1990 0.1684
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.9: Baseline regressions with sample stratified along education - non-routine
manual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hours per worker
———- Physical ———- ———- Personal ———-
Low Mid High Low Mid High
High Index -0.0638 -0.4136 -0.3730 -0.7455 -1.3270 -2.2299***
(0.3555) (0.3428) (0.4946) (1.2181) (0.8603) (0.6462)
t -0.1168*** -0.0916*** -0.0160 -0.1180*** -0.1019*** -0.0250
(0.0164) (0.0132) (0.0174) (0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0184)
High Index * t 0.0187 0.0021 -0.0698*** 0.0697 0.0287 -0.0422
(0.0216) (0.0171) (0.0232) (0.0430) (0.0270) (0.0272)
Constant 39.8746*** 44.9661*** 44.3864*** 40.1727*** 45.0066*** 43.5932***
(0.6365) (0.4649) (0.9950) (0.5512) (0.4394) (1.0307)
Observations 4945745 7384674 4424008 4976773 7463390 4519556
R-squared 0.2468 0.1972 0.1667 0.2463 0.1972 0.1719
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.4 Non-routine manual personal
Definition of Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
Table C.10: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
High Index -3.1303*** -0.9984** -0.5236 -0.5120
(0.5991) (0.4760) (0.4660) (0.4615)
t -0.1036*** -0.0850*** -0.0860*** -0.0878***
(0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0112) (0.0108)
High Index*t -0.0171 0.0140 0.0411** 0.0267
(0.0267) (0.0225) (0.0208) (0.0198)
Constant 39.3242*** 39.3638*** 42.3381*** 41.3666***
(0.4231) (1.1248) (0.7431) (0.5124)
Observations 21831786 16959719 16959719 16959719
R-squared 0.0132 0.1462 0.1705 0.1932
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No Yes Yes No
Sector FE No No Yes No
Country-Sector FE No No No Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
0.9∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.11: Age and gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours per worker
—–Age—– —–Gender—–
younger older female male
High Index -1.0136** -1.6268** -0.7760 0.1131
(0.4987) (0.6999) (0.6304) (0.3008)
t -0.0910*** -0.0581*** -0.0863*** -0.0865***
(0.0120) (0.0114) (0.0149) (0.0120)
High Index * t 0.0035 0.0477 0.0510* -0.0299*
(0.0205) (0.0332) (0.0268) (0.0170)
Constant 40.8567*** 50.2047*** 35.0262*** 42.1684***
(0.6234) (1.9759) (0.8779) (0.5394)
Observations 3794069 2228632 7846974 9112745
R-squared 0.1140 0.1396 0.1416 0.0971
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-
sector level. Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy
interview, marital status. Industry controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy
that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index. Sample
is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table C.12: Education and full-time/part-time status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hours per worker
——-Education——- ——Status——
low mid high FT PT
High Index 0.1550 -0.4186 -1.0393* -0.3378 0.0239
(0.5415) (0.3101) (0.5302) (0.2438) (0.4780)
t -0.1145*** -0.1026*** -0.0248 -0.0378*** 0.0189
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0182) (0.0108) (0.0120)
High Index * t 0.1034*** 0.0644*** -0.0634** -0.0088 0.0380
(0.0316) (0.0217) (0.0260) (0.0127) (0.0274)
Constant 40.0030*** 44.7952*** 43.4015*** 53.1620*** 10.9220***
(0.5262) (0.4017) (1.0088) (0.5503) (0.8640)
Observations 4976773 7463390 4519556 13555103 3356901
R-squared 0.2474 0.1967 0.1683 0.1465 0.1369
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th
percentile for the index. Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1992-2016.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.5 Country-level results
Table C.13: Country results - coefficient on interaction term only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NRCA NRCP RC RM NRMP NRMI Off
AT 0.0511***−0.0303*** 0.0360*** 0.0061* 0.0733***−0.0560*** −0.0699***
BE 0.0867*** 0.0825***−0.0355***−0.0811***−0.0146***−0.0535*** −0.0631***
DE 0.0051 −0.0686*** 0.0465***−0.1990***−0.0538*** 0.0713*** −0.1150***
DK −0.0627***−0.0344***−0.0217***−0.0947*** 0.0248*** 0.0417*** −0.1120***
ES 0.1070*** 0.0097*** 0.0136***−0.0520*** 0.0250***−0.1010*** −0.0401***
FI 0.0005 −0.0791*** 0.0390***−0.0166** 0.0411***−0.0129* −0.0366***
FR 0.1020*** 0.1020***−0.0320***−0.1390***−0.0383***−0.0062* −0.0654***
GR 0.0569*** 0.0257*** 0.0636***−0.0397***−0.0292*** 0.0031 0.0222***
IE 0.1120*** 0.0238*** 0.0259***−0.0658***−0.0420***−0.1360*** 0.0979***
IT 0.1660*** 0.1080*** 0.0390***−0.1020***−0.0143***−0.0447*** −0.0417***
LU 0.0072 −0.0358***−0.0061 −0.0099* 0.0292***−0.0879*** 0.0172***
NL 0.0306***−0.0416***−0.0464***−0.1650***−0.1150*** 0.0242*** 0.0033
PT 0.1330*** 0.1020*** 0.0520***−0.1430***−0.0712*** 0.0405*** 0.0227***
SE −0.0282***−0.1010***−0.0110***−0.0823***−0.0085*** 0.0038 −0.0552***
UK −0.1090***−0.0763*** 0.0088***−0.1750***−0.1130*** 0.0972*** −0.0450***
All regressions weighted with EU-LFS weights, and standard errors clustered at country-sector level.
Demographic controls: age, educational level, sex, size of firm, proxy interview, marital status. Industry
controls are 1 digit NACE. The coefficient is from the interaction term of the High Index with the trend.
High Index is a dummy that takes value 1 if the occupation is above the 66th percentile for the index.
Sample is individuals working non-zero hours in EU-15 countries from 1998-2016.
NRCA=Non-routine cognitive analytical, NRCP=Non-routine cognitive personal, RC=Routine cognitive,
RM=Routine manual, NRMP=Non-routine manual - physical, NRMI=Non-routine manual - personal,
Off=Offshorability
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
